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Abstract
Publish/Subscribe systems hold strong assumptions of the expected behaviour of clients
and routers, as it is assumed they all abide by the matching and routing protocols. As-
sumptions of implicit trust between the components of the publish/subscribe infrastructure
are acceptable where the underlying event distribution service is under the control of a
single or multiple co-operating administrative entities and contracts between clients and
these authorities exist, however there are application contexts where these presumptions
do not hold. In such environments, such as ad hoc networks, there is the possibility of
selfish and malicious behaviour that can lead to disruption of the routing and matching
algorithms.
The most commonly researched approach to security in publish/subscribe systems is
role-based access control (RBAC). RBAC is suitable for ensuring confidentiality, but due
to the assumption of strong identities associated with well defined roles and the absence of
monitoring systems to allow for adaptable policies in response to the changing behaviour
of clients, it is not appropriate for environments where: identities can not be assigned to
roles in the absence of a trusted administrative entity; long-lived identities of entities do
not exist; and where the threat model consists of highly adaptable malicious and selfish
entities.
Motivated by recent work in the application of trust and reputation to Peer-to-Peer
networks, where past behaviour is used to generate trust opinions that inform future trans-
actions, we propose an approach where the publish/subscribe infrastructure is constructed
and re-configured with respect to the trust preferences of clients and routers. In this thesis,
we show how Publish/Subscribe trees (PSTs) can be constructed with respect to the trust
preferences of publishers and subscribers, and the overhead costs of event dissemination.
Using social welfare theory, it is shown that individual trust preferences over clients and
routers, which are informed by a variety of trust sources, can be aggregated to give a
social preference over the set of feasible PSTs. By combining this and the existing work
on PST overheads, the Maximum Trust PST with Overhead Budget problem is defined
and is shown to be in NP-complete. An exhaustive search algorithm is proposed that is
shown to be suitable only for very small problem sizes. To improve scalability, a faster
tabu search algorithm is presented, which is shown to scale to larger problem instances
and gives good approximations of the optimal solutions.
The research contributions of this work are: the use of social welfare theory to provide
a mechanism to establish the trustworthiness of PSTs; the finding that individual trust is
not interpersonal comparable as is considered to be the case in much of the trust literature;
the Maximum Trust PST with Overhead Budget problem; and algorithms to solve this
problem.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Given the scalability of the Internet and online services, it is common for users to interact
with others who are unknown to them. Such interactions are at greater risk of failure due
to the increased likelihood of malicious and selfish behaviour. Consider an online auction
system where a buyer must decide if he wishes to enter into an agreement to purchase
an item from a seller, but has not conducted any transactions with him in the past. The
buyer is clearly unable to reach an informed decision on the reputation of the seller and
consequently it may choose not to trust it. In the absence of information on the past
behaviour of the seller, it may be able to make use of indicators, such as attributes of
the item’s textual description that is provided by the seller to determine if it should place
its trust in the seller. For some individuals this may be sufficient for a transaction to
proceed, while for others it may not. In the absence of trust in an online auction system,
the number of high-value transactions that take place will be greatly reduced, as users’
perceived risk will be too great.
The use of reputation systems is a widely adopted approach to addressing the issue of
the absence of trust between users of Internet services (Resnick et al., 2000). These sys-
tems utilise the past behaviour of entities to determine their reputation and consequently
their trustworthiness, which can then be used by users to determine the risk entailed in
future interactions with others. A reputation system consists of three components (Marti
and Garcia-Molina, 2006): information gathering; scoring and ranking; and response. Fol-
lowing on from the online auction example given above, a reputation system would gather
information by requesting that users provide feedback on transactions, with positive and
negative feedback aggregated to give a score for each user that would then be used by
2others to decide upon the risk entailed in future transactions. Aside from the disincentive
of being ostracised due to poor reputation, incentives could be introduced by the service
provider to encourage good behaviour. An area in which there has been significant re-
search in the use of reputation management is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. A number of
reputation systems have been proposed to address the issues of malicious and selfish be-
haviour (Kamvar et al., 2003) (Xiong and Liu, 2004), such as the distribution of corrupted
files and freeloading, respectively. Another example of the use of reputation to secure a
system is CONFIDANT (Buchegger and Le Boudec, 2004), which secures mobile ad hoc
network (MANET) routing by monitoring the routing behaviour of nodes and using this
information as input to a Bayesian trust model. Paths consisting of untrusted nodes are
ignored at the path selection stage of routing and requests for routes from untrusted nodes
are dropped.
Trust is not restricted to individuals and agents, non-atomic structures can also be
trusted. To say that one trusts the government to govern the state implies that the
one sufficiently trusts the governance provided by the components of government. For
the British government, these are: the Sovereign; the Crown; the Cabinet; the Privy
Council; and the Civil Service. The same is also true when one says that we trust society1,
however as it is not well defined, it is much harder to determine its components. To date,
computational trust models have not addressed composite trust, that is trust in an entity
as a function of the trust of its components, and yet it is central to following question, do
users trust the network? A network consists of inter-connected nodes of various types, all
responsible for the execution of various algorithms to ensure reliable, efficient and when
required, secure communications. Interactions take place within the network and not with
it, so it is reasonable to assume that if a node trusts a network of which it is a member,
then it trusts the other nodes to implement their roles and responsibilities correctly. Each
node will have a preference over the set of feasible network topologies, which is informed
by its trust of the nodes and paths for each topology. The preferences of nodes may be in
conflict, but despite this, they must all be aggregated to yield a single, socially acceptable
preference over the network topologies. This must be done in a manner that is as equitable
as possible unless some policy dictates otherwise.
The motivation for trusted network structures is that the risk posed by malicious and
selfish nodes is reduced, as their presence is minimised or eradicated from the network.
The construction of trusted networks and more specifically trusted publish/subscribe trees
1This is of course under the assumption that it exists, which would contradict a former British Prime
Minister.
3is the crux of this thesis. The motivation for the choice of publish/subscribe is given in
the remainder of this section.
Publish/Subscribe is a communication paradigm where events generated by producers
are delivered to interested consumers. A publish/subscribe system consists of publishers,
subscribers and an event notification service of brokers whose responsibility is to facil-
itate event dissemination from publishers to interested subscribers. A subscriber issues
a subscription that expresses its interests to the event notification service. Publishers
submit events to the event notification service, which are delivered to subscribers who
have issued matching subscriptions. The event notification service is responsible for the
following: the matching of subscriptions and notifications; and the routing of notifications
from publishers to those subscribers where notifications and subscriptions match.
The primary advantage of publish-subscribe over other forms of network communica-
tion models such as the client-server model is decoupling (Eugster et al., 2003), which is
defined along the following three dimensions:
• Time - Publishers and subscribers do not need to be participating in the interaction
at the same time. Events may be published when some subscribers are disconnected
and events may be received by subscribers when the publisher is disconnected.
• Space - Publishers and Subscribers need not be aware of one another. Publishers
push events to subscribers using the event notification service without the need for
the identifiers of the subscribers. Subscribers do not require the identities of pub-
lishers in order to receive events that they issue. Space decoupling gives a degree of
sender and receiver anonymity, as only the brokers to which the subscribers and pub-
lishers are connected will be able to associate their identity with their subscriptions
and notifications, respectively.
• Synchronisation - Publish/Subscribe communication is asynchronous. Publishers
do not block when pushing notifications as no acknowledgement is required from the
subscriber. Subscribers can be notified using callback of the arrival of an event of
interest.
It is this decoupling that makes publish/subscribe advantageous for a number of applic-
ations, such as real-time sports scores distribution2, stock quotations services and online
auctions. The drawback to this decoupling, particularly the space decoupling, is that there
2http://www.research.ibm.com/distributedmessaging/gryphon.html
4is a restriction on accountability and consequently there is the potential for a number of
security issues and also difficulties in addressing them.
Although there has been little research in identifying and understanding the secur-
ity vulnerabilities of publish/subscribe systems, a taxonomy of denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks (Wun et al., 2007) and confidentiality issues (Wang et al., 2002) have been presen-
ted. Typically, designers of event-based notification services have assumed that implicit
trust exists between clients, clients and the event notification service, and the components
of the event notification service. Where this assumption is relaxed, the research emphasis
has been on the use of Role-based Access Control (RBAC) (Belokosztolszki et al., 2003)
(Pesonen et al., 2006) (Pesonen et al., 2007), and matching and routing algorithms us-
ing encrypted notifications and subscriptions (Li et al., 2004) (Srivatsa and Liu, 2005)
(Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006) to address the trust issues. One significant disadvantage
of RBAC and computing on encrypted data techniques is that both are unable to adapt
autonomously to changes in the behaviour of participants. In these systems, changes in
the trust relationships require the re-keying of encryption functions and for RBAC, the
re-specification of policies.
In this thesis, it is proposed that the publish/subscribe tree (PST) - the tree topology
used for event dissemination - is constructed and reconfigured when necessary with respect
to both the trust preferences of the publishers and the subscribers, and the communication
overhead costs. A trusted PST minimises the risk posed by selfish and malicious nodes by
attempting to eliminate them from the network, whilst ensuring that efficient communic-
ation may take place. Should any changes in behaviour by nodes of a PST be observed
by a monitoring service, the PST can be reconfigured to reflect the updated reputation
of the nodes. As noted above, this adaptation to changing behaviour in existing security
systems for publish/subscribe is complex.
The use of trusted PSTs for event dissemination is suitable for a number of application
areas. Where there is an absence of long-lived identities or administrative entities respons-
ible for the publish/subscribe infrastructure, the use of RBAC is not feasible and there is
an increased risk from malicious and selfish behaviour. Examples of such environments are
publish/subscribe applications in MANETs and publish/subscribe based Internet routing.
In addition to publish/subscribe in MANETs, other application areas that are suitable
for RBAC and confidential publish/subscribe may also be suitable for the use of trusted
PSTs. For real time publish/subscribe systems, such as air traffic control data distribution
services, trust is a function of quality of service (QoS). In these systems, the PST can be
5constructed and reconfigured to maximise trust and consequently performance. With
respect to air traffic control, an area control centre (ACC) can publish radar data using
a trusted PST to other ACCs, where the publishing ACC is the root and subscribing
ACCs are the terminal nodes. The internal nodes of the PST are those of the event
distribution service (e.g. EuroControl’s Radar Network3) that may consist of brokers
under the responsibility of one or many organisations.
The emphasis of the research presented in this thesis is the trust evaluation function
for PSTs and algorithms to find the PST with the greatest trust subject to some overhead
communication budget. Monitoring of PSTs, a component of any reputation system, is
discussed at the end of this thesis as an avenue for future research.
1.2 Research Contributions
Although the use of trust and reputation in P2P applications and ad hoc routing is one of
the inspirations for this research, the application of trust is rather different in those con-
texts. In P2P applications, trust is typically used to determine if one-to-one transactions
should take place, for example file transfers. Here, rather than use trust to determine if
interactions should occur, the objective is to create a trusted network structure, that is a
PST that is trusted by the publisher and its subscribers.
Trust is a mental state and is likely to differ across individuals, as each will use dif-
ferent trust sources combined with their own individual personality traits (captured by
an individual’s trust evaluation function) to come to a trust evaluation of some entity.
More often than not, the trust preferences of publishers and subscribers will differ, so
how can individuals’ preferences over some set of feasible PSTs be aggregated to single
ordering that appeases the desires of all the relevant entities? Fortunately, aggregation of
individual preferences is the core research issue of social welfare and choice theory (Arrow
et al., 2002) and concepts from this field are used extensively to address this issue. In the
absence of policies that prioritise the trust preferences of some subset of nodes over others,
it is evident to ask how the individuals’ trust preferences can be fairly aggregated to a
single social trust preference. A utilitarian approach is rejected, as it is shown by example
that this can punish those that have little trust in the socially chosen PST. Instead, rather
than appease the majority, the motivation for the proposed aggregation function is Rawls’
principles of justice (Rawls, 1971), in particular the difference principle that states that
social and economic inequalities satisfy the condition that they are to be to the greatest
3http://www.eurocontrol.int/surveillance/public/standard page/sur SDDS.html
6benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Of course, there are philosophical
argument for and against each approach, but we argue that a PST that results in great
risk to one node and little risk to others is not preferable to one where the risk to the least
well off is reduced at the expense of others. The leximin social welfare functional models
Rawls’ difference principle and an analytical form of the functional (Yager, 1997) is used
to aggregate individuals’ trust preferences over PSTs.
The use of the leximin social welfare functional to aggregate individuals’ trust functions
raises an important issue that has been neglected in many computational trust models.
If trust is considered to be cardinal, as is required for the trust maximisation problem
addressed in this thesis, then it must be inter-personal comparable. It is argued that trust
is not inter-personal comparable, unless the unrealistic assumption is made that individuals
determine the trustworthiness of others in the same manner. It is an assumption that is
reluctantly made in this work, but it is hoped that this neglected research issue will be
considered by designers of future computational trust models.
Aside from the issue of aggregating individuals’ trust preferences over a set of feasible
PSTs, there remains the problem of how publishers and subscribers can determine the
trustworthiness of a PST. It seems logical to assume that one’s trust in the PST is given
by the relationships that exist between it and other nodes in the tree, that is an individual
trust evaluation of a PST is a function of the trust of some subset of paths in the PST
of which it is an endpoint. The communication paths for a node in a PST are dependent
upon its role and its depth. For the publisher, the paths that must be considered are
the paths to each subscriber. For subscribers that are terminal nodes, the only path of
interest is that to the publisher, but for an internal node subscriber, not only the path
to the publisher must be evaluated but also the paths to each descendant node that is a
subscriber. Individual PST trust evaluation functions for publishers, internal subscribers
and terminal subscribers are defined. There is, to the best knowledge of the author,
no existing work that addresses the issue determining the trustworthiness of a network
structure.
Having proposed a mechanism to determine the trustworthiness of PSTs, the question
of finding the PST that maximises trust within some overhead budget can be addressed.
The problem is defined and shown to be in NP-complete, so an exhaustive search approach
can not be expected to scale to large problem instances. Instead, a tabu search algorithm
is proposed that has greater scalability than the exhaustive search. The quality of the
solutions found by the tabu search are evaluated and shown to be good approximations of
7the optimal solutions. Running times are shown to be superior to those of the exhaustive
search except for very small problem sizes.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 consists of two parts: an introduction to PSTs; and a discussion of the security
issues in publish/subscribe systems and various approaches to addressing them. The PST
preliminaries include the definition of a PST and the overhead metric that are used in
the remainder of the thesis. Existing approaches to the minimum overhead PST problem
are also reviewed. The second part of the chapter covers publish/subscribe security, both
the security issues and proposed solutions to address them. The surveyed approaches
can be classified as being of either access-control or computing on encrypted data based.
A number of limitations to these approaches are highlighted and justify the need for an
adaptive trust based mechanism to address security challenges.
Chapter 3 begins with a predominantly mathematical introduction to social welfare
theory. Only the necessary prerequisites are presented with particular emphasis on the
leximin social welfare functional and inter-personal comparability, both central to the PST
trust function that is defined later in the chapter. Following on from the social welfare
theory preliminaries, a trust evaluation function for PSTs is defined, which gives a socially
acceptable ordering over a set of feasible PSTs that maximises the trust in the PSTs held by
the least trusting. As the function is a leximin social welfare functional it requires inter-
personal comparability of utilities, in this case trust. We argue that the inter-personal
non-comparability of trust has been disregarded in existing computational trust models,
and we present a number of assumptions to address this issue for the proposed approach.
Having devised a mechanism to evaluate the trustworthiness of a PST, the maximum
trust PST with overhead budget problem is defined and approaches to solve it are presented
in chapter 4. Although the problem is shown to be in NP-complete, an exhaustive search
algorithm is presented, followed by an algorithm that uses the tabu search metaheuristic.
An evaluation of the proposed algorithms is given in chapter 5. Three problem sets are
defined where the problems increase in complexity with the number of vertices and edges
in the connectivity graph. The mathematical methods used to generate these sets are also
described. The exhaustive search algorithm is used to determine the optimal solutions
for problems of low complexity only, as it does not scale to larger problems, which is
to be expected given that the problem is in NP-complete. Solutions found by the tabu
search algorithm under various configurations are compared to the optimal solution where
8available. The results of the evaluation are as expected: the tabu search algorithm scales to
larger problem instances than the exhaustive search; and the tabu search algorithm finds
the optimal solution for the majority of problems in execution times that are comparable
to those of the exhaustive search algorithm for problems of considerably less complexity.
In chapter 6, the thesis concludes with a summary of the research contributions. A
discussion of avenues for future research is also given.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
The concept of publish/subscribe was originally proposed for the implementation of group
inter-process communication in the System V kernel (Cheriton and Zwaenepoel, 1985),
while the news service of ISIS2 by Frank Schmuck (Birman and Joseph, 1987) is the
first documented implementation of a topic-based publish/subscribe system (definition 1).
Since these initial developments, a great deal of research on publish/subscribe systems
has been conducted. The most notable research developments are the evolution of pub-
lish/subscribe data models from topic-based to the more expressive content-based model
(definition 2) (Rosenblum and Wolf, 1997) and the decentralisation of event distribution
architectures (Cugola et al., 2002) (Carzaniga et al., 2001). More recently, the emphasis
of publish/subscribe research has been on its application in mobile environments (Cugola
and Jacobsen, 2002) (Meier and Cahill, 2002) (Caporuscio et al., 2003) (Fiege et al., 2003),
the use of P2P architectures for the implementation of the event distribution architecture
(Pietzuch and Bacon, 2002) (Gupta et al., 2004) (Triantafillou and Aekaterinidis, 2004)
(Baldoni et al., 2005) (Zhu and Hu, 2005) (Choi and Park, 2006) and optimisation of the
content-based routing and matching algorithms (Fabret et al., 2001) (Carzaniga and Wolf,
2003) (Muhl et al., 2003). An introduction to publish/subscribe is given by Eugster et al.
(Eugster et al., 2003).
Definition 1 (Topic-Based Publish/Subscribe). In topic-based publish/subscribe, each
publisher publishes each of its events to a topic or subject, while a subscriber subscribes
to a topic to receive all events published to it. This scheme typically utilises either flat-
addressing or hierarchical-addressing of topics. Flat-addressing subdivides the event space
into disconnected subspaces. Hierarchical-addressing allows for a structured topic-space,
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where a subscription to a topic in the hierarchy also implies a subscription to all sub-topics.
Definition 2 (Content-Based Publish/Subscribe). Content-based publish/subscribe ad-
dresses the lack of expressiveness of the topic-based model by defining a subscription as a
function over the event’s content. The cost of this expressiveness is that as the subscrip-
tion complexity increases, the message state and processing complexity at broker nodes
which must perform content-based matching and routing.
The publish/subscribe literature presented and discussed in this chapter covers the two
areas that are most relevant to the research presented in this thesis: publish/subscribe
trees as described by Huang and Garcia-Molina (Huang and Garcia-Molina, 2003), that
is an event-distribution topology where there is no concept of a broker network with
clients external to it, but instead a tree spanning the publisher and its subscribers where
brokers and subscribers may be internal nodes that are responsible for routing notifications;
publish/subscribe security with particular emphasis on the two types of solutions to various
security issues described in (Wang et al., 2002), computing on encrypted data and access
control.
2.2 Publish/Subscribe Trees
Publish/Subscribe Tree (PST) construction with respect to overhead costs was considered
by Huang and Garcia-Molina in the context of publish/subscribe in wireless ad hoc net-
works (Huang and Garcia-Molina, 2003). They proposed an overhead metric for PSTs
and the SHOPPARENT algorithm to construct a PST. Their work makes the simplifying
assumption that there need only be one tree spanning the connectivity graph where any
node can publish an event by routing it to the root of the tree, which then distributes it
to the subscribers.
The SHOPPARENT algorithm adopts a greedy approach to the construction of the
least overhead PST by having each node periodically search for a parent that reduces the
overhead at that node. The algorithm allows for the mobility of nodes by using beacon
messages to inform nodes of potentially better parents that have moved within range
and to notify descendant nodes in the PST of loss of connectivity due to node failure
or movement of the parent to some other part of the connectivity graph. Although the
SHOPPARENT algorithm solves a different problem to the one addressed in this work,
the overhead metric is used as defined by the authors and is discussed futher in section
2.2.2.
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2.2.1 Publish/Subscribe Tree Roles
Each node in a PST may assume only one of three roles: publisher; subscriber; and
router. As there may be many advertisements from many publishers at a given time and
each advertisement is associated with a unique PST, it is important to note that a node
may assume different roles in different PSTs. For example, in one tree a node may be
a router that facilitates the operation of the event routing and matchmaking, while in
another PST it is the root publishing events. The role of a node is always specified within
the context of a given PST, TAp = (VAp , EAp). These roles can be defined as:
Definition 3 (Publisher Role). The publisher, p, issues an advertisement Ap. The PST,
TAp , for Ap, is rooted at p. p propagates events matching Ap on this tree to the routers
and subscribers in TAp .
Definition 4 (Subscriber Role). The set of all subscribers is S such that S ⊆ V . S = V
is possible due to the multiple roles a node may assume in different PSTs. A node is a
subscriber if it has one or more subscription functions, S = {v | SFv 6= ∅ ∧ v ∈ V } where
SFv is the set of subscriptions functions held by v. Given a PST TAp , the set of subscriber
nodes in TAp is SAp = {s | sfs(Ap) = true ∧ s ∈ S} where sfs is the subscription function
of s. If a subscriber s is an internal node of the PST, it not only receives events to which
it is subscribed to, but also routes events to descendent nodes.
Definition 5 (Router Role). All nodes in a PST that are neither the publisher nor
subscribers are routers. Their role is to forward events to downstream subscribers and
ensure connectivity to subscribers. The set of possible router nodes for a PST TAp is given
by RApc = V \ (SAp ∪ {p}) where V is the set of vertices in the connectivity graph. The
set of router nodes in the PST TAp is given by RAp = VAp \ (SAp ∪ {p}).
2.2.2 Publish/Subscribe Tree Overheads
Before presenting the overhead metric for PSTs, the following three types of subscription
are defined: inherent subscription; effective subscription; and proxied subscription (Huang
and Garcia-Molina, 2003).
Definition 6 (Inherent Subscription). The inherent subscription si of a subscriber i is
given by its subscription function sfi.
Definition 7 (Effective Subscription). The effective subscription Si of a subscriber i is
given by the disjunction of its inherent subscription si and its proxied subscription s
′
i,
Si = si ∨ s′i.
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Definition 8 (Proxied Subscription). The proxied subscription s
′
i of a subscriber i is given
by s
′
i =
⋃
j=1,...,n Sj for each child 1, . . . , n of i.
Huang and Garcia-Molina (Huang and Garcia-Molina, 2003) define the cost of a PST
T , CT (E), as:
CT (E) =
∑
i
CTi(E) (2.1)
where E is the set of events to be published and CTi(E) is the cost of receiving,
processing and forwarding the events in E at node i of T . The cost CTi at a node i, is
given by:
CTi(E) = (r+ pr) ·ΦE(si ∧¬s
′
i) + (r+ f) ·ΦE(¬si ∧ s
′
i) + (r+ pr+ f) ·ΦE(si ∧ s
′
i) (2.2)
where r is the cost to receive an event, pr is the cost to process an event, f is the cost
to forward the event, si is the subscription function at node i, s
′
i is the aggregation of the
subscription functions of all child nodes (and by recursion, all descendant nodes) of i, and
ΦE(α) gives the number of events from the set E that match the subscription function α.
Huang and Molina go on to show that the equations 2.1 and 2.2 can be simplified
to define the overhead rather than cost. In equation 2.2, the first component of the
sum remains constant for all trees, while for the third component, we can remove the
processing and forwarding constants as these are not overheads since the node has an
interest in these events. For the second component, node i has no interest in these events,
so costs associated with this component are entirely overheads. This gives the following
functions to replace equations 2.1 and 2.2:
OT (E) =
∑
i
OTi(E) (2.3)
OTi(E) = (r + f) · ΦE(¬si ∧ s
′
i) + f · ΦE(si ∧ s
′
i) (2.4)
While Huang and Molina state that it is possible to determine for some applications the
event distribution, E, it can be shown that a priori knowledge of the event distribution
is not required for the implementation of tree construction algorithms with respect to
equations 2.3 and 2.4. By inspection of equation 2.4, nodes with subscriptions not covered
by their ancestors’ subscriptions incur greater overheads on their ancestors than those
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where there is covering. To lower the total overhead at each node, the tree construction
algorithm should attempt to maximise subscription covering in the PST, tending ΦE(si ∧
s
′
i) in 2.4 to larger values and ΦE(¬si ∧ s
′
i) to lower, as greater overheads (r + f) are
incurred with the latter.
Definition 9 (Publish/Subscribe Tree Overhead). Let E be a set of events, r be some
cost associated with receiving an event, f be a cost associated with forwarding an event,
si be the inherent subscription and s
′
i be the proxied subscription. For a PST TAp , its
overhead is defined as OTAp (E) =
∑
i∈VAp OTApi(E) where OTApi(E) = (r+ f) ·ΦE(¬si ∧
s
′
i) + f · ΦE(si ∧ s
′
i).
2.2.3 Publish Subscribe Tree Definition
In this work, a different definition of PST is adopted. For each advertisement, there is a
PST rooted at the publisher of the advertisement. The tree spans all subscribers whose
subscription function matches the advertisement associated with the PST and subset of
router nodes who are not subscribers to the advertisement, but are included in the PST
to facilitate connectivity and reduce overheads.
PSTs are not explicitly defined by Cao and Shen, so the following definition has been
devised. Note that only subscribers may be terminal nodes at any given time in a PST,
as it is illogical to forward events to a router who has no descendants that are subscribers,
as this only increases the overhead cost of the PST.
Definition 10 (Publish Subscribe Tree (PST)). Given an undirected connected con-
nectivity graph G = (V,E), a publisher p such that p ∈ V , an advertisement Ap held by
publisher p, a set of subscribers SAp = {s | sfs(Ap) = true ∧ s ∈ V \ {p}} where sfs is
the subscription function of s, and a set of routers RAp = V \ (SAp ∩ {p}) is the set of
candidate router nodes. A PST TAp for the advertisement Ap is a tree routed at p that
spans all subscribers in SAp and a subset of Rap nodes where all r ∈ Rap can not be a
terminal node of the PST and for all s ∈ Sap , s may be either a branch node or a terminal
node of the PST.
2.2.4 The Minimum Overhead Publish/Subscribe Problem
Following the work of Huang and Garcia-Molina (Huang and Garcia-Molina, 2003), Cao
and Shen (Cao and Shen, 2009) address the same problem of finding the minimum overhead
PST tree, however their approach differs, as they assume that the PST is not a spanning
tree on the connectivity graph, but a Steiner tree that is rooted at the publisher and spans
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its subscribers. With this definition of a PST, the minimum overhead PST problem (see
problem 1) is shown to be NP-complete (see theorem 1). The authors then go on to present
the DSAPST algorithm where each node selects a parent as a function of the hop count
to the publisher and a measurement of the subscription covering provided by the parent’s
subscription i.e. the overlap of the parent’s subscription with the node’s subscription. The
subscription-aware DSAPST algorithm is compared to a multicast subscription-unaware
MAODV1 approach to event distribution, with the former outperforming the latter with
respect to PST overheads and connectivity of subscribers.
Problem 1 (The Minimum Overhead Publish/Subscribe Problem (MOPST)). Given an
undirected connectivity Gc = (Vc, Ec) where Vc is the set of vertices in Gc and Ec is the
set of edges. Find a minimum overhead tree that is routed at r and spans all subscribers
(Cao and Shen, 2009).
Theorem 1 (The Minimum Overhead Publish/Subscribe Problem in NP-complete). The
MOPST problem is NP-complete (Cao and Shen, 2009).
2.3 Publish/Subscribe Security
Much of the content-based publish/subscribe research has focused on the development
of content-based matching and routing algorithms with the aim of increasing both per-
formance and scalability. Until recently, much less attention had been paid to the issues
of fault-tolerance, security, mobility and congestion control. Security in particular has
yet to be fully explored and addressed, with much of the work constrained to addressing
confidentiality through the use of access control mechanisms.
The design of content-based publish/subscribe systems predominantly assumes that
there are implicit trust relationships between clients, clients and the event distribution
service, and between all brokers within the event distribution service. These assumptions
render the consideration of security issues extraneous as there are no malicious participants
and consequently no potential threats. The application context, an event distribution ser-
vice under the control of a single or multiple co-operating administrative entities, and
contractual obligations between clients are just some of the reasons why such assump-
tions can be justified. Should these not hold true, all components of the system become
vulnerable to a number of security concerns.
The security issues in publish/subscribe can be encapsulated into four groups: generic;
1http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-manet-maodv-00.txt
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confidentiality; accountability; and availability (Wang et al., 2002). The generic issues
are similar to those that exist in other network paradigms and additionally they are also
addressable by the use or modification of existing techniques. Authentication, anonymity
and integrity are classified as generic issues. Confidentiality assumes that implicit trust
no longer holds between publisher, subscribers and infrastructure, raising questions as to
how to perform content-based matching and forwarding when publishers and subscribers
trust neither one another nor the brokers with their events and filters. Accountability
addresses the issue of how to ensure subscribers are correctly billed for events they con-
sume. Availability of the system is susceptible to denial of service attacks that may exploit
resource limitations of the clients and brokers, conceptual and theoretical design flaws of
the content-based scheme, and any implementation vulnerabilities. Although Wang et
al. provide an overview of the security issues of content-based publish/subscribe systems,
there is only discussion of existing research that may provide possible solutions and no
novel solutions are proposed.
This section describes the security issues that are specific to content-based publish/
subscribe and relevant to the trust approach that is presented in this thesis, hence the
exclusion of a discussion on accountability. Having described these issues, a number of
proposed schemes are reviewed, which predominantly make use of either access-control or
computing on encrypted data techniques.
2.4 Confidentiality
2.4.1 Definitions of Confidentiality
Definition 11 (Information, Subscription and Publisher Confidentiality). There are three
types of confidentiality in publish/subscribe systems. These are defined as follows (Wang
et al., 2002):
• The infrastructure can perform content-based routing, without the publishers trust-
ing the infrastructure with the content (Information Confidentiality);
• The subscribers can obtain dynamic, content-based data without revealing their
subscription functions to the publishers or infrastructure(Subscription Confiden-
tiality);
• Publishers can control which subscribers may receive particular publications (Pub-
lication Confidentiality);
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The implementation of a content-based publish/subscribe system that respects these
confidentiality definitions requires the infrastructure to perform content-based routing
and matching without access to the plaintext notifications and filters. Information and
subscription confidentiality clearly conflict with content-based publish/subscribe, and this
implies that the only suitable scheme is one where content-based matching algorithms can
be implemented to match encrypted notifications and filters. In some application contexts,
publishers and subscribers will not have complete distrust of the event based service, and
may trust a subset of brokers. This gives the following definitions of information and
subscription confidentiality:
Definition 12 (Confidentiality with Partial Trust of Infrastructure (Notification/Filter
level)). Publisher confidentiality remains the same as in definition 11. Information and
Subscription confidentiality are redefined as follows:
• The infrastructure can perform content-based routing, without the publishers trust-
ing part of the infrastructure with the content. (Information Confidentiality)
• The subscribers can obtain dynamic, content-based data without revealing their
subscription functions to the publishers or untrusted parts of the infrastructure.
(Subscription Confidentiality)
These modified definitions imply the use of trust domains within the broker network,
which can weaken reliability and efficiency of routing. Consequently, the confidentiality
definitions can be further modified to allow distrusted brokers to perform content-based
routing on attributes of events that are not considered confidential. This gives the following
modification:
Definition 13 (Confidentiality with Partial Trust of Infrastructure (Attributes/Attribute
Filter level)). Publisher confidentiality remains the same as in definition 11. Information
and Subscription confidentiality are redefined as follows:
• The infrastructure can perform content-based routing, without the publishers trust-
ing part of the infrastructure with all or some of the content. (Information Con-
fidentiality)
• The subscribers can obtain dynamic, content-based data without revealing some or
all of the attribute filters of their subscription functions to the publishers or untrusted
parts of the infrastructure. (Subscription Confidentiality)
17
2.4.2 Definition of Confidential Content-Based Publish/Subscribe
A formal definition of confidential content-based publish/subscribe is given by Raiciu and
Rosenblum (Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006), which uses definition 11 of confidentiality. An
ideal confidential content-based publish/subscribe protocol is defined by the authors as
one where a broker has no access to plaintext notifications and subscriptions, only their
indices, and so an oracle with access to the plaintext notifications and subscriptions is used
to perform content-based matching that given the indices of a notification and subscription,
returns true if the two match. Any confidential content-based publish/subscribe scheme
must not leak any additional information to the broker. This definition is formalised and
shows that the following properties must hold in such a scheme:
• Notification Security - notification ciphertext indistinguishability is guaranteed.
• Subscription Security - ciphertext representations are distinguishable using cov-
ering, however a stricter threat model may assume that they should not be.
• Notification Unforgeability - the inability of an attacker to forge arbitrary noti-
fications appearing to be valid.
• Subscription Unforgeability - the inability of an attacker to forge arbitrary sub-
scriptions that appear to be authentic.
• Match Isolation - the inability to perform any further computation other than
testing for matching and covering using the oracle.
Raiciu and Rosenblum determine the following five algorithms that are essential for any
confidential content-based publish subscribe implementation as given by their definition:
• KeyGen(t) - given a security parameter t, return a shared key K between a publisher
and associated subscribers.
• IndexSub(K,S) - executed by a subscriber and given its subscription S and key K,
returns an encrypted subscription, Se.
• IndexNot(K,N) - executed by a publisher and given its notification N and key K,
returns an encrypted notification Ne.
• Match(Ne, Se) - returns 1 if Ne ≺NS Se, 0 otherwise.
• Cover(Se1 , Se2) - returns 1 if Se2 ≺SS Se1 , 0 otherwise.
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Raiciu and Rosenblum go on to present a confidential content-based publish/subscribe
scheme that abides by this definition(section 2.6.1.1). Prior to this research, Li et al.
proposed a confidential publish/subscribe scheme using prefix-preserving cryptography
(Li et al., 2004), but it does not guarantee notification security.
2.5 Availability
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is performed by a malicious entity to disrupt legitimate
access to a network service. If the attack is performed by multiple entities, then it is
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. These attacks can vary significantly in
their characteristics (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004) and consequently there are a variety of
mitigation techniques.
Mitigating against denial of service attacks that attempt to reduce the availability
of publish/subscribe systems has surprisingly received very little research attention. A
comprehensive taxonomy of DoS attacks in content-based publish/subscribe systems that
categorises their effects and their properties is given by Wun et al. (Wun et al., 2007).
Using the event-based middleware, PADRES (Fidler et al., 2005), the authors were able
to identify the effects of these attacks, and classify the properties of DoS attacks. While
no solutions are proposed, the authors express the hope that their work will lead to others
instigating further research, however, this does not appear to have been the case.
2.5.1 CBPS Denial of Service Attack Characteristics
The experiments performed by Wun et al. allow the identification of three effects resulting
from DoS attacks: localisation; workload complexity and message state. Localisation
describes the behaviour where an attack that induces heavy load at an external broker
may inhibit propagation of the attack due to very high input queuing delay, and therefore
resulting in internal brokers being unaffected. A publication attack results not only in
input queuing delays at the broker serving the attacker, but also increased input and output
queuing delays at other external brokers with subscriptions matching the notifications
being flooded, in spite of the localisation effect. This property is referred to by the authors
as the transmission of the attack, as it disrupts resources beyond the initial broker node
under attack.
The expressiveness of the content-based model allows for the crafting of notifications
and filters that consist of many attributes or attribute filters respectively, and as these
increase in number, so does the message complexity. The matching of complex notifications
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and filters requires increased processing and memory requirements when compared to
lower ones, so an attacker can take advantage of this by utilising a high complexity attack
workload. As is expected, the authors’ experimental results show that the effects of such
an attack are more significant than ones of low complexity. At an affected broker, the rate
of increase in response times is much greater and the rate of decrease after the conclusion
of an attack is slower. The latter due to the backlogged messages of the workload that
are contained in the input queue of the broker. These messages must be processed by the
broker even after the attack has ended and this leads to a continuing increase in response
time despite the attack having concluded.
In addition to transmission and workload complexity, attackers can also benefit from
the maintenance of state in content-based publish/subscribe systems. Subscription flood-
ing capitalises on the maintenance of filter state at the brokers by injecting malicious sub-
scriptions at a high rate into the infrastructure and consequently increasing the memory
consumption at brokers. The results of a low complexity constant rate subscription flood-
ing attack experiment are given and they show that this attack, when compared to a pub-
lication flooding attack with similar properties, yields a more severe increase in memory
consumption. The impact of the reduction of free memory at the broker leads to an in-
crease in processing time of approximately two orders of magnitude, and consequently
exponential growth in the response time of the broker.
The authors draw a number of conclusions having identified these effects from their
DoS experiments: mitigating solutions might be able to utilise localisation to prevent
attacks; workload complexity can currently be measured by attribute and attribute filter
counts; and attacks taking advantage of message state could be mitigated by limiting the
lifetime of notifications and subscriptions, and the use of policies to manage state. To this,
it should be added that covering can help in limiting the effects of a message state based
attack by not requiring the propagation of covered subscription filters, while merging may
reduce the memory requirements at a broker. Disallowing blackhole advertisements (an
advertisement that covers all subscriptions) and blackhole subscriptions (a subscription
that covers all events) helps to prevent an attacker gain an understanding of the interests
of clients, potentially limiting the number of brokers affected by an attack.
Having discussed these effects, a taxonomy of denial of service attacks in content-based
publish/subscribe is given. The taxonomy proposes six classes of properties for attacks,
these are: exploitation; source; target; propagation; statefulness; techniques; and content-
dependence. The authors used the taxonomy to classify a number of attacks as to be using
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either the stockpiling technique or to be of semantic weakness type. An example attack
using stockpiling would be one where the attacker uses a blackhole advertisement to match
all subscriptions in an effort to cause maximum disruption by a flooding of notifications.
Semantic weakness allows an attacker to utilise theoretical or conceptual design flaws, for
example the SIENA content-based model (Carzaniga et al., 2001) allows for unsubscribe
and unadvertise operations which can be abused by attackers to remove advertisements
and filters that they do not own from the infrastructure.
2.5.2 Solutions to Denial of Service Issues
In addition to attempting to address authentication and confidentiality, Eventguard (Sriv-
atsa and Liu, 2005) implements a number of mechanisms that attempt to address DoS
attacks. The authors identify three types of DoS attacks: flooding-based; fake unsubscribe
and unadvertise; and selective or random message dropping. The use of signatures to pre-
vent the dissemination of fake notifications and the rejection of duplicate notifications
on the input queue are used to mitigate against flooding-based DoS, spam and spoofed
messages.
2.6 Review of Existing Solutions
Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2002) suggest the application and in some cases modification
of existing techniques to address the various classes of security issues. End-to-end and
point-to-point authentication can be achieved by the use of public-key infrastructure.
Computing with encrypted data (Abadi et al., 1987), secure circuit evaluation (Abadi and
Feigenbaum, 1990) and private information retrieval (Chor et al., 1995) (Di Crescenzo
et al., 2000) are proposed areas of interest that may help to provide confidentiality, but no
solutions are given. The authors propose a number of techniques to provide accountability,
including out-of-band solutions such as providing users with decryption keys with respect
to any service level agreements, infrastructure-based solutions such as allowing perimeter
broker nodes to perform accounting and trusted brokers to perform auditing tasks, and
alternatively by the possible use of verifiable secure computation (Gennaro and Micali,
1995). Although many initial ideas and areas of further related research are proposed, it
appears that most of these have not been further explored by the research community. To
date, the key contribution of this work has been to identify and raise awareness of security
issues, and to define confidentiality in the context of publish/subscribe.
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2.6.1 Confidential Content-Based Publish/Subscribe
2.6.1.1 Raiciu and Rosenblum
The definition of a confidential content-based publish/subscribe system has been formal-
ised by Raiciu and Rosenblum (Raiciu and Rosenblum, 2006) (section 2.4.2). Confidential
content-based techniques are proposed for equality, substring and numeric matching. An
implementation based on SIENA and requiring little modification is presented and addi-
tionally the authors claim that their proposed techniques can be implemented in other
content-based event-distribution systems. The basis of the techniques is to implement
content-based matching on encrypted data.
Equality matches are implemented using a pseudorandom function F . A subscription
value S is passed to function F that is keyed with a shared secret key K, i.e. FK(S).
Notifications are encrypted by first passing the notification value to F keyed with S,
then using the returned value as the key for encrypting a uniform random nonce, rnd,
i.e. FFK(N)(rnd). An encrypted notification Ne matches an encrypted subscription Se if
FFK(N)(rnd) = FSe(rnd), so in addition to Ne and Se the only information revealed to the
infrastructure is rnd. Given two subscriptions Se1 and Se2 , Se1 covers Se2 if Se1 = Se2 .
As substring matching is computationally expensive, this motivates the authors to
implement keyword matching, as they believe this to be adequate for most applications.
The mechanisms proposed are an application of those originally devised by Goh (Goh,
2003). Given r hash functions in a Bloom filter (Bloom, 1970) BF , a master key is
K = (k1, k2, . . . , kr) drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}rt where t is some security
parameter, a subscription is encrypted as (Fk1(S), . . . , Fkr(S)). A notification N is en-
crypted by first extracting keywords w1, w2, . . . , wn, then for each keyword wi is encrypted
as if a subscription, (xi,1, . . . , xi,r) = (Fk1(wi), . . . , Fkr(wi)), codification is completed by
setting each bit of the Bloom filter, BF [Frnd(xi,r)] = 1 for each r. An encrypted noti-
fication and subscription, Ne = (rnd,BF ) and Se = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) respectively, are not
matched if for some i to r, BF [Frnd(xi)] = 0. The covering test is identical to that of
equality matching.
Techniques for inequality and range subscriptions are presented that are both based on
the secure index scheme proposed by Chang and Mitzenmacher (Chang and Mitzenmacher,
2005), however they are not without their disadvantages. The inequality operator is not
a function on a pair of real values, but instead an approximation that operates on a pair
(x, y) where x ∈ R and y ∈ D such that D ⊂ R and D must be agreed upon between
publisher and subscribers. This reduces expressiveness and introduces additional coupling.
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The range matching algorithm is an approximation scheme with a trade-off between the
subscription size and matching times against the number of false positives and likelihood of
information leakage. Despite these disadvantages, the techniques are proven to be correct
implementations of confidential content-based publish/subscribe.
Evaluation of these encrypted matching techniques is performed using a modified ver-
sion of SIENA. Inequality matching with and without covering is 1.7 and 3 times more
expensive, respectively. Range matching times similarly see a benefit from utilising cov-
ering, as they are only 3 times more expensive than plaintext compared to 6 times more
expensive without the use of covering. Equality matching times are also six times more on
average than plaintext. Increases in communication overhead are more significant in scale,
with notifications 15 times larger, and subscriptions 10 times larger than their plaintext
representations.
The authors identify several limitations applicable to all confidential content-based
publish/subscribe schemes as defined by definition 11: the “Attack at Dawn” problem;
limited indistinguishability; confidentiality-generality tradeoff; and trust. While the “At-
tack at Dawn” problem can be mitigated using anonymising techniques, the use of a shared
key between publisher and subscriber not only increases the coupling between these entit-
ies, but also requires the assumption that they will not leak it. Determining when a leak
has occurred, its source, and its recipients is non-trivial.
In addition to the issues that are applicable to all confidential publish/subscribe
schemes, there are a number that are specific to the techniques described above. The
content-based model is limited in its expressiveness, substring support is replaced by the
less granular keyword matching, and the inequality tests can only be preformed against
a subset of real numbers, although perfect matching is possible with high space and con-
sequently time complexity. The overhead of the inequality scheme is 2 · l where l is the
size of the dictionary, i.e. number of reference points.
All forms of confidentiality given in definition 11 are met (it is the only work surveyed
that achieves this) and there no longer needs to be any trust between entities with no-
tification and subscription content, however, this is replaced by a trust relationship over
the shared key. Unless a mechanism is devised allow for effective monitoring such that
key leakage can be detected and the access rights of the source of the key revoked, then a
dependence on implicit trust remain.
23
2.6.1.2 Li et al.
Prior to the scheme of Raiciu and Rosenblum, Li et al. (Li et al., 2004) proposed a
confidential publish/subscribe scheme that is based on the premise that interval matching
can be transformed to prefix matching, and that using a prefix preserving encryption
function, notifications and subscriptions can be encrypted and matched in their non-
plaintext form by a broker. As is the case with the Raiciu and Rosenblum scheme, a
shared key between publisher and subscribers is required, however, Li et al. propose some
justification for this by arguing that their scheme is designed for private publish/subscribe
systems with an event infrastructure under the control of a single entity.
An interval [32, 111] using 8-bit binary representation can be transformed to the set
of prefixes, {001∗, 010∗, 0110∗}, an algorithm for which is given by the authors. The
encryption and decryption algorithms for prefix-preserving IP address anonymisation (Fan
et al., 2004) can then be applied to the set of prefixes. Having agreed upon a shared key
K, a pseudorandom prefix-preserving function FK , is used to encrypt the attributes of
a notification, N . A subscriber uses the authors’ interval to prefix algorithm for each
attribute filter, encrypting each using the same pseudorandom prefix-preserving function.
Brokers are able to establish if notifications are covered by subscription filters by matching
the encrypted set of prefixes against the encrypted bits of the notification.
The algorithm is shown to be computationally efficient and in the order of n where
n is the number of bits in the interval, however, this technique leaks information with
the justification given by the authors that it is a necessary trade-off against efficiency.
A malicious entity in the publish/subscribe system given a plaintext-ciphertext pair, can
attempt to ascertain the prefix bits given another ciphertext. The more pairs an entity
is able to acquire, the probability of prefix bits being leaked increases. As a result of
this, notification indistinguishability can not be guaranteed. While the authors go on to
propose the use of different keys for each attribute and time bounded prefix-preserving
pseudorandom function, these only help to mitigate against this security issue.
2.6.1.3 Other work on Confidentiality
The SIENA fast forward implementation2 contains an implementation of confidential exact
matching, but that it is insecure as notification are distinguishable (Raiciu and Rosenblum,
2006). Eventguard (Srivatsa and Liu, 2005) implements confidentiality using per-topic
shared keys for topic-based publish/subscribe systems.
2http://www.inf.usi.ch/carzaniga/cbn/forwarding/index.html
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2.6.2 Access Control
2.6.2.1 Access Control Upper Bound Filters
Miklo´s describes a method to define access control policies on clients’ advertisement and
subscription filters (Miklo´s, 2002). These policies are upper bound filters that use the
covering and strict covering semantics in conjunction with client credentials to define
positive access rights for subscriptions and notifications. Using the SIENA content-based
model, upper bounds access rights for publishers and subscribers can be given by access
control filters that are associated with clients’ credentials. The access control filter only
allow a broker to accept a filter or notification from a client if it is covered by the control
filter and if the control filter is associated with the client’s credentials.
The approach adopted addresses a number of attack scenarios as defined by the author.
Fake advertisements, blackhole advertisements and blackhole subscriptions can not be per-
formed if control filters are appropriately defined by the access control management entity,
and this leads to a reduced risk to stockpiling and message state based attacks. Message
state attacks can be further limited as an attack can not enact a flooding of arbitrary
subscriptions to the infrastructure in an attempt to increase the memory consumption at
brokers. Publisher flooding is also restricted and access violations can no longer occur due
to the use of credentials.
The techniques proposed do not address any form of confidentiality. Clients must
submit their advertisement, notifications and subscriptions to the infrastructure with the
assumption that it can be trusted. A screening technique is proposed that attempts to
provide some form of publisher confidentiality by allowing a publisher to permit subscribers
to only view the notification attributes that are matched by an attribute filter in their
subscription.
2.6.2.2 Scopes
Fiege et al. (Fiege et al., 2004) attempt to address the issue of implicit trust between
publishers, subscribers and infrastructure by defining the concept of scopes which can
be used to map external trust defined by external contracts between entities to the pub-
lish/subscribe system. Scopes allow for the grouping of a publisher and its trusted sub-
scribers, thereby limiting the visibility of notifications to these clients, however, there is
an inheritance relationship between scopes that allows notifications to be propagated to a
super-scope if the scope interface between the two allows this.
An implementation of scopes using REBECA (Mu¨hl, 2002) is described with particular
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focus on the changes required to the routing tables, such that these are split between
scopes, and as a result grouping brokers within the infrastructure in a given scope in
addition to the clients, effectively creating an overlay. A scope join request issued at a
broker is processed by the first broker in the scope, with the reply to the requesting broker
sent on the return path to allow all brokers on it to a create routing table entries for the
scope. All nodes on this path join the scope.
Access control is implemented at the external brokers of the infrastructure. A publisher
submits an advertisement to an external broker along with an attribute certificate3 that
is used as the publisher’s credential. Given the credential, the advertisement is either
discarded if not valid, or propagated within the scope along with an additional certificate,
containing the public key of the publisher, which is used to authenticate subscribers at
external brokers. A subscriber requesting to join the scope, submits its attribute certificate
to the external broker, which verifies the signature of the certificate using the publisher’s
public key. Border brokers ensure that only authorised clients participate in the scope and
ensures through the attributes of the content providers’ attribute certificate that there are
no access violations on publish/subscribe API calls.
The authors address a number of the security issues of scopes. As mentioned above,
the scope can be extended, and the addition of the broker not only adds it to the scope, but
also adds brokers on the path to the scope. These nodes may be distrusted and should not
be included. The proposed mechanism to prevent this is for each broker on the path, from
the joining broker to the broker currently in the scope, to append its attribute certificate
to the request. The broker processing the join request then tests the attribute certificates
with respect to any trust management policies. For those circumstances where the broker
has only distrusted paths to a scope that it wishes to join, tunnelling can be used to create
a connection to it.
The work addresses trust explicitly through the creation of trusted overlays upon the
publish/subscribe network to create a trusted environment for communication. While
the use of scopes does indeed overcome the security issues induced through the implicit
trust assumed by content-based publish/subscribe, scopes reduce the fault-tolerance, as
there is a trade-off between trust and path redundancy of the infrastructure. Application
of the techniques to application contexts where there are no external contracts between
publishers and subscribers is not discussed, however, with the addition of monitoring
techniques and reputation management, scopes could be extended to these scenarios.
3http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt
26
2.6.2.3 Role-based Access Control
Belokosztolski et al. (Belokosztolszki et al., 2003) propose the use of Role-based Access
Control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996) in publish/subscribe systems with the research goal
of implementing security management in the publish/subscribe middleware with minimal
modifications to the publish/subscribe API and its algorithms. The proposed system
implements RBAC on the HERMES event-based middleware (Pietzuch and Bacon, 2002)
using the Open Architecture for Secure Interworking Services (OASIS). RBAC provides
the following three mechanisms (Mu¨hl et al., 2006): restrictions on the interaction of event
clients; trust levels for event-brokers; and encryption of event data to control information
flow in the system on a fine-grained basis.
In confidential publish/subscribe, the assumption held is that the entire infrastructure
is distrusted, however, this is not the case for the proposed RBAC solutions. Instead, the
infrastructure is assumed to be trusted to perform content-based matching and forwarding,
but certain brokers may not be trusted to access all attributes of notifications. Clients
are not implicitly trusted, requiring the use of access control mechanisms at edge brokers.
These trust relationships imply that the strict definition of confidentiality given in 11 is
not met, but instead the weaker form that is given in definition 13.
The RBAC publish/subscribe model assumes that the publish/subscribe model is
defined with respect to type-based publish/subscribe, however, Mu¨hl et al. (Mu¨hl et al.,
2006) state that it supports access control policy specification using notification attributes
and subscription filters. Each client is assigned a credential that is used to determine
its role. Using OASIS, the model allows the event type owner to specify the following
role-based access control policies at the edge brokers:
• Broker-Client Connection Policy - given a client’s credential, it is used to de-
termine if the client should be hosted by the broker.
• Type Management Policy - given a client’s credential, it is used to determine if
the client is allowed to create, modify or remove event types.
• Advertisement Policy - allows the event type owner to restrict the roles that are
permitted to publish matching notifications.
• Subscription Policy - allows the event type owner to define the roles that are
allowed to issue subscriptions for the given event type.
These policies are implemented at the edge brokers. Any client performing an action at
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an edge broker must provide its credentials so that the relevant policy can be used to permit
or disallow the action and ensure that no access violation can occur. For advertisement and
subscription policies, restriction techniques are proposed that transforms an advertisement
or subscription filter to one that is more restrictive. For content-based publish/subscribe
this is defined by an upper bound control filter as described by Miklo´s (see section 2.6.2.1).
Under certain conditions, it is not possible to assume that the infrastructure can be
trusted to access the content of notifications and subscription filters. By assigning brokers
to roles, access to a set of event types and their sub-types can be specified by policies
defined with respect to these roles. The use of a web of trust of X.509 certificates rooted
at the event type owner is proposed to implement this mechanism. The web of trust allows
brokers to ensure that for a given event, it can be forwarded to other brokers that have
been assigned to a role, which is permitted to access the event’s type. It can also be used
by a publisher to ensure that its hosting broker is permitted to accept and propagate its
advertisement.
Belkosztolski et al. (Belokosztolszki et al., 2003) propose that if required, events may
be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping, however, the approach of specifying access control
on event types creates trust domains in the infrastructure, resulting in partitioning that
reduces redundancy and efficiency (Mu¨hl et al., 2006). Pesonen et al. (Pesonen et al.,
2007) propose the implementation of access control using encryption of either event types
or attributes. For event type security, types are associated with a key, and for attrib-
ute security, each attribute is associated with a key. Attribute encryption allows for a
much finer granularity of access control, so brokers can perform content-based routing on
attributes that they are permitted to access. Where the broker has no access rights to
the event contents, routing is performed using the unencrypted event type identifier. The
proposed system uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Nechvatal et al., 2001)
in EAX mode (Bellare et al., 2004), and consequently symmetric key use. A capability-
access model (Pesonen et al., 2006) is used to determine if a broker has been granted
access rights to the encryption keys by the event type owner. As expected, experimental
results show that event throughput is greater with event type encryption than attribute
encryption due to the increased overhead of the latter, but attribute encryption results in
lower hop counts, as more information is available to the broker network for routing.
The use of RBAC in conjunction with publish/subscribe addresses a number of security
issues. Publisher confidentiality can be guaranteed, but the strictest forms of information
and subscription confidentiality can only be met in part. At least some of the infrastruc-
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ture must be trusted so that the content-based matching and forwarding algorithms can
operate correctly, thereby breaching information and subscription confidentiality, but for
many applications this will likely be acceptable. As expected, experimental results show
attribute encryption results in lowered throughput in the infrastructure when compared
to event-type encryption and no encryption, but reduced hop counts against event-type
encryption.
RBAC will not prevent attacks by entities assumed to be trusted, but who have become
malicious, and this is complicated further when trusted clients and brokers sporadically
do not behave as expected. Policies would have to be manually modified by the event
type owners and if encryption is used, keys revoked and reissued to comply with the
new policy and to expel the malicious entity from those that are trusted. To implement
this more successfully, without the opportunity for malicious reporting of misbehaviour,
monitoring mechanisms must be defined whose observations are used to determine the
reputation and trustworthiness of entities which are then used to influence policy. Finally,
the RBAC publish/subscribe model only considers trust relationships between publisher
and infrastructure, and subscriber and infrastructure. Scenarios where brokers do not
trust one another are not considered. These issues are also true for the for scope technique
described above.
2.6.3 Spam
Publish/Subscribe is a many-to-many form of communications where, as is the case with
e-mail, the cost of communication is cheap. This allows attackers to propagate unsolicited
and bogus messages, such as spam and bogus messages. It is this that motivates Tarkoma
(Tarkoma, 2006) to investigate the problem of content-based spam and leads to the pro-
posal of a system that blacklists the public-key identities of publishers and brokers that
disseminate spammers.
Content-based spam can be classified as either inbound or outbound. Inbound de-
scribes unwanted messages in the input queue of a broker that are matched by a filter in
its routing table. Outbound are malicious messages that a broker attempts to not propag-
ate on matching filters. A number of mitigating techniques such as sender verification and
blacklisting are proposed by the author for both types of spam.
With e-mail, endpoints are defined by the unique e-mail address, so an attacker only
needs to have a list of addresses to target to perform the attack. In content-based pub-
lish/subscribe, the endpoints are described by filters and not addresses. Only if a no-
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tification matches a filter will it be forwarded. As a result of the content-based model,
an attacker must be aware of the subscription filters in the infrastructure to maximise
the subscribers who will receive the spam. Should the publish/subscribe API allow it,
blackhole advertisement and subscriptions allow the attacker to learn about the interests
of the clients, where the former can be used to determine all subscriptions at a given time,
and the latter matching all notifications submitted to the infrastructure. Depending on
the structure, an alternative to the blackhole techniques is for an attacker or clique of
attackers to infiltrate the structure of the broker network at particular positions to sample
filters and notifications. For example, in a publish/subscribe system that makes use of
a hierarchical structure the root node would be the optimal position at which to sample
communications.
Tarkoma’s proposed solution to spam is to allow publishers and brokers to be marked
as blacklisted in a blacklist that is implemented using a distributed hash table (DHT).
This requires the use of public key identities issued by a certificate authority, so the pub-
lish/subscribe system must be augmented with not only a DHT, but also public-key infra-
structure. Each advertisement and notification submitted to the infrastructure is signed at
each hop and dropped by a broker if it is signed by a blacklisted public-key identity. In or-
der to ensure that a publisher or broker is not maliciously blacklisted, several observations
of malicious behaviour are required for blacklisting. The author cites two disadvantages
with this solution, the first is that may give rise to network partitioning, and the second
is that the additional calls to the DHT and the verification of signatures can introduce
overheads such as increased response times and larger messages sizes respectively.
As with scopes, the proposed system could be extended with monitoring and reputation
management to provide a more comprehensive solution to ensure trustworthy behaviour in
publish/subscribe. Unfortunately, due to an absence of experimental results, it is difficult
to assess the extent of the potential for network partitioning and the overheads due to
DHT lookups and signature verification.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, the PST preliminaries have been presented, followed by a survey of se-
curity issues in publish/subscribe systems and approaches to address these. The PST
preliminaries include a definition of a PST and the overhead metric that is used in later
chapters. Disadvantages to the various security approaches surveys are identified when
juxtaposed to the proposed creation of a trusted PST, most notably that the systems are
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unable to adapt changes in behaviour of nodes.
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Chapter 3
Trusted Publish/Subscribe Trees
3.1 Social Choice and Welfare Preliminaries
3.1.1 Introduction
Social choice theory is described as being “concerned with relationships between indi-
viduals’ preferences and social choice” (Fishburn, 1973) and alternatively by Suzumura as
“being concerned with the evaluation of alternative methods of collective decision-making,
as well as with the logical foundations of welfare economics” (Arrow et al., 2002). The
latter goes on to state that “as soon as multiple individuals are involved in making de-
cisions for their common cause, one or other method of collective decision-making cannot
but be invoked”. Social choice theory is the study of the specification of preferences, their
motivating utilities, and the aggregation mechanisms of individual preferences to a socially
acceptable preference, all underpinned by concepts from welfare economics.
The history of social choice theory dates back to the late 1700s. Its theoretical found-
ations in collective-decision making begin in 1781 when the Acade´mie Royale des Sciences
published Borda’s positional voting scheme1 (Borda, 1781) and adopted it for the election
of members to the academy from 1780 to 1784 when the voting scheme was attacked by
Napole´on and consequently revoked. As a member of the academy and the First Consul of
the First French Republic, Napole´on2, was not the only detractor of the Borda count. A
fellow member, the Marquis de Condorcet, opposed Borda’s scheme, and so he proposed
an alternative using simple majority pairwise comparisons of all candidates’ rankings and
defined the voting paradox in which social preference may be cyclic despite individual
preferences being transitive3 (Condorcet, 1785). Suzumura cites the Condorcet paradox
1http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k35800/f787
2Membership of the academy was not restricted to scientists.
3http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k417181/f4
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as signalling the requirement for a formal treatment of collective decision making (Arrow
et al., 2002), but it was well over one hundred years later that significant research contri-
butions were made towards this by Arrow with his definition of the social welfare function
and his impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) (Arrow, 1963). Arrow’s axiomatic framework
allows for the analysis and comparison of social welfare functions, and proves that none
can satisfy all of a set of reasonable conditions.
The origin of welfare economics is widely regarded to be the work of Bentham who
proposed that moral actions were those that maximised pleasure as opposed to those that
maximised pain and presented the Felicific calculus (Bentham, 1781) to measure utility.
One property of this calculus is to take into account the number of individuals who obtain
pleasure from the action under consideration. Mill drew upon this to formulate the greatest
happiness principle that is widely described in the literature as “greatest happiness of the
greatest number”4 (Mill, 1863), that is the maximisation of the utility of the majority.
Rather than adopt a utilitarian approach to determining the most trusted PST, the
trust framework prefers a PST that maximises the trustworthiness of the least well-off
node. This method is motivated by Rawls’ principles of justice, and more precisely, the
difference principle (Rawls, 1971). This principle is part of the second principle of justice
and states that social and economic inequalities satisfy the condition that they are to be
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Rawls’ goes on to state
that under these principles of justice, a society would favour a social choice that maximises
the least well-off, the maximin principle. In this work, the leximin social welfare functional
is used, which is an extension of the maximin principle.
Another aspect of social theory considered in this section is interpersonal compar-
ability of utility. There has been much discussion as to whether utility is individually
measurable and interpersonally comparable. Utilitarians supported this view, as it allows
for the maximisation of the utility of a society, but it was later rejected by others and
ultimately so by Arrow in his definition of the social welfare function that assumes prefer-
ences to be ordinal and of incomparable interpersonal utility (Arrow, 1951), and proposing
that “interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is no
meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual welfare”. To
justify this, it is claimed that measurability of utility is meaningless as comparing mar-
4This quote used to describe the principle is from prior work on morals by Hutcheson in Inquiry
concerning Moral Good and Evil, 1725.
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ginal utility differences at different levels of well-being is not possible5. This implies that
Arrow disagreed with Gossen’s first law (Gossen, 1854), commonly referred to as the law
of diminishing marginal utility, which states that the marginal utility (the utility gain or
loss) of the consumption of a unit of service decreases as the supply of units increases (i.e.
the utility gain from the first unit of consumption is greater than the second and so on),
as this assumes the measurability that he postulates is not possible. Robbins argues that
it is questionable that mental states can be measured (Robbins, 1935), as is assumed to
be the case for Gossen’s laws. He proposes that while it is possible to determine if some
individual has a greater marginal utility from one state than another (intrapersonal com-
parability), as one can ascertain this from the subject’s introspection or by observation,
it is not possible to compare the magnitude of satisfaction of different individuals, neither
by comparing the individuals’ introspection nor by observation. This theory contradicts
Gossen’s first law, as it is not possible to measure and compare the marginal utilities of
individuals, and it contradicts interpersonal comparability of utility.
Sen argues that interpersonal comparability of utility is possible using the following
as an example to justify his argument: “We may, for example, have no great difficulty in
accepting that Emperor Nero’s utility gain from the burning of Rome was smaller than the
sum-total of the utility loss of all the other Romans who suffered from the fire” (Sen, 1999).
Clearly such a statement is not rational given the theory put forward by Robbins, but it
is difficult to disagree with it. Sen also urges caution as there is not a one-to-one mapping
between individuals’ utilities in all scenarios (as may be the case in the example of the
burning of Rome), and this leads to his conclusion that utility may be fully comparable,
partially comparable or incomparable. As the social welfare function defined by Arrow
can not consider interpersonal comparability, Sen proposed the Social Welfare Functional
(Sen, 1977). These differ to social welfare functions in that they aggregate individuals’
utility functions to a social preference without making any assumptions as to the type of
the utility function, and allow for interpersonal comparability.
Social choice theory has a long history, but much of the work covered in this chapter and
used to determine the trust metric for publish/subscribe trees is relatively recent. In this
chapter, a predominantly mathematical treatment of social choice and welfare theory is
given that covers social welfare functions, a discussion of cardinal and ordinal preferences,
impossibility theorems and egalitarianism. Social choice theory is a vast domain, so this
5Temperature differences are often given in the literature, as an analogy to support this argument.
Arrow gives the example of a 1 ◦C from 0 ◦C to 1 ◦C having a different impact than of 100 ◦C to 101 ◦C.
We add that the significance is dependent upon the individual.
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review is not complete, and covers only the necessary topics that are required to understand
the formulation of the trust metric for PSTs.
3.1.2 Social Welfare Function
Definition 14 (Preference Ordering). A preference ordering is a binary relation R over
a set of alternatives C that satisfies the following properties:
1. R is complete. ∀x, y ∈ C.xRy ∨ yRx.
2. R is transitive. ∀x, y, z ∈ C.xRy ∧ yRz =⇒ xRz.
The binary relation, R, is a weak order. In order to fully capture the properties of
preference, both preference, P , and indifference, I, are defined in terms of R.
1. xRy (Weak Preference)
2. xPy =⇒ ¬yRx (Strict Preference)
3. xIy =⇒ xRy ∧ yRx (Indifference)
Definition 15 (Society). A society is a set of individuals N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Definition 16 (Profile). Given a society of n individuals, a profile is an n-tuple of pref-
erence ordering, (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) where pii is the preference ordering of the i
th individual
of the society.
Definition 17 (Social Welfare Function). A social welfare function is a mapping F : O →
Π where the domain, O, is the set of all profiles for a society’s n individuals and over the
set of C alternatives, and the co-domain is the set of all preference orderings, Π over the
set C of alternatives.
3.1.2.1 General Possibility Theorem
Arrow originally proposed five reasonable conditions for social welfare functions (Arrow,
1951), however, non-imposition (the social welfare function is a surjective function) and
monotonicity (if an alternative rises in one or more individual preferences, the alternative
will not fall in the social preference ordering) were later replaced by pareto-efficiency
(Arrow, 1963), as the latter can be derived from the two replaced axioms and independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Given the axioms of unrestricted domain, pareto-efficiency,
independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship, Arrow presented the General
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Possibility Theorem, which proved that no social welfare function can satisfy all these
reasonable conditions.
Axiom 1 (Unrestricted Domain). Arrow defines this axiom as “All logically possible
orderings of the alternative social states are admissible”. The domain O of the social
welfare function F is the set of all logically possible n-tuples over the set of alternatives
C.
Axiom 2 (Pareto-Efficiency). For all x, y ∈ C and for each individual i of a society, if
xPiy then xPy.
Axiom 3 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). Let (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) and
(pi′1, pi′2, . . . , pi′n) be two profiles for a society of n-individuals and where each pii and pi′i is
a preference ordering over the set of alternatives C. For all individuals i and all x, y ∈ C,
xRiy ⇐⇒ xR′iy =⇒ xRy ⇐⇒ xR′y. That is the social preference ordering of x and y
are solely dependent on their orderings in the individual preference orderings.
Axiom 4 (Non-Dictatorship). A social welfare function is dictatorial if there is an indi-
vidual i in a society such that for all x, y ∈ C, xPiy =⇒ xPy.
Theorem 2 (Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem). If |C| ≥ 3 then there is no social
welfare function F that satisfies the axioms of unrestricted domain, pareto-efficiency, in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. The above axioms are proved
to be inconsistent.
3.1.3 Social Welfare Functionals
Arrow’s proof shows that the only social welfare function to be of unrestricted domain,
pareto-efficient and independent of irrelevant alternatives is dictatorship. Sen identified
that the absence of interpersonal comparability of preferences as the reason for this, and
as a result, proposed the social welfare functional that mapped profiles of individual util-
ity functions to a social preference ordering (Sen, 1970, 1977). By allowing ordinal and
cardinal comparability, the General Possibility Theorem result no longer applied, however
it is important to note that utility can not always be considered to be comparable.
Definition 18 (Individual Evaluation Function). An individual utility function is a real-
valued function to the set of alternatives C for an individual i, ui : C → R.
Definition 19 (Representable). A preference ordering, R is said to be representable by
an evaluation function u, if and only if ∀x, y ∈ C.xRy ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y).
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Definition 20 (Profile). A profile U is an n-tuple of utility functions, (u1, u2, . . . , un). It
can also be defined as a real-valued function, U : C × N → R|N | where U(·, i) = ui and
U(c, ·) is a restriction of U to c, the evaluation vector of alternative c ∈ C.
Definition 21 (Social Welfare Functional). A social welfare functional is a function F :
U → R where U is the set of all permissible profiles and R is the set of all preference
orderings.
By allowing interpersonal comparability, social welfare functionals need not be dictat-
orial and hold the other desirable properties given by Arrow, thereby avoiding the general
possibility theorem. The leximin social welfare functional used in the trust metric for
PSTs utilises the cardinal full comparability (definition 29). All of the following defini-
tions in the remainder of this subsection can be found in (Sen, 1970, 1977). Definitions 25
to 29 define the various types of ordinal and cardinal comparability for individual utility
functions. Definitions for partial comparability (Sen, 1970) are omitted, as they are not
utilised.
Definition 22 (Set of Individual Real-Valued SWFLs). Let Li be the set of real-valued
social welfare functionals over the alternatives C for individual i.
Definition 23 (Set of all profiles). Let L be the cartesian product,
∏n
i=1 Li (L = U in
definition 21).
Definition 24 (Comparability Set/Invariance Requirement). Let L¯ ⊂ L be a comparab-
ility set if and only if ∀U,U ′ ∈ L¯ : F (U) = F (U ′) where F is a social welfare functional.
Definition 25 (Ordinal Non-Comparability). For all (u1, u2, . . . , un), (u
′
1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n) ∈ L¯,
there is a n-tuple of positive monotonic functions, Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn), such that ∀i ∈
N.u′i = ψi(ui).
Definition 26 (Ordinal Level Comparability). For all (u1, u2, . . . , un), (u
′
1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n) ∈
L¯, there is a positive monotonic function, ψ, such that ∀i ∈ N.u′i = ψ(ui).
Definition 27 (Cardinal Non-Comparability). For all (u1, u2, . . . , un), (u
′
1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n) ∈
L¯, there is a n-tuple of positive affine functions, Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn), such that ∀i ∈
N.u′i = ψi(ui).
Definition 28 (Cardinal Unit Comparability). For all (u1, u2, . . . , un), (u
′
1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n) ∈
L¯, there is a positive real n-vector a and a positive real number b, such that ∀i ∈ N.u′i =
ai + b · ui.
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Definition 29 (Cardinal Full Comparability). For all (u1, u2, . . . , un), (u
′
1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n) ∈
U¯ , there is a positive affine function, ψ, such that ∀i ∈ N.u′i = ψ(ui).
For cardinal full comparability (definition 29), there is a one-to-one mapping between
the individuals’ utility functions, so not only are the units of welfare comparable, but also
their origins, implying that absolute values and differences of utility are inter-personally
comparable. This is not the case for cardinal unit comparability (definition 28), where
the transformation shifts the origin with respect to the individual specific parameter,
ai, so origins are not comparable across individuals. This rules out the inter-personal
comparison of absolute values of utility, but differences of utility are still comparable.
Ordinal full comparability (definition 26) requires that a monotonic function that preserves
the ordering across individuals’ utility functions.
Below, axioms 1 - 4 are redefined for social welfare functionals and the impossibility
theorems with respect to these axioms are presented. Sen proves that no ordinal and
cardinal non-comparable SWFLs can satisfy all the axioms, theorems 3 (identical to the-
orem 2) and 4. By weakening the axioms, that is by removing one of them as a requirement,
or by weakening theorem 3 so that the SWFL is ordinal level comparable, a possibility
arises.
Axiom 5 (Unrestricted Domain (SWFL)). Identical to Axiom 1.
Axiom 6 (Pareto-Efficiency (SWFL)). For all x, y ∈ C and for each individual i of a
society, if ui(x) > ui(y) then xPy.
Axiom 7 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (SWFL)). Let (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) and
(pi′1, pi′2, . . . , pi′n) be two profiles for a society of n-individuals and where each pii and pi′i is
a preference ordering over the set of alternatives C. For each individual i, xRiy ⇐⇒
xR′iy =⇒ xRy ⇐⇒ xR′y.
Axiom 8 (Non-Dictatorship (SWFL)). A social welfare function is dictatorial if there is
an individual i in a society such that for all x, y ∈ C, ui(x) > ui(y) =⇒ xPy.
Theorem 3 (Ordinal Non-comparable SWFL Impossibility). There is no social welfare
function that is ordinally non-comparable and for which the axioms 5, 6, 7, and 8 hold
true.
Theorem 4 (Cardinal Non-comparable SWFL Impossibility). There is no social welfare
function that is cardinally non-comparable and for which the axioms 5, 6, 7, and 8 hold
true.
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3.1.4 Leximin Social Welfare Functional
The leximin social welfare functional captures the definition of the difference principle
by maximising the welfare of the least well-off individual. Unlike the maximin approach,
leximin allows for ties to be broken by maximising the welfare of the n−1, n−2, . . . least-
well off until the tie is broken. In the following definition of the leximin social welfare
functional, pareto-efficiency and non-dictatorship are substituted by the stricter strong
pareto and anonymity axioms, respectively. Either ordinal level comparability or cardinal
full comparability with Hammond’s equity axiom (Hammond, 1976) must be satisfied by
the leximin SWFL. In this work, the latter is used, as the individual utility functions to
be aggregated are cardinal trust functions.
Axiom 9 (Strong Pareto Efficiency). For all x, y ∈ C and for each individual i of a society,
if ui(x) ≥ ui(y) then xRy and if there is an individual i such that ui(x) > ui(y) then xRy.
Axiom 10 (Anonymity). If U ′ is a reordering of U , then F (U ′) = F (U).
Axiom 11 (Hammond’s Equity Axiom). If there is a profile U over a set of alternatives
C, any two individuals m,n ∈ N and any two alternatives, x, y ∈ C, such that um(y) <
um(x) < un(x) < un(y) and ∀i ∈ N \ {m,n} : ui(y) = ui(x) then xRy.
Definition 30 (Leximin Social Welfare Functional). Let i(x) be the ith worst-off indi-
vidual under the alternative x, that is there is a subset M ⊂ N where |M | = i − 1
individuals such that for all m ∈ M , ui(x) ≥ um(x). For any given pair of alternatives
x, y ∈ C, xPy if and only if there is an i ∈ N such that:
1. ui(x)(x) > ui(y)(y); and
2. um(x)(x) = um(y)(y) where m ∈M .
If ∀i ∈ N : ui(x)(x) = ui(x)(x) then xIy.
Theorem 5 (Leximin Properties). Any social welfare functional satisfying axioms 5, 9, 7,
10, 11 and cardinal inter-personally comparable (definition 29) is a leximin social welfare
functional.
3.1.5 Analytical Formulation of Leximin
In this subsection, an analytical approach to the leximin social welfare functional (Yager,
1997) is presented. Rather than implementing the leximin social welfare function as one
of pairwise comparisons, Yager’s defines an ordered weighted average (OWA), Fleximin :
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such that xRy if and only if Fleximin(x) ≥ Fleximin(y), xPy if and only if Fleximin(x) >
Fleximin(y), and xIy if and only if Fleximin(x) = Fleximin(y). The analytical leximin OWA
allows for the specification of a trusted PST maximisation problem where the PST that
maximises Fleximin is the most trustworthy.
Definition 31 (Ordered Weighted Average (OWA)). An ordered weighted average op-
erator F of dimension n is a mapping F : Rn → R that has an associated vector of
weights W = [w1, w2, . . . , wn] such that
∑n
i=1wi = 1 and each wi ∈ [0, 1] and where
F (y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
∑n
j=1wj · zj where zj is the j-largest yi.
Definition 32. (Analytical Leximin Aggregation) The analytical leximin aggreg-
ation operator, Fleximin, is an ordered weighted average where the weight vector W =
[w1, . . . , wn−2, wn−1, wn] is defined as follows:
w1 =
∆n−1
(1 + ∆)n−1
,
wj =
∆n−j
(1 + ∆)n+1−j
for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
If |a− b| < ∆ then a = b. If a > b then |a− b| > ∆.
Theorem 6 (The Analytical Leximin Aggregation is a Leximin SWFL). For all x, y ∈
C, xPleximiny ⇐⇒ Fleximin(u1(x), u2(x), . . . , un(x)) > Fleximin(u1(y), u2(y), . . . , un(y))
and xIleximiny ⇐⇒ Fleximin(u1(x), u2(x), . . . , un(x)) = Fleximin(u1(y), u2(y), . . . , un(y))
where ui(x) ∈ R, ui(x) is the utility of individual i for the alternative x, xPleximiny implies
that x is preferred to y by a leximin social welfare functional and xIleximiny implies that
x is indifferent to y by the same leximin social welfare functional.
Yager does not explicitly discuss inter-personal comparability, but it is clear that it ap-
plies to the analytical leximin aggregation. Definition 24 implies that ∀U,U ′ ∈ L¯ : F (U) =
F (U ′), that is ∀x, y ∈ C : xRy ⇐⇒ ∀(u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ L¯ : F ((u1(x), u2(x), . . . , un(x))) ≥
F ((u1(y), u2(y), . . . , un(y))) and from this xPy and xIy can be defined as in defini-
tion 14 (Sen, 1970). For Yager’s analytical leximin function, the following invariance
must hold true given theorems 6 and 24, xRleximiny ⇐⇒ ∀(u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ L¯ :
Fleximin((u1(x), u2(x), . . . , un(x))) ≥ Fleximin((u1(y), u2(y), . . . , un(y))). However, all ele-
ments of L¯ can not be cardinal non-comparable or cardinal unit-comparable given theorem
5 that states that leximin SWFLs must be cardinal fully comparable, as it would be a con-
tradiction to the invariance requirement.
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3.2 Trust and Publish/Subscribe Trees
3.2.1 Definition of Trust
Trust is “the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely and
reliably within a specified context” and distrust is “the lack of firm belief in the competence
of an entity to act dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context” (Grandison
and Sloman, 2000). Typically, the terms trust and reputation have been considered to
be interchangeable, particularly in the areas of peer-to-peer and mobile ad hoc network
routing. For some applications, this may be a justifiable assumption, as the only trust
source is past behaviour, however other trust sources such as a priori knowledge and
knowledge external to the system may be of value in making a trust judgement. In
the context of publish/subscribe, behavioural history is of too coarse a granularity to be
evaluated as a single property due to an entity’s ability to assume multiple roles within
the system. For example, a node may be a publisher in one tree and a subscriber in
another with differing competences of each role. A trust evaluation function may benefit
by considering the role under which past behaviours occurred.
The sources to determine trust are varied, with their importance to trust evaluation
dependent on the trustor, who may consider some properties to be of more significance
than others depending on the context. Vector-based trust models have been proposed to
represent the properties that determine the competence of an entity within a given context
(Ray and Chakraborty, 2004), a generalisation of which is provided below. Note that no
assumptions are made as to either the properties to be considered or the context, as it is
not of any significance to the PST problems addressed in this thesis and their solutions.
Definition 33 (Trust Vector). A trust vector is a d-dimensional real-valued vector Ληi,j =
[ληi,j1 , λ
η
i,j2
, . . . , ληi,jd ] such that for each λ
η
i,jn
is a real value, each representing a different
property of trust, such as reputation, within some context η. Ληi,j is the trust vector
representing i’s trust opinion of j within some context η.
Definition 34 (Individual Trust Function). For each individual i ∈ N , i has a trust
function τi : Rd → R which is a mapping of trust vectors to trust values. Given a pair of
individuals i and j, a trust vector Ληi,j , τi(Λ
η
i,j) is a real value representing i’s trust in j
within the context η.
Axiom 12 (Consistency of Individual Trust Functions). For each i, j, k ∈ N , if i has
trust vectors Ληi,j and Λ
η
i,k such that Λ
η
i,j = Λ
η
i,k, then τi(Λ
η
i,j) = τi(Λ
η
i,k). If this is untrue
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for some node i, then it is bias and can be determined to be malicious. No external
information other than that from the trust vector should be considered.
Definition 35 (Trust Ordering). For each i, j, k ∈ N , a trust preference ordering can be
defined as follows:
1. τi(Λ
η
i,j) ≥ τi(Ληi,k) =⇒ jRik;
2. τi(Λ
η
i,j) > τi(Λ
η
i,k) =⇒ jPik;
3. τi(Λ
η
i,j) = τi(Λ
η
i,k) =⇒ jIik.
As per Arrow’s definition of preference given in definition 14, R is complete and transitive.
3.2.2 Semiring-based Trust
Theodorakopoulos and Baras propose a semiring-based trust framework that allows users
to determine the trustworthiness of others, even in the absence of first-hand trust inform-
ation (Theodorakopoulos and Baras, 2006). Given two nodes, i and j, the i’s trust in
j is determined by the aggregation of the trustworthiness of the nodes on some path or
set of paths between the two nodes. Their proposed model can be used to express the
a variety of trust models, such as Eigentrust (Kamvar et al., 2003) and the PGP web of
trust (Zimmermann, 1995).
Semirings can not only be used as a framework for trust models, but can also be used to
determine the trustworthiness of paths in some graph, in this case a connectivity graph.
The path trust semiring presented in definition 37 is a generalisation of the path trust
rating used in SPROUT (Marti et al., 2005) and allows an individual i to determine the
trust of the path to some individual j. This differs to the Theodorakopoulos and Baras
framework that gives the trust of the individual.
Definition 36 (Semiring). A semiring (S,⊕,⊗) is a set, S, with two binary operators, ⊕
and ⊗ that meets the following axioms:
• (S,⊕) is commutative semigroup with neutral element 0:
a⊕ b = b⊕ a
(a⊕ b)⊕ c = a⊕ (b⊕ c)
a⊕ 0 = a
• (S,⊗) is a semigroup with a neutral element 1 and an absorbing element 0:
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(a⊗ b)⊗ c = a⊗ (b⊗ c)
a⊗ 1 = 1⊗ a = a
a⊗ 0 = 0⊗ a = 0
• ⊗ is distributive ⊕:
(a⊕ b)⊗ c = (a⊗ c)⊕ (b⊗ c)
a⊗ (b⊕ c) = (a⊗ b)⊕ (a⊗ c)
A semiring (S,⊕,⊗) with a partial order that is monotone with respect to both oper-
ators is called an ordered semiring (S,⊕,⊗,≤):
a ≤ a′ ∧ b ≤ b′ ⇒ a⊕ b ≤ a′ ⊕ b′ ∧ a⊗ b ≤ a′ ⊗ b′
An ordered semiring (S,⊕,⊗,≤) is ordered by the difference relation, or naturally
ordered, if,
∀a, b ∈ S . (a ≤ b)⇔ ∃z ∈ S.a⊕ z = b
A semiring (S,⊕,⊗) is idempotent if the idempotent law holds for ⊕:
a⊕ a = a
For idempotent semirings, the relation defined by:
a ≤ b⇔ a⊕ b = b
is a partial order.
Definition 37 (Path Trust Semiring). The trusted path semiring is a semiring, (S,⊕,⊗)
where S = [0, 1] and ⊕ and ⊗ are defined as:
for all s1, s2 ∈ S, s1 ⊕ s2 = max(s1, s2)
for all s1, s2 ∈ S, s1 ⊗ s2 = s1s2
Example 1 (Example Use of Trusted Path Semiring). Assume the presence of a simple
path σ1 = (e1, e2, ..., en) where n is the number of edges, and the vertices on the path are
given by δ(e1) = {v1, v2}, δ(e2) = {v2, v3}, ..., δ(en) = {vn, vn+1}. Let vertex v1 and vn+1
be the initial and final vertex respectively. Let the trustworthiness of the path σ1 be τσ1
and is determined by the initial vertex to be τ(v1, v2)⊗ τ(v1, v3)⊗ ...⊗ τ(v1, vn+1) where
τ : V × V → S and gives the trust that one vertex has in another, represented by values
from the set S of the semiring. Additionally, given p alternative simple paths from v0 to
vn+1, the most trusted one is given by τσ1 ⊕ τσ2 ⊕ ...⊕ τσp = max(τσ1 , τσ2 , ..., τσp).
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Example 1 demonstrates how the path trust semiring given in definition 37 can be
used to rate the trustworthiness of a path. As stated above, it is a semiring representation
of the reliability path rating metric defined by Marti et al. (Marti et al., 2005). The
metric can be interpreted as the likelihood that a given message is correctly routed to the
destination, as the trust of each node is the probability that the node will execute the
routing protocol as defined. In the context of publish/subscribe, this translates to the
path trust rating being the probability that the nodes on the path correctly execute the
content-based routing and matching algorithms.
3.2.3 Trust Relationships in Publish/Subscribe Trees
The trust definitions provided allow for an entity to evaluate the trustworthiness of oth-
ers, but it does not define how an entity can determine the trustworthiness of a pub-
lish/subscribe tree. To do this, first it is important to understand the trust relationships
between nodes in a PST. These relationships can then be evaluated using the individual
trust functions and aggregated to give a trust value for a PST. Using the confidentiality
and role definitions, the following trust relationships can be identified:
1. Does the publisher trust the subscribers to receive its publications? (from Modified
Publisher Confidentiality)
2. Does the publisher trust the internal nodes (be it subscribers or routers) with its
publications? (from Modified Information Confidentiality)
3. Do the subscribers trust the internal nodes with their subscription functions so that
content-based matching and routing can take place (from Modified Subscription
Confidentiality)
4. Do the subscribers trust the publisher to publish correct and timely publications?
5. Do the subscribers, both leaf and internal, trust upstream nodes to route events to
it correctly?
6. Do the internal nodes, excluding subscribers, trust the publisher, so as to want to
route its events?
7. Do the internal nodes trust the downstream internal nodes on the PST to correctly
route events that they propagate?
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8. Do the internal nodes trust the upstream internal nodes to route events correctly
from the publisher?
9. Do the internal nodes trust the downstream subscribers so as to want to route events
to them?
3.2.4 Trust Evaluation Functions for PSTs
From the list of relationships given in section 3.2.3, trust evaluation is dependent on the
role of the node and its depth in the PST. The definitions below show how the trust of a
PST is evaluated for the publisher, the internal subscribers and the terminal subscribers.
The publisher has a contract to deliver events to each subscriber in the publish/
subscribe tree, so it is logical to conclude that it wishes to maximise the trustworthiness
of each path to the subscribers. The publisher may reject a subscriber’s attempt to join
the tree, that is implement some kind of trust-based access control. The publisher trust
function gives the publisher’s trust value of a PST by aggregating the trust of each path
to each subscriber in the PST. Note that paths to subscribers may share sub-sequences of
vertex and edge sequences, but irrespective of this, each path is evaluated. Additionally,
where the publisher is neighbouring the subscriber, the trust value of the path is 1, as the
subscriber has been trusted to receive events and there is no intermediate path that must
be considered in the evaluation of the path.
Definition 38 (Publisher PST Trust). Let T = (V,E) be a PST, where V = S ∪R∪ {p}
for a publisher p, set of subscribers S and set of routers R, and let α be some aggregation
function, α : R|S| −→ R. For each s ∈ S, there is a path σp,s = {p, . . . , s}, a vertex
sequence with initial vertex p, final vertex s and if |σp,s| > 2, it has intermediate vertices
{v1, v2, . . . , v|σp,s|−2}, and whose trustworthiness is given by:
τp(σp,s) =
 1 if |σp,s| = 2τp(Ληp,v1)⊗ τp(Ληp,v2)⊗ · · · ⊗ τp(Ληp,v|σ|−2)⊗ τp(Ληp,v|σ|−1) if |σp,s| > 2
The trust of T for p is a function of the trust of the paths to each subscriber and is
given by τp(T ) = α(τp(σp,s1), τp(σp,s2), . . . , τp(σp,s|S|)).
Terminal nodes, always subscribers given the PST definition, receive events along a
path sourced at the publisher and with at least one node on the path being aware of its
subscription. Their trust in the PST is determined exclusively by the trust of this path.
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Again, as with the publisher, if the subscriber is adjacent to the publisher, its trust value
of the path to the root is given as 1 because it has expressed a willingness to receive
notifications from the publisher by joining the PST.
Definition 39 (Terminal Subscriber PST Trust). Let T = (V,E) be a PST, where V =
S∪R∪{p} for a publisher p, set of subscribers S and set of routers R. For each subscriber
s ∈ S such that s is a terminal of T and σs,p = {s, . . . , p} is a path in T with initial vertex
s to terminal vertex p and if |σs,p| > 2 with intermediate vertices {v1, v2, . . . , v|σs,p|−2},
then the trust of s in T is given by:
τs(T ) =
 1 if |σs,p| = 2τs(Ληs,v1)⊗ τs(Ληs,v2)⊗ · · · ⊗ τs(Ληs,v|σs,p|−2)⊗ τs(Ληs,v|σs,p|−1) if |σs,p| > 2
For each internal subscriber node, not only does it receive notifications on the path to
the publisher, but it also propagates the notification on the subtree of which it is the root,
but only if the notification matches its proxied subscription. An internal subscriber can
be considered as simultaneously sharing the roles of terminal subscriber and publisher, so
it also shares their associated trust relationships. An internal subscriber’s trust of a PST
is a function of the trust in the path to the publisher and the trustworthiness of the paths
to the subscribers in its subtree.
Definition 40 (Internal Subscriber PST Trust). Let T = (V,E) be a PST, where V =
S∪R∪{p} for a publisher p, set of subscribers S and set of routers R. For each subscriber
s ∈ S such that s is an internal node, there is a path σs,p = s, . . . , p where s is the
initial vertex, p is the final vertex and with intermediate vertices {v1, v2, . . . , v|σs,p|−2} if
|σs,p| > 2. The trust of the σs,p is given by:
τs(σs,p) =
 1 if |σs,p| = 2τs(Ληs,v1)⊗ τs(Ληs,v2)⊗ · · · ⊗ τs(Ληs,v|σ|−2)⊗ τs(Ληs,v|σ|−1) if |σs,p| > 2
Additionally, for each s ∈ S such that s is an internal node, let Ts = (Vs, Es) be the
subtree rooted at s. For each s′ ∈ (S \ s) ∩ Vs, there is a path σs,s′ = {s, . . . , s′} that has
initial vertex s, final vertex s′, and intermediate vertices {v1, v2, . . . , v|σs,s′ |−2}. The trust
of the path σs,s′ is given by:
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τs(σs,s′) =
 τs(Λ
η
s,s′) if |σs,s′ | = 2
τs(Λ
η
s,v1)⊗ τs(Ληs,v2)⊗ · · · ⊗ τs(Ληs,v|σ|−1)⊗ τs(Ληs,s′) if |σs,s′ | > 2
For each internal subscribe node s in a PST T , the trust of s in T is given by τs(T ) =
β(τs(σs,p), τs(σs,s′1), . . . , τs(σs,s′d−1)) where β : R
d −→ R is some aggregation function of
trust values, and d = |Vs ∩ S|+ 1.
In the implementation of this model, the aggregation functions α and β in definitions
38 and 40 are the leximin aggregation function given in definition 32 and the minimum
aggregation function. If d were not variable across PSTs, then β would also be given by
definition 32. Although other aggregation functions such as arithmetic mean could have
been used, this would not have been fitting with Rawls’ difference principle.
Consider two PSTs t1 = (Vt1 , Et1) and t2 = (Vt2 , Et2), and an internal subscriber
s ∈ Vt1 , Vt2 , such that τs(T1) = β(0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.1) and τs(T2) = β(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). If β is
the arithmetic mean then t1Pt2, however, if β is the minimum aggregation function then
t2Pt1. It can be argued that t2Pt1 is a more appropriate trust preference for s because of
two reasons, the first fairness and the second, the increased likelihood of damage to the
reputation of s if the path with trust value 0.1 has a subscriber as its final vertex.
Assuming that in t1, τs(σs,s′) = 0.1 and in t2, τs(σs,s′) = 0.5, then it is evident that
s′ is better off under in t2, as the path to it from s is of a higher trust value. t2 is a
fairer choice and benefits the least well-off, but this comes at a cost to the trust of other
paths. Additionally, in this scenario, choosing t1 over t2 is not wise, as even through
the other paths are of very high trust value, the path of trust value 0.1 is liable to loss
or corruption of events that are re-broadcast to s′ and consequently resulting in lower
reputation feedback of s from s′.
Having defined the individual trust functions for PSTs, the only remaining issue is
how to aggregate these to give a trust value for PSTs. As discussed in section 3.1.1, an
egalitarian approach is rejected and the reasons for this have been illustrated above. The
social ordering of PSTs must improve the well-being of the least well-off with respect to
trust, so it follows that the leximin social welfare functional is used, since it is assumed
that all nodes are to be treated equally and there is consequently an absence of policies
defining a subset of preferred nodes. However, a quantitative measure is required because
the problem to be solved is one of finding the PST that maximises the trustworthiness
of the PST used for a given advertisement, so Yager’s analytical leximin function given
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in definition 32 must be used instead. Unfortunately, its use is not without issue, as it
requires cardinal full comparability and it is, at the least, questionable if trust functions
comply with this property (see section 3.2.5).
Definition 41 (Socially Trusted PST Aggregation). Let t = (Vt, Et) be a PST where
Vt = S ∪ R ∪ {p}. For each i ∈ S ∪ {p}, there is a real-value τi(T ) representing i’s trust
value of t. The social trust value of t is given by Fleximin(τi1(T ), τi2(T ), . . . , τi|S∪{p}|(T )).
3.2.5 Trust and Interpersonal Comparability
There has been much discussion in fields of social sciences and computer science regarding
trust, with a variety of trust definitions, trust evaluation functions and trust metrics
proposed. In section 3.1, a brief overview of social choice theory is given and includes a
discussion of interpersonal comparability. Here, this theory is used to show that individual
trust evaluation functions are interpersonally non-comparable when used to determine
preference over a set of possible PSTs, and can only be interpersonally comparable under
strict conditions.
Assuming that trust is measured as a real value, for trust evaluation functions to meet
cardinal full comparability, as required by the leximin social welfare functional, there
must be a one-to-one correspondence between individuals’ trust evaluation functions. To
assume this is not logical due to the heterogeneous nature of the individuals whose under-
standing of trust and the manner in which trust sources (e.g. reputation from behavioural
history) are evaluated can not only differ given the context, but also given the personal
characteristics of the individual, which can evolve with interactions over time.
Many different trust metrics have been proposed, with some trust management systems
using discrete trust values, and others using real-valued representations of trust. Metrics
classified as the latter are typically represented by the unit interval or [-1, 1] with 0 as the
origin indicating indifference and/or uncertainty, -1 representing absolute distrust and 1
representing absolute trust. It is assumed that trust can be expressed using real values,
but irrespective of the metric chosen, if two individuals i and j have trust opinions 0.5
and 0.75 of two PSTs t1 and t2 respectively, is t2 more trustworthy than t1? It seems
obvious to assume 0.75 > 0.5 =⇒ t2Pt1 for i and j, but this ignores how the two trust
values have been derived. This is a problem of interpersonal comparability. There is also
the issue of interpersonal comparability of differences or comparison of marginal utility.
If τi(T2) − τi(T1) > τj(T1) − τj(T2), is the gain in trust for i when the PST T2 is chosen
instead of T1 greater than the loss (or gain) for j? Due to the complex nature of trust,
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there are arguments against this.
Definition 41 gives the socially trusted PST aggregation, which uses the analytical
leximin aggregation function (definition 32) to define an ordering over a set of PSTs with
respect to each individual’s trust evaluation of the PSTs. As the aggregation function im-
plements a leximin social welfare functional using cardinal individual PST trust functions,
these must be inter-personally comparable given theorem 5. The inter-personal compar-
ability of trust requires that a unit of trust exists and that its definition is shared by
all individuals, and that the origin of the trust continuum used to measure trust at each
individual is identical. Under these criteria, absolute trust values between individuals can
be compared, however it is unrealistic to assume these to be true for trust. An individual
may determine that the values -1, 0 and 1 represent absolute distrust, indifference or ig-
norance, and absolute trust, while another may assume that trust is represented by the
unit interval where 0 represents absolute trust and ignorance and 1 represents absolute
trust. Even if some continuum can be defined such that the definitions of the extremes
and the origin are identical and it can be imposed upon all individuals, there is no notion
of a unit of trust.
Trust can be formed using a number of trust sources, but typically in the literature,
it is a function of reputation, which is in turn a function of past interactions. In a given
application context, such as a P2P file sharing system, users may have different perceptions
of identical behaviour. Some may tolerate corrupted file downloads more than others, and
in this scenario may rate identical transactions differently. For example, in Eigentrust
(Kamvar et al., 2003), a given user i downloads a corrupted file from a user k and rates
the transaction as -1, but a user j may download the same corrupted file from k and rate
the transaction 0, perhaps due to having a higher tolerance of such malicious behaviour
or citing communication errors as the reason for the transaction failure. In this scenario,
i and j interpret the trust sources differently, j is more tolerant of malicious behaviour,
perhaps because the file has less value to it or perhaps because of its characteristics.
Assume that τi and τj are identical and that some origin on the trust continuum exists,
if i and j both hold a trust value of 0.7 in some entity k, the meaning of that value
differs between the two, as their interpretation of the trust sources that is their individual
trust functions are different. Given two PSTs T1 and T2, it is not possible to state that
τi(T1)− τi(T2) > τj(T2)− τj(T1) is true or false, that is the differences in the trust of two
PSTs are not comparable across individuals. It is postulated that trust is inter-personally
incomparable.
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The trust mechanisms described above provide a social preference ordering of the feas-
ible PSTs such that the socially preferred choice maximises the trust of the node with the
lowest trust evaluation of the trees, that is the least well off as implied by the leximin so-
cial welfare functional. Mapping individuals’ cardinal trust evaluation functions to a social
preference ordering using the leximin social welfare function requires that the trust eval-
uation functions are interpersonally comparable, but arguments have been presented that
contradict this. The proposed solution to this issue is to assume that each individual’s
trust evaluation function is identical, along with all other auxiliary functions required,
such as reputation functions (definition 42). This assumption appears to be overly strict
and unrepresentative of the nature of trust. Nodes are considered to homogeneous with
respect to trust evaluation, valuing properties and behaviours of others identically. Trust
values between pairs of nodes would only differ because of different instances of trust
sources used as input to the trust function. Some may consider the following assumptions
to be unreasonable, however they are no worse than the ignoring the issue of interpersonal
comparability of trust, which is currently the case in trust-related literature. A greater
understanding of how trust is derived from the perspective of social sciences and a form-
alisation of this are both beyond the scope of this thesis, but certainly warrants further
academic research.
Definition 42 (Inter-personal Comparable Trust Assumption). ∀i, j ∈ S∪{p} : ∀T ∈ T :
τi(T ) = τj(T ) where T is the set of PSTs for some connectivity graph G. It must also be
assumed that for all i, j ∈ S∪{p} and for all k ∈ V , if Ληi,k = Ληj,k, then τi(Ληi,j) = τj(Ληi,k).
3.3 Summary
The first part of this chapter provides an introduction to social welfare and choice the-
ory, with the emphasis on the following areas: social welfare functions; social welfare
functionals; the leximin social welfare functional; and inter-personal comparability. The
introduction provides only the necessary prerequisites for an understanding of the motiv-
ations of the trust functions that are given later in the chapter.
In the remainder of the chapter, the trust functions for PSTs are presented and the issue
of inter-personal comparability of trust is addressed. The flow of communications in the
PST is used to define PST trust evaluation functions for the publisher, internal subscribers
and terminal subscribers. The individual trust functions give the trustworthiness of the
PST as function of some subset of paths in the PST, which is dependent on its role and
height in the tree. Using the analytical leximin function, a leximin ordering over a set of
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PSTs can be derived by aggregating each individual’s evaluation. As the approach uses the
leximin social welfare function, cardinal full inter-personal comparability is required, but
it is argued that such an assumption for trust is unrealistic, so simplifying assumptions
are proposed to address this. This is an issue that is widely disregarded in the trust
literature.
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Chapter 4
Minimum Overhead-Maximum
Trust PST Problem
In this chapter, the PST trust maximisation problem with overhead budget is defined
and algorithms are presented to solve the problem. As the problem is shown to be in
NP-Complete, two algorithms are proposed to solve it. An exhaustive search algorithm
enumerates all feasible PSTs and selects the one that maximises trust within some overhead
budget. As the problem is in NP-Complete, evidently the algorithm can not be expected to
scale to large problem instances, so a tabu search algorithm is presented that approximates
the solution. Both algorithms are dependent upon a modification to Char’s spanning tree
enumeration algorithm to find all PSTs in a graph, which is also described in this chapter.
4.1 Problem Definition
Problem 2 (The PST Trust Maximisation Problem with Overhead Budget (MTPSTO)).
Given an overhead budget B > 0, an event distribution E, an undirected connectivity
graph Gc = (Vc, Ec), a publisher p that holds an advertisement Ap, a set of subscribers
S = {s | sfs(Ap) = true} where sfs is the subscription function of s, a set of routers
R = Vc \C where C = {p} ∪ S, find a PST T that is rooted at p, spans C and maximises
the trust value τ(T ) = Fleximin(τc1(T ), . . . , τc|C|(T )) where τci(T ) is the trust evaluation
of ith node in C, subject to OT (Ev) ≤ B.
Problem 3 (The PST Trust Maximisation Problem with Overhead Budget (MTPSTO)
- Decision Problem). Given an overhead budget B > 0, q ∈ [0, 1] is a trust quota in the
unit interval, an event distribution E, an undirected connectivity graph G = (V,E), a
publisher p that holds an advertisement Ap, a set of subscribers S = {s | sfs(Ap) = true}
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where sfs is the subscription function of s, a set of routers R = Vc \C where C = {p}∪S,
is there a PST T that is rooted at p and spans C such that τ(T ) ≥ q ∧OT (E) ≤ B.
Problem 2 is a PST trust maximisation problem within a given overhead budget, B.
This approach is preferred to a multi-objective problem as this allows for the budget to
be tunable to suit the application requirements. For example, if performance is of great
importance then a strict overhead budget is required. This will restrict the search space
of the feasible PSTs to those that provide low communication overheads, but possibly
at the expense of the trustworthiness of the PST that solves the problem. Applications
that are suited to this model are real-time data distribution applications, such as radar
data distribution, and media distribution where the QoS required is dependent upon the
properties of the media.
Theorem 7 (MTPSTO is NP-complete). The PST Trust Maximisation Problem with
Overhead Budget is NP-complete.
Proof of Theorem 7. To show that MTPSTO ∈ NP, for a given PST TPST = (VPST ,
EPST ), the overhead of the tree OTPST (E) with respect to some event distribution E
and the trust value τ(TPST ) must be established in polynomial time. The algorithm to
calculate OTPST (E) for TPST must start at the publisher vertex of the PST and perform a
post-order tree traversal of the tree, so that the Oti(E) = (r+f)·ΦE(¬si∧s
′
i)+f ·ΦE(si∧s
′
i)
is calculated for each node i ∈ VPST . At each i, every event e ∈ E must be tested to
establish if si(e) = true, so this algorithm has O(|VPST ||E|) complexity. This part of the
proof is similar to the MOPST ∈ NP proof by (Cao and Shen, 2009).
To complete this first part of the proof, it must be shown that the trust value of the
PST can be calculated in polynomial time. The analytical leximin aggregation function
Fleximin, given in definition 32, which is used to aggregate the individual trust evaluations
of a PST must sort the set of trust values to be aggregated, which can be performed by a
tuned quicksort algorithm of O(c · log(c)) (Bentley and McIlroy, 1993) and then calculate
the OWA which has a total cost of 2c as there are two constant time operations, the
multiplication of a trust value with its weight and the summation, so the running time of
Fleximin isO(c+c·log(c)) where c = |C|. Next, the complexity of establishing the individual
trust evaluations that are the inputs to Fleximin must be determined. Assume that a data
structure containing for all a, b ∈ Vc, τa(Ληa,b). Given a pair of nodes a, b ∈ VPST , the
lookup time for τa(Λ
η
a,b) is dependent on the data structure used and is assumed to be
polynomial time, α. Each of the following roles, the publisher, the internal subscribers and
the terminal subscribers are considered. For each terminal subscriber s, the total cost of
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calculating τs(σs,p) where σs,p is the path from s to p in TPST is y ·α where y = |σs,p| − 2.
For the publisher p in TPST , a pre-order tree traversal algorithm is used to find all the
paths to all s ∈ VPST ∩ S where at every s the trust value τp(σp,s) is calculated, so the
time complexity of this algorithm is O(n+ α · w) where n = |VPST | and w = |VPST ∩ S|.
The internal subscriber must calculate the trust to the publisher and all subscribers in
the subtree rooted at the internal subscriber, so it must execute both algorithms, giving
O(n+ α(w + y)). A PST can be verified in polynomial time, so MTPSTO ∈ NP.
To prove that MTPSTO is NP-hard, it must be shown that there is a polynomial time
reduction from MOPST, that is MOPST ≤P MTPSTO. The MOPST problem is given in
problem 1. A polynomial-time reduction from any instance of MOPST to MTPSTO can
be performed, as follows:
1. ∀a, b ∈ VPST , τa(Ληa,b) = 1 ⇐⇒ τ(T ) = 1.
2. The decision version of the MOPST problem returns true if Ot(E) ≤ k, so let B = k
in MTPSTO.
3. Let q = 1 in the decision problem version of MTPSTO.
Given an instance of MOPST such that OTPST (E) ≤ k, after reduction of this instance
to an instance of MTPSTO using the rules presented above, assume that MTPSTO returns
false, that is either OTPST (E) > B or τ(TPST ) < q. τ(TPST ) = 1 is true for every PST
found by MTPSTO given the definition of the analytical leximin function in definition 32
and the fire rule of the reduction, so OTPST (E) > B must hold. However, B = k, so it
follows that OTPST (E) > B and OTPST (E) ≤ k is a contradiction.
Given an instance of MTPSTO such that there is a PST TPST where τ(TPST ) ≥
q ∧ OTPST (E) ≤ B, and assume that in MOPST OTPST (Ev) > k. Let k = B as defined
the polynomial-time reduction, substituting B for k, OTPST (E) > k ∧ OTPST (E) ≤ k is a
contradiction.
4.2 An Exhaustive Search Algorithm for MTPSTO
To solve the MTPSTO problem, an exhaustive search algorithm of all possible PSTs is
presented. The algorithm must calculate the trust value and the overhead value of every
PST in the connectivity graph Gc = (Vc, Ec) that is rooted at the publisher p and spans
all subscribers S for a given advertisement Ap. The set of all PSTs for Ap is a subset of
the set of all Steiner trees in Gc. Using this property and the fact that the set of all Steiner
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trees is given by the enumeration of all spanning trees for Gc and all its subgraphs, an
exhaustive search algorithm must find all the spanning trees of Gc and all its subgraphs
that are eligible PSTs, and calculate the trust and overhead values of each. As the set
C = {p}∪S must be present in every eligible PST for the advertisement Ap, the considered
subgraphs of G must also contain these vertices. Also note that subgraphs with router
vertices with only one adjacent edge are not examined as all spanning trees found will
not be PSTs as this router vertex will be a terminal router vertex in every PST and this
contradicts the definition of a PST.
Algorithm 1 presents an exhaustive search to find the PST that solves the MTPSTO
problem. At line 2, all subgraphs containing the publisher and the set of subscribers are
found. At line 6, for each subgraph, the PSTEnumeration algorithm is executed, which
finds all spanning trees in the subgraph that are also PSTs. The overhead values for each
PST is calculated at line 9 and if the overhead is less than or equal to the assigned budget,
the trust of the PST is evaluated at line 11. Should the PST have the same trust value
as the best PST found so far by the algorithm, ties are broken by selecting the PST with
the least overhead.
4.3 Spanning Tree Enumeration
A number of algorithms have been proposed to solve the problem of enumerating all
spanning trees of a graph. Backtracking-based techniques proposed by (Minty, 1965)
and (Gabow and Myers, 1978) have O(m + n + mt) and O(m + n + nt) complexity for
undirected graphs respectively, where m = |E|, n = |V |, and t is the number of spanning
trees. Prior to the publication of these algorithms, an alternative was proposed (Char,
1968), and although a complexity analysis was not given, it was later shown to be of
O(m + n + n(t + t0)) running time where t0 is the number of subgraphs found by the
algorithm that are not spanning trees (Jayakumar et al., 1984). Char’s approach differs to
the backtracking-based techniques as it lexicographically tests subgraphs to determine if
each is a spanning tree. It is shown to be suitable for enumerating PSTs, as the spanning
tree test of a subgraph can be modified to determine if the subgraph is a PST.
4.3.1 Char’s Spanning Tree Enumeration Algorithm
Char’s algorithm, presented in algorithm 2, begins with the initialising of Tinit, the initial
spanning tree at line 1. The original algorithm, as described by (Jayakumar et al., 1984),
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Algorithm 1: MTPSTO-Exhaustive(Gc, p, S, B)
Input : Gc = (Vc, Ec) /* Connectivity Graph */
Input : p /* Publisher */
Input : S /* Subscribers */
Input : B /* Overhead Budget */
Input : E /* Event Set */
Output: TAp /* PST */
1 begin
2 Gc = {(Vx, Ex) | Vx ⊂ Vc ∧ C ⊆ Vx ∧ ∀(a, b) ∈ Ec, (a, b) ∈ Ex =⇒ a, b ∈ Vx}
/* Gc is the set of all subgraphs of Gc including Gc */
3 Tbest ← null
4 Obest ←∞
5 τbest ← −∞
6 for (Vx, Ex) ∈ Gc do
7 A← PSTEnumeration(G)
8 for TAp ∈ A do
9 OTAp ← EvaluateTreeOverhead(TAp , E, p)
10 if OTAp ≤ B then
11 τTAp ← EvaluateTrust(TAp , p, S, )
12 if τTAp > τbest then
13 τbest ← τTAp
14 Obest ← OTAp
15 Tbest ← TAp
16 else if τTAp = τbest ∧OTAp < Obest then
17 τbest ← τTAp
18 Obest ← OTAp
19 Tbest ← TAp
utilises Breadth-first Search (BFS) to determine the initial spanning tree and label the
vertices from n to 1 in the order that they are visited. In the algorithm below and in the
implementation used in this work, Depth-first Search (DFS) is chosen instead, as it shown
to reduce the value of t0 (Jayakumar et al., 1984).
Having found the initial tree and labeled the vertices, let REF(i) give the index of the
parent of the vertex i. Line 4 initialises the first tree sequence λ0 to be that found by the
BFS or DFS. The sequence DIGIT holds a subgraph of the graph, and is at first set to
the initial spanning tree. DIGIT(k) gives the index of a node that is adjacent to k. The
length of DIGIT is n − 1 and there must be a DIGIT(i) = n where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 for the
subgraph defined by DIGIT to be a connected graph. Let SUCC be a function such that
SUCC(DIGIT(k)) gives the next vertex in adjacency list of k.
A DIGIT sequence is tested for tree compatibility using the IsTreeSeq procedure. A
sequence gives a tree if and only if for each DIGIT(i) such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, there is
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Algorithm 2: CharEnumeration(G)
Input : G = (V,E) /* Connectivity Graph */
Output: Tspan /* Set of all spanning trees in G */
1 begin
2 Tinit = DFS(G) /* Find initial tree and label vertices */
3 Tspan ← {Tinit}
4 λ0 ← (REF(1 ),REF(2 ), ...,REF(n-1 )) /* Tinit seq. representation */
5 DIGIT(i)← REF(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
6 k ← n− 1
7 while k 6= 0 do
8 if SUCC(DIGIT(k)) 6= null then
9 DIGIT(k)← SUCC(DIGIT(k))
10 if IsTreeSeq(DIGIT) then
11 Tspan ← Tspan∪{Translate(DIGIT)}
12 k ← n− 1
13 else
14 DIGIT(k)← REF(k)
15 k ← k − 1
a vertex sequence (i,DIGIT(i),DIGIT(DIGIT(i)), . . . , j) giving a path from i to j where
j > i. It is, however, not necessary to test each i for tree compatibility. Given a tree
compatible sequence, (DIGIT(1 ),DIGIT(2 ), . . . ,DIGIT(n-1 )), the next sequence is given by
changing DIGIT(k) to SUCC(DIGIT(k)), resulting in a sequence (DIGIT(1 ),DIGIT(2 ), . . . ,
DIGIT(k-1 ), SUCC(DIGIT(k)),REF(k+1 ), . . . ,REF(n-1 )), so the test for tree compatibility
need only take place at position k in the sequence, as all other positions will pass the test.
Lines 7 to 15 present the process of enumerating the remaining spanning trees. The
algorithm, starting with the initial spanning tree sequence, generates a series of sub-
graph sequences. Rather than test each of the sequences from the set of all possible
sequences of n − 1 edges, if for some k, DIGIT(k) is set to the index of a vertex at line 9
such that there is no path k,DIGIT(k), . . . , n then sequences containing the subsequence
(DIGIT(1 ),DIGIT(2 ), . . . ,DIGIT(k)) at positions 1, 2, . . . , k respectively, can not be a tree
so these sequences are ignored by the algorithm, reducing the search space.
The running time of Char’s algorithm is dominated by n(t+ t0). The number of non-
tree compatible subgraphs, t0 is shown to be dependent on the the initial spanning tree.
Jayakumar et al. (Jayakumar et al., 1984) propose DFS search must start at the vertex
in the graph with the maximum degree, as t+ t0 is shown to be a function of the degree
of all n − 1 vertices. Additionally, the following three properties are identified that may
further reduce t0 (Jayakumar et al., 1984):
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1. Maximising the number of leaf nodes of the initial spanning tree found by DFS, as
for each leaf node s, there will be no sequence generated by changing DIGIT(s) that
is a non-tree compatible sequence.
2. Maximising the number of ancestors of each vertex in the DFS, as this reduces t+t0.
3. Minimising the number of descendants of each vertex k, as this is the upper bound
the number of times the block from lines 8 - 12 is executed for k.
These properties lead to two DFS techniques being proposed by Jayakumar et al.
(Jayakumar et al., 1984), both beginning the search at the vertex with the highest degree.
The first heuristic selects the next node to visit that maximises the number of ancestors
in the tree, and in the event of a tie, chooses the vertex that minimises the degree. The
second heuristic visits vertices of minimum degree, deciding ties by choosing the vertex
with the most ancestors in the tree. Experimental results show there is little difference
between the two techniques with respect to the value of t0 and both techniques greatly
reduce t0 when compared to BFS. The second heuristic is used for the implementation of
DFS in this work.
The second proposed optimisation is path compression (Jayakumar et al., 1984). As-
sume a tree sequence is found by the algorithm when k = i, this gives a tree sequence
λ1 = (DIGIT(1 ), . . . ,DIGIT(i-1 ),DIGIT(i),REF(i+1 ), . . . ,REF(n-1 )). Let the next tree λ2
be found for some k > i such that position λ2 differs to λ1 at position k only implying
that the first i positions of DIGIT remain the same, as those in λ1. The tree compatability
test for λ1 tests for a path i,DIGIT(i), . . . , j where j > i and this must be true for λ1
to be a tree. For λ2, this path is also present in the tree. Assume that the path found
by the tree compatability test for λ2 is k,DIGIT(k), . . . , i, . . . , j, . . . ,m such that k < m.
It is known that the path from i to j is unique and j > i from the tree compatibility
test for λ1, so if the pair (i, j) is available to tree compatability test for λ2 the path can
be “compressed” thus reducing the complexity of the procedure. The test can terminate
successfully if j ≥ m or proceed from position j. Algorithm 3 shows the tree compatib-
ility test with path compression, where the NEXTVERTEX sequence is used to store the
compressed path and to perform the test.
Theorem 8 (Leaf Node Property). Let λ = (DIGIT(1 ),DIGIT(2 ), . . . ,DIGIT(n-1 )) be a
DIGIT sequence representation of a spanning tree of some graph G and let k be the index
of a vertex where 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 such that there is no DIGIT(i) = k where 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
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Algorithm 3: isTreeSeq(DIGIT, NEXTVERTEX, k)
Input : DIGIT /* Tree Sequence */
Input : NEXTVERTEX /* Path Compressed Sequence */
Input : k /* Position of changed DIGIT(k) */
1 begin
2 i← k
3 j ← DIGIT(k)
4 while i ≥ j do
5 if i = j then
6 return false
7 if j < i then
8 j ← NEXTVERTEX(j )
9 NEXTVERTEX(k)← j
10 for m← k + 1 to Length(DIGIT) do
11 NEXTVERTEX(m)← REF(m)
12 return true
The vertex k is a leaf node in the tree represented by the sequence λ. If k = n and
there is only one DIGIT(i) = k then the vertex n is a leaf node in the tree represented by
sequence λ.
Proof of Theorem 8. First, the case where 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 is considered. Let λ =
(DIGIT(1 ),DIGIT(2 ), . . . ,DIGIT(n-1 )) be a DIGIT sequence representation of a spanning
tree of some graph G and let k be the index of a vertex where 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
Assume that there is some set I of vertex indices, where:
1. ∀i ∈ I.1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 ∧ i 6= k;
2. ∀i, j ∈ I.i 6= j;
3. |I| ≥ 1;
4. ∀i ∈ I.DIGIT(i) = k
There must also be a DIGIT(k) = m where 1 ≤ m ≤ n and ∀i ∈ I.m 6= k 6= i (i.e.
no loop). The values at DIGIT(k) and DIGIT(i) for all i ∈ I, give the following edges in
the tree represented by λ, (k,DIGIT(k)) and all edges (i, k) for all i ∈ I. The presence of
these edges contradicts k being a leaf node, as if this were the case then there would only
be one edge adjacent to k, but there are instead |I| + 1 adjacent edges. As 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
is true, there will always be one edge (k,DIGIT(k)), so k is a leaf vertex in λ if and only
if |I| = 0.
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Finally, the case where k = n is considered. Again, k is a leaf vertex if and only if k
is adjacent to one edge. As k > n − 1 there is no value DIGIT(k) in the sequence λ and
consequently no edge (k,DIGIT(k)) in the spanning tree represented by λ, so if k is a leaf
vertex, there must only be one edge (i, k) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Therefore, when k = n, k
is a leaf vertex in the tree given by λ if and only if |I| = 1.
Algorithm 4: isPST(DIGIT)
Input: DIGIT /* Tree Sequence */
1 begin
2 for k ← n to 1 do
3 if isRouter(k) then
4 l← 1
5 if k = n then
6 l← 2
7 for i← n− 1 to 1 do
8 if DIGIT(i) = k then
9 c← c+ 1
10 if c = l then
11 return true
12 return false
Theorem 9. Let λ be a DIGIT sequence that is a spanning tree and also a PST of some
graph G. For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, if k is the index of a router then there is at least one
DIGIT(i) = k and if k = n and k is the index of a router there are at least two DIGIT(i) = k
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and i 6= k.
Proof of Theorem 9. Given the definition of a PST (definition 10, no router node can be a
leaf vertex and given theorem 8, for a given leaf vertex k, a tree sequence DIGIT has either
no DIGIT(i) = k if 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1 or one DIGIT(i) = k if k = n where 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1∧ i 6= k.
Therefore, if k is the index of a router and 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, then there is at least one
DIGIT(i) = k and if k = n then there are at least two DIGIT(i) = k.
Theorem 9 implies that the algorithm to test if a tree sequence is a PST must check if
each router index is not a leaf vertex in the tree represented by the sequence. Algorithm 4
makes use of this property to implement the PST test that must be executed immediately
before line 11 in algorithm 2. This gives algorithm 5 to find all spanning trees in a graph
that are also PSTs.
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Algorithm 5: PSTEnumeration(G)
Input : G = (V,E) /* Connectivity Graph */
Output: Tspan /* Set of all spanning trees in G */
1 begin
2 Tinit = DFS(G) /* Find initial tree and label vertices */
3 Tspan ← {Tinit}
4 λ0 ← (REF(1 ),REF(2 ), ...,REF(n-1 )) /* Tinit seq. representation */
5 DIGIT(i)← REF(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
6 NEXTVERTEX(i)← REF(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
7 k ← n− 1
8 while k 6= 0 do
9 if SUCC(DIGIT(k)) 6= null then
10 DIGIT(k)← SUCC(DIGIT(k))
11 if IsTreeSeq(DIGIT, NEXTVERTEX, k) ∧ IsPST(DIGIT) then
12 Tspan ← Tspan∪{Translate(DIGIT)}
13 k ← n− 1
14 else
15 DIGIT(k)← REF(k)
16 k ← k − 1
4.4 Tabu Search Algorithm for MTPSTO Problem
4.4.1 Tabu Search Preliminaries
All problems in NP-complete can be solved by exhaustive search, but as the size of the
problem instance increases, the running times become impractical. Unless P = NP holds
true, it is unlikely that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve these and NP-
hard problems. For these problems, approximate solutions that are at least close to the
optimal can be found within reasonable time bounds by using approximation or metaheur-
istics algorithms. Approximation algorithms differ to metaheuristics, in that the former
guarantees that the solution found is within a factor of the optimal solution for all problem
instances and has provable running time bounds (Talbi, 2009). Despite this, metaheurist-
ics have been shown to find good solutions for a variety of optimisation problems, including
graph theory problems. One of these metaheuristics for combinatorial optimisation prob-
lems is tabu search (Glover, 1989, 1990), which extends local search by marking recent
moves as tabu and not to be remade for some number of iterations. Tabu search reduces
the likelihood of cycling, by allowing for the search to progress beyond localised areas of
the search space. This allows solutions that may be better than the local optimum to be
found.
A number of approaches to the Steiner problem in graphs that use the tabu search
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metaheuristic have been proposed (Ribeiro and De Souza, 2000) (Gendreau et al., 1999).
The proposed algorithm by Ribeiro and De Souza, finds solutions that are better than the
Takahashi-Matsuyama heuristic (Takahashi and Matsuyama, 1980) and F-tabu (Gendreau
et al., 1999). As this metaheuristic is shown to be successful for finding the minimum
Steiner tree in graphs, the use of tabu search for finding the PST that is close to the
optimal for a MTMOPST problem is explored in the remainder of this section.
For combinatorial optimisation problems (definition 43), the search space can be ex-
plored by defining a move that when applied to an existing current solution gives a new
solution. In the case of the Steiner tree problem, these moves are the addition and removal
of Steiner nodes from an existing Steiner tree. Local search heuristics, such as hill climb-
ing, find the local optimum when no improving moves are feasible (the stopping criterion),
but this may not be the global optimum. The tabu search heuristic overcomes the local
optimum problem by allowing moves that do not yield an improvement in the solution
and through the use of a short-term memory structure, the tabu list, which stores recent
moves that can not be reapplied to solutions for some given number of iterations.
The tabu search algorithm for a minimisation combinatorial problem is described in
algorithm listing 6, however it is only a simple approach and may be extended and modified
in a number of ways, as described below. Let S(x) be the set of moves that are feasible
to apply to solution x and s(x) be the solution given when move s is applied to x. At
line 1, the initial solution x, is initialised, and next it is set to xbest. To complete the
initialisation phase, the iteration counter k begins at zero and the tabu list T is the empty
set. The tabu search executes until the stopping criteria at line 6 is true, that is either the
maximum number of iterations, kmax is met, or there are no non-tabu moves available for
the search to follow. At line 7, of all the legitimate moves available at a given iteration,
the move that yields the best neighbouring solution to the current solution x, is set as sk
and the new current solution becomes sk(x). Regardless of whether the current solution
x, is better than than the best solution found up to iteration k (lines 8 and 9), the move
sk becomes tabu at line 12 and is followed by the removal of an existing tabu move.
Definition 43 (Combinatorial Optimisation Problem). Given a set of feasible solutions
F and a function F : F → R, find the optimal solution x ∈ F for a minimisation problem
such that F (x) ≤ F (y) for all y ∈ F , or F (x) ≥ F (y) for a maximisation problem.
The choice of the move structure is dependent upon the problem. For the Steiner tree
problem in graphs, a move is defined as the addition to or removal of a Steiner node from
the solution. When a move is applied to a solution, it is marked as tabu by storing it
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Algorithm 6: Tabu Search
Output: xbest /* Tabu search best solution */
1 begin
2 Let x ∈ F be an initial, feasible solution.
3 xbest = x
4 k = 0
5 T = ∅
6 while k < kmax ∨ S(x)− T 6= ∅ do
7 x = sk(x) such that for all s ∈ S(x)− T , F (sk(x)) < F (s(x))
8 if F (x) < F (xbest) then
9 xbest = x
10 if |T | > tlimit then
11 T = T − {s | s ∈ S ∧ s 6= sk}
12 T = T ∪ {sk}
13 k = k + 1
14 return xbest
in the tabu list for some number of iterations. A number of strategies for the tabu list
have been proposed, that can generally be classified as recency-based or frequency-based.
Recency-based tabu lists are commonly used and examples include lists that: store the
moves of the last k-iterations; store the inverse moves of the moves for the last k-iterations;
store the moves and their inverses of the last k-iterations. For recency-based tabu lists,
k is typically a small value, and it is therefore short-term memory, but it is shown to
yield good results. The alternative is frequency-based tabu lists that keep track of the
frequency of moves (long-term memory), allowing the search to tend to less frequent moves
and consequently allowing it to diversify the exploration of the search space, however this
is not strictly a tabu list, as moves are not marked as tabu.
While the use of a tabu list of moves is effective at preventing cycles, they may prevent
good moves from being executed where there is no risk of cycling. Aspiration functions
are used to allow certain tabu moves to be chosen by the tabu search in lieu of the best
non-tabu move. The most commonly used form allows a tabu move to applied to the
current solution if it yields a solution that is better than the best solution, xbest, that is
if there is a t ∈ T such that F (t(x)) < F (xbest) ∧ F (t(x)) < F (sk(x)) ∧ ∀t′ ∈ T \ {t} :
F (t(x)) < F (t′(x)), then xbest = t(x).
The use of diversification strategies allow the tabu search to continue from a solution
at some point in the search space other than the existing current solution. After some
number of iterations, the diversification strategy is executed and the search restarts from
the solution found by the strategy. The motivation for the use of diversification is to allow
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the search space to explore other regions of the search space, as local search heuristics
explore a localised search subspace. As described by Gendreau (Gendreau, 2003), the use
of diversification gives the search breadth and is the most critical issue in the design of
tabu search algorithms. Diversification also breaks any cycling if the diversified solution
is not part of the cycle. For the tabu search algorithm to solve the Steiner tree problem in
(Ribeiro and De Souza, 2000), the diversification strategy uses the Takahashi-Matsuyama
heuristic to find a Steiner tree, which is rooted at a different vertex each time it is executed.
This is a form of restart diversification, which determines the point in the search space
where the search restarts. An informed restart diversification strategy could make use of
a frequency-based tabu list to diversify to lesser explored regions of the search space. The
other principal diversification strategy is continuous diversification, in which the objective
function is modified to penalise moves to solutions with respect to their frequency in the
tabu list. The penalty is increased for moves that feature either entirely or in part (given
the moves’ components) more frequently in the tabu list.
At each iteration of the tabu search, the solutions given by each move must be eval-
uated using the objective function, but this may be a time consuming operation. Rather
than evaluate each candidate solution for the exact objective value, a surrogate objective
function can be used instead. A good surrogate function is representative of the objective
function, that is the ordering defined by the function over the set of feasible solutions is
identical or the inverse to that of the objective function. After evaluation using the sur-
rogate objective function, a subset of potentially favourable moves can then be evaluated
using the objective function with the best being selected. An alternative of this can-
didate list strategy is the probabilistic tabu search, which select moves with probability
proportional to its surrogate objective value.
In algorithm 6, the termination criteria is k < kmax ∨ S(x) − T 6= ∅, that is either
some maximum number of iterations is met or there are no permissible non-tabu moves to
explore. Other termination criteria include (and as listed in (Gendreau, 2003)): reaching
a limit on CPU time; the number of iterations without an improvement in F (xbest) being
equal to some limit; and when the objective value reaches some threshold.
4.4.2 Algorithm
To solve the MTPSTO problem, the use of the tabu search metaheuristic is proposed.
The presentation of the tabu search algorithm begins with algorithm listings 7 and 8,
which describe the procedure to find insertion and removal candidate moves, respectively.
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Similar to the move structure defined in (Ribeiro and De Souza, 2000), a tabu search move
is defined as the addition or removal of a router node from the PST. As is the case with
Steiner trees, there is a subset of nodes that must always be included in the vertex set of
the tree, these are the publisher node and the subscriber nodes. It follows that only the
combination of router nodes is variable, hence the choice of move structure.
Definition 44 (MTPSTO Tabu Search Insertion Move). The function m+ is the in-
sertion move function m+ : Tc × R → Hc where Tc is set of all PSTs in Gc, Hc is
the set of all subgraphs in Gc. Let Gc = (Vc, Ec) be a connectivity graph, TPST =
(VPST , EPST ) be a PST in Gc, r be a node in the set R \ VPST (i.e. not in the PST)
to be added to TPST . m
+(TPST , r) = (Vmod, Emod) where Vmod = VPST ∪ {r}, Emod =
{(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Ec ∧ a = r ∧ b ∈ VPST } ∪ EPST , and (Vmod, Emod) ∈ Hc.
Definition 45 (MTPSTO Tabu Search Deletion Move). The function m− is the insertion
move function m− : Tc × R → Hc where Tc is set of all PSTs in Gc, Hc is the set of
all subgraphs in Gc. Let Gc = (Vc, Ec) be a connectivity graph, TPST = (VPST , EPST )
be a PST in Gc, r be a node in the set R∩VPST to be removed from TPST . m−(TPST , r) =
(Vmod, Emod) where Vmod = {v | v ∈ VPST ∧ v 6= r}, Emod = {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ EPST ∧ a 6= r},
and (Vmod, Emod) ∈ Hc.
4.4.2.1 Determining Moves
Algorithm 7 returns a set M+ of routers that can be added to a PST, TPST . The algorithm
guarantees that for all r ∈M+, there is at least one PST that has a vertex set {p} ∪ S ∪
{r}∪{x | x ∈ R∧x ∈ VPST } in the connectivity graph Gc. The algorithm iterates over the
set of routers that are in the connectivity graph, but not in TPST (line 2). The insertion
move of the router r is a potential candidate move, but only if its addition to the TPST
will result in a subgraph of Gc that contains a PST. At line 3, Er is an edge set that
contains all adjacent edges to r in Gc that are also adjacent to VPST . If the cardinality
of Er is 1, then r will be a vertex of degree 1 in the subgraph induced by the algorithm,
so r would be terminal vertex of any PST. This is a contradiction of the definition of a
PST, so a test for this property is performed at line 4. The addition to TPST of r and its
edges adjacent to TPST , need only contain one PST for the move to be feasible. For every
pair of edges that are adjacent to r and two distinct nodes, x and y in VPST (line 5), a
cycle in is formed in TPST . At line 6, pTxyPST
is the set of edges between x and y in TPST .
Line 7 is an optimisation that ignores the pairs of edges under consideration if the path
that it encloses is of length 1, as an edge can not be removed from pTxyPST
to break the
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cycle. A node can not be removed from the pTxyPST
, as it may not contain a router node
and even if it did, it would result in a more complex move structure. It must be possible
to remove an edge e from pTxyPST
such that the two vertices which are endpoints of e are
not router nodes (lines 8 to 10). To ensure that this is the case, one of the following
predicates must be true: ∃(u, v) ∈ pTxyPST : u, v ∈ S (terminal vertices are subscribers);
∃(u, v) ∈ pTxyPST : u ∈ S ∧ v ∈ R ∧ |(u, x) | (v, x) ∈ EPST | (there is a PST where u
is a terminal subscriber and v is an internal router); or ∃(u, v) ∈ pTxyPST : u ∈ R ∧ v ∈
R∧|(u, x) | (u, x) ∈ EPST | ≥ 2∧|(u, x) | (u, x) ∈ EPST | ≥ 2 (two routers with at least one
descendant in TPST , which is reconnected by the router r and a pair of edges adjacent to
TPST ). For each r whose addition to TPST results in one of these predicates being true, it
is added to M+.
Algorithm 7: FindInsertionMoves(Gc, TPST , R, S)
Input : Gc = (Vc, Ec) /* Connectivity graph */
Input : TPST = (VPST , EPST ) /* Current PST */
Input : R /* Set of routers R = V \ C where C = {p} ∪ S */
Input : S /* Set of subscribers */
Output: M+ /* Set of routers that can be added to TPST */
1 begin
2 foreach r ∈ VPST \R do
3 Er ← {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Ec ∧ (a = r ∧ b ∈ VPST ) ∨ (a ∈ VPST ∧ b = r)}
4 if |Er| > 1 then
5 foreach ((r, x), (r, y)) ∈ Er2 do
6 pTxyPST
← FindPath(TPST , x, y)
7 if
∣∣∣pTxyPST ∣∣∣ > 1 then
8 foreach (u, v) ∈ pTxyPST do
9 if u, v ∈ S ∨ (u ∈ S ∧ v ∈ R ∧ deg(v) > 2) ∨ (u ∈ R ∧ v ∈
S ∧ deg(u) > 2)∨ (u ∈ R∧ v ∈ R∧ deg(u) > 2∧ deg(v) > 2)
then
10 M+ ←M+ ∪ {r}
11 break outer;
12 return M+
Algorithm 8 describes the procedure by which removal moves are found. The algorithm
determines if the graph induced by the removal of a router node from a PST and the
addition of all edges between all pairs of nodes remaining in the PST will result in a graph
that has at least one PST. The for loop at line 2 iterates over each router node in the
PST, TPST , where r is the current route node under consideration. Lines 3 to 5 create a
graph Gmod that is a copy of the PST without the router r and its adjacent edges. In the
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block that begins at line 6, for each edge in Gc, if its endpoints are in Gmod, then it is
added to Gmod’s edge set. At line 5, Gmod may be a disconnected graph, so the addition
of edges from Gc that have both endpoints in Gmod may reconnect the graph. If Gmod is
not connected, then it will not contain a PST, so the algorithm tests for this at line 9.
If Gmod is connected, the next condition for the graph to contain a PST is that for all
routers in (R ∩ Vmod) \ {r}), no router must have only one adjacent edge. If a router has
one adjacent edge, it will be a terminal node of a PST for Gmod, and this is a contradiction
to the definition of a PST. If Gmod contains no dangling router nodes, then it is added to
the set of feasible moves M−.
Algorithm 8: FindRemovalMoves(Gc, TPST , R)
Input : Gc = (Vc, Ec) /* Connectivity Graph */
Input : TPST = (VPST , EPST ) /* Current PST */
Input : R /* Set of routers R = V \ C where C = {p} ∪ S */
Output: M− /* Set of routers that can be removed from TPST */
1 begin
2 foreach r ∈ VPST \ ({p} ∪ S) do
3 Vmod ← {v | v ∈ VPST ∧ v 6= r}
4 Emod ← {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ EPST ∧ (a 6= r ∧ b 6= r)}
5 Gmod ← (Vmod, Emod)
6 foreach (x, y) ∈ Ec do
7 if x, y ∈ Vmod then
8 Emod ← Emod ∪ {(x, y)}
9 if IsConnectedGraph(Gmod) then
10 foreach r ∈ R ∩ Vmod do
11 if |{(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Emod ∧ (a = r ∨ b = r)}| < 2 then
12 Continue at line 2
13 M− ←M− ∪ {r}
14 return M−
4.4.2.2 Move Evaluation
The application of a move to a PST gives a subgraph of the connectivity graph (defin-
ition 44 and definition 45). Algorithms 7 and 8 ensure that the subgraph will contain
at least one PST. Algorithm 9 finds the PST in a graph that maximises the trustwor-
thiness within the overhead budget constraint. If no PST is found within the overhead
budget constraint, the PST that maximises the trustworthiness is found. Although the
algorithm describes the evaluation of an insertion move, the evaluation of a deletion move
only differs at line 4. The for loop at line 5 iterates over each PST found by the PST
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enumeration algorithm (algorithm 5). The PST is evaluated and if found to be a better
PST than those previously evaluated, then Tmax, τmax and Omax are set appropriately.
The algorithm terminates at line 22 by returning the best PST Tmax that has been found
in the subgraph Gmod, along with its trust value (τmax) and its overhead value (Omax).
Algorithm 9: EvaluateMove(Gc, TPST , r, B)
Input : Gc = (Vc, Ec) /* Connectivity graph */
Input : TPST = (VPST , EPST ) /* Current PST */
Input : r /* Router to be added */
Input : B /* Overhead Budget */
Output: (Tmax, τmax, Omax)
1 begin
2 τmax ← −∞
3 Omax ←∞
4 Gmod = m
+(TPST , r) /* If removal move, function m
− is used */
5 foreach Tnext ∈ PSTEnumeration(Gmod) do
6 τTnext ← EvaluateTreeTrust(Tnext)
7 OTnext ← EvaluateTreeOverhead(Tnext)
8 if Omax > B ∧OTnext > B then
9 if τTnext > τTmax then
10 Tmax ← Tnext
11 τmax ← τTnext
12 Omax ← OTnext
13 else if Omax < B ∧OTnext < B then
14 if τTnext > τTmax then
15 Tmax ← Tnext
16 τmax ← τTnext
17 Omax ← OTnext
18 else if Omax > B ∧OTnext < B then
19 Tmax ← Tnext
20 τmax ← τTnext
21 Omax ← OTnext
22 return (Tmax, τmax, Omax)
4.4.2.3 Surrogate Objective Function
Given a set of moves M+ ∪M−, each move must be evaluated to determine which gives
the best PST tree with respect to the objectives of maximising trust within some overhead
budget. As mentioned in section 4.4.1, evaluation of each move to determine the exact
objective value of the solution it yields can be time consuming. To address this issue, the
use of surrogate evaluation function is proposed that can be used to reduce the cardinality
of the set M+ ∪M−. The smaller set of moves is then evaluated fully for exact objective
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values of the solutions that result from their application.
The PST solution to a MTPSTO problem maximises the trust held in the PST by
the least trusting node (through the use of the leximin social welfare functional) within
some overhead budget. A greedy approach is adopted for the surrogate objective function,
which seeks to maximise the improvement to the least well-off node. Given the subgraph
Gmod that is induced by the application of a move m to the current PST solution, TPST ,
the surrogate objective value is given by the most trusted path between the node with
the least trust in TPST and the publisher, p. Due to the fact that a semiring-based trust
model for path trust is used (section 3.2.2), it is possible to to use the generic shortest
distance algorithm algorithm defined in (Theodorakopoulos and Baras, 2006) to find the
most trusted path between two nodes.
Definition 46 (Surrogate Objective Function for MTPSTO Tabu Search). The surrogate
objective function is defined as, sobj : Hc → R[0,1] whereHc is the set of all subgraphs of Gc
and R[0,1] is the unit interval. Given a PST TPST and a router insertion move r ∈ VPST \
({p} ∪ S), let Gmod = (Vmod, Emod) be the graph induced by the addition of r to TPST ,
where Vmod = VPST ∪r and Emod = EPST ∪{(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ Ec ∧ (a = r ∧ b ∈ VPST )}, and
is a subgraph of the connectivity graph, Gc. sobj(Gmod) = max∀σx,p∈Px,p(τx(σx,p)) where
∀y ∈ VPST \ {x} : τx(TPST ) < τy(TPST ), Px,p is the set of paths in Gmod between x and p
and τx is the trust function of x.
4.4.2.4 Penalty Function
Tabu search is designed for combinatorial problems in the form given by definition 43. The
MTPSTO problem differs to this in that not only does it maximise the trust objective,
but it does so within the overhead budget constraint. There are a number of approaches
to modifying tabu search to handle these types of problems, these are: a static penalty
on solutions that do not respect the constraint; or an adaptive penalty function where the
penalisation value applied to solutions that breach the problem constraint is dependent
upon some other variable.
Two techniques are proposed for the MTPSTO problem. The first is a simple static
penalty function that penalises any over-budget solution by decreasing the trust value
by 50%. The second is the Near Feasibility Threshold (NFT) technique for tabu search
(Kulturel-Konak et al., 2004), which determines the penalty to be applied to an over-
budget solution with respect to the short-term and long-term memory structures of the
tabu search. The method uses the properties of moves in the tabu list to determine the
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NFT. Solutions that are infeasible are mildly punished if within the NFT region, and more
significantly so if beyond it. The NFT approach is compared to alternative methods by
Nonobe and Ibaraki (Nonobe and Ibaraki, 1998) and Gendreau et al. (Gendreau et al.,
1994). While it outperforms the Nonobe and Ibaraki method with respect to best solution
quality for a number of problems, results in comparison to the method devised by Gendreau
et al. are mixed. For the orienteering problem, which is a maximisation problem with a
single constraint, both the NFT approach and the Gendreau et al. approach are shown to
be effective.
Definition 47 (NFT for Tabu Search (Kulturel-Konak et al., 2004)). The feasibility ratio,
Rj at iteration j of an instance of a tabu search is given by equation 4.1 where Fj is the
number of moves in the tabu list that have yielded feasible solution at iteration j and Tj
is the size of the tabu list at iteration j.
Rj =
Fj
Tj
(4.1)
The NFT for a constraint i is determined by equation 4.2. If the current move gives
a feasible solution, the NFT increases to encourage searching in infeasible region. If the
move is infeasible, then the NFT decreases. This increases the region beyond the NFT,
which is subject to greater penalisation than that within the NFT.
NFTi,j+1 =
 NFTi,j
(
1 +
Rj
2
)
, if move is feasible
NFTi,j
(
1+Rj
2
)
, if move is infeasible.
(4.2)
Should a solution x be beyond the NFTi, its objective value F (x) is penalised to give
Fp(x) as defined in equation 4.3 where Fall is the unpenalised objective value of the best
solution found, Ffeas is the objective value of the best feasible solution found, n is the
number of constraints, di(x,B) is the value by which x is over the i’s constraint value B,
NFTi is the NFT of constraint i, and ki is an exponent for the constraint i that amplifies
the penalty when x is beyond NFTi.
Fp(x) = F (x) + (Fall − Ffeas)×
n∑
i=1
(
di(x,B)
NFTi
)ki
(4.3)
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4.4.2.5 Diversification
Two restart diversification techniques are proposed: Takahashi-Matsuyama diversifica-
tion, which uses the Steiner tree heuristic by Takahashi and Matsuyama (Takahashi and
Matsuyama, 1980) to form a PST (algorithm 10); and SPT diversification that creates
PSTs that are also shortest path trees to some arbitrary node. After every n iterations of
the tabu search algorithm or when there are no moves for the tabu search to exploit, the
diversification method is invoked.
Takahashi and Matsuyama present a Steiner tree heuristic in (Takahashi and Mat-
suyama, 1980) that can easily be modified to find a Steiner tree that is a PST. The only
modification required is to stipulate that the initial vertex of the algorithm is either a
publisher or a subscriber, and that the remaining subscribers and, if not the initial vertex,
the publisher are the Steiner nodes. Algorithm 10 describes the Takahashi-Matsuyama
diversification method. Lines 3 to 6 initialise the diversified PST to contain a randomly
chosen node from the set of C containing the publisher and subscribers. At each iteration
of the while loop at line 7, the node y ∈ C \ VPST with the shortest path to any node
z ∈ VPST is added to TPST (line 16 and 17). At line 12, the ShortestPath function is a
single-pair shortest path algorithm, which can be implemented using Dijkstra’s algorithm
(Dijkstra, 1959). The Endpoint function at line 16 returns the vertices for a given edge
set.
Algorithm 10: Takahashi-Diversification(Gc, p, S)
1 begin
2 C = S ∪ {p}
3 Let x be a randomly chosen node from the set C
4 VPST = {x}
5 EPST = ∅
6 TPST = (VPST , EPST )
7 while |VPST ∩ C| 6= C do
8 length←∞
9 δmin ← null
10 foreach y ∈ C \ VPST do
11 foreach z ∈ VPST do
12 δy,z ← ShortestPath(Gc, y, z)
13 if |σy,z| < length then
14 δmin ← δy,z
15 length← |δy,z|
16 VPST = VPST ∪ Endpoints(δmin)
17 EPST = EPST ∪ δmin
18 return TPST
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The SPT diversification method chooses a node x at random from the set S ∪ {p}.
The initial PST tree TPST = (VPST , EPST ) is created, where VPST = {x} and EPST = ∅.
For each y ∈ (S ∪ {p}) \ VPST , VPST = VPST ∪ σy,x where σy,x is the set of vertices of
the shortest path between x and y in Gc, and EPST = EPST ∪ δx,y where δx,y is the set of
edges of the shortest path between x and y in Gc.
4.4.2.6 Tabu Search Algorithm for MTPSTO
The tabu search algorithm for the MTPSTO problem is given in algorithm 11 and is
described by a flowchart in figure 4.1. At line 4, the initial solution is found using the
diversification algorithm, either the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification (as listed) or the
SPT diversification. The initial solution is stored as the current PST solution, TPST and
evaluated for its trust value at line 5. Should the initial solution be over budget, it is
penalised using the penalty function of choice (lines 6 and 7). The initial solution is made
the best solution at line 8.
The tabu search executes until imax iterations without any improvement in the best
solution have occurred. From line 11 to 14, the set of feasible insertion and removal
moves for the current PST, TPST are found. Rather than evaluate every moves found,
an aggressive optimisation is performed where only the best insertion and best deletion
moves with respect to the surrogate objective function are considered (lines 13 and 14),
however if both of these moves are tabu, diversification is invoked (lines 15 and 18). These
moves are evaluated and if over budget, they are penalised using the penalty function
(lines 19 to 20). Of the two moves under consideration during an iteration of a tabu
search, the one leading to the more trustworthy PST (lines 25 to 28) is chosen as the
next current solution of the search. Two approaches are considered for the selection of the
most trusted PST given the chosen moves. The adaptive PST policy chooses the PST that
maximises trust and has not been visited previously, while the best PST policy considers
previously visited PSTs. The preferred move is placed in the tabu list and the oldest
move in the list removed if the tabu list has reached some maximum (line 29). Should
the PST found during the current iteration be the most trustworthy one found so far,
then it is set as the best solution and the value i, which counts the number of iterations
since an improvement in the best solution found, is set to zero. If this is not the case, i is
incremented. The number of iterations since the last diversification has not reached the
maximum, the current solution (upon which moves are applied in the next iteration) is
set to the best solution of those given by the moves m+ and m−.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter begins with the definition of the Maximum Trusted PST with Overhead
Budget (MTPSTO) problem and a proof that shows that the problem is in NP-complete.
The algorithms presented in this chapter make use of Char’s spanning tree enumeration
algorithm (Char, 1968), which is modified to provide an enumeration of PSTs. An exhaust-
ive search algorithm for the problem is presented, which is expected to be of little use for
anything but the smaller problem instances due to the problem complexity. This provides
the motivation for the use of the tabu search metaheuristic. A brief background on tabu
search is provided, followed by the tabu search algorithm for the MTPSTO problem.
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Algorithm 11: TabuSearch(G, p, R, S, B, imax, ∆max)
Input : G = (V,E) /* Connectivity Graph */
Input : R /* Set of routers in V (R ⊂ V ) */
Input : S /* Set of subscribers in V (S ⊂ V ) */
Input : B /* Overhead budget */
Input : imax /* Maximum iterations without improvement */
Input : ∆max /* Maximum iterations before diversification */
1 begin
2 i = 0; ∆ = 0
3 L← ∅ /* Tabu List */
4 TPST ← Takahashi(G)
5 τTPST ← EvaluateTreeTrust(TPST)
6 if EvaluateTreeOverhead(TPST) > B then
7 τTPST ← PenaltyFunction(τTPST )
8 τbest ← τTPST ; Tbest ← TPST
9 while i < imax do
10 Onext ←∞; τnext ← −∞
11 M+ ← FindInsertionMoves(G, TPST , R, S)
12 M− ← FindRemovalMoves(Gc, TPST , R)
13 m+ ← max∀m∈M+(sobj(m))
14 m− → max∀m∈M−(sobj(m))
15 if m+ ∈ L ∧m− ∈ L then
16 TPST ← Takahashi(G)
17 ∆← 0
18 Continue at line 9
19 (Tm+ , τm+ , Om+)← EvaluateMove(G, Tc, m+)
20 (Tm− , τm− , Om−)← EvaluateMove(Gc, TPST , m−)
21 if Om+ > B then
22 τm+ ← PenaltyFunction(τm+)
23 if Om− > B then
24 τm− ← PenaltyFunction(τm−)
25 if τm+ > τm− then
26 mtabu ← m+; Tnext ← Tm+ ; τnext ← τm+
27 else
28 mtabu ← m−; Tnext ← Tm− ; τnext ← τm−
29 L← L ∪ {mtabu}
30 if τnext > τbest then
31 Tbest ← Tnext;
32 τbest ← τnext
33 i← 0; ∆← 0
34 else i← i+ 1
35 if ∆ < ∆max then
36 TPST ← Tnext; ∆← ∆ + 1
37 else
38 TPST ← Takahashi(G)
39 ∆← 0
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart Describing Algorithm 11
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Chapter 5
Evaluation and Computational
Results
5.1 Evaluation Overview
The mathematical analysis of tabu search is an open area of research (Glover et al., 1993),
so to analyse the performance of the tabu search algorithms that are proposed in chapter
4, an evaluation based on experimental results is presented in this chapter.
The evaluation is concerned with two properties, the quality of the solutions found and
the running times of the algorithm. The former is given by the relative error of the trust
and overhead values with respect to the optimal solution, and the latter is measured by
subtracting the values returned from the System.nanoTime() method of the Java class
library, which is called immediately prior to and after the experiment. Note that the
running times exclude any operations required to initialise the experiment, such as the
instantiation of the connectivity graph from its GraphML1 representation. The aim of
the evaluation is to draw conclusions on the suitability of tabu search for the MTPSTO
problem by:
• comparing the quality of the solutions found by the tabu search algorithms to the
optimal solutions;
• comparing the running times of the tabu search algorithms to the exhaustive search
algorithm;
• assessing the difference in the quality of solutions found by the algorithms using the
static and NFT penalty functions;
1http://graphml.graphdrawing.org/
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• assessing the difference in running times between algorithms using the static and
NFT penalty functions;
• determining if either the Takahashi-Matsuyama or the Shortest Path Tree diversific-
ation strategies yield better solutions with respect to running time and/or solution
quality;
• examining the difference in solution quality and running times between the best and
adaptive PST selection strategies;
• comparing the shortest path tree and the Steiner tree (found by the Takahashi-
Matsuyama heuristic), both rooted at the publisher and spanning the set of sub-
scriber nodes, to the optimal solutions and those found by the tabu search algorithms;
• comparing the average running times, average relative errors in trust and overhead
values, and the number of exact and over budget solutions found by each algorithm.
The algorithms described in chapter 4 have been implemented using the Java pro-
gramming language. The implementations are dependent upon two third-party libraries,
the Java Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG)2 (ver. 2.01) and the OpenTS lib-
rary3 (ver. 1.0-exp10), a tabu search framework. The JUNG library provides a framework
that allows for the modelling, analysis and manipulation of graphs. The OpenTS library
provides a tabu search framework that is used as the basis of the implementations of the
tabu search algorithms.
Each experiment was executed five times unless stated otherwise. The running times
given in the results tables and in the discussion throughout the remainder of this chapter
are averages over these five execution runs unless stated otherwise. The solution quality is
measured by the relative errors in the trust and overhead values between the approximation
and the exact solution. Equation 5.1 defines relative error where v is a value greater than
0 and va is an approximation of v.
η =
∣∣∣∣v − vav
∣∣∣∣ (5.1)
2http://jung.sourceforge.net/
3http://www.coin-or.org/Ots/index.html
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5.2 Evaluation Environment
All experiments were performed on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2)
service4 using a High-Memory Extra Large instance (m2.xlarge). The instance has a
specification of 17.1 Gb of RAM, two virtual cores with 3.25 EC2 Compute Units (one
EC2 compute unit is equivalent to a 1.0-1.2 GHz 2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon)5 reported
as two 2.67 GHz Intel Xeon X5550 CPUs by the command cat /proc/cpuinfo, and
420 Gb of instance storage. Amazon Linux AMI 64-bit with Linux kernel 2.6.35.11 was
the chosen operating system image. All implementations were executed using the Java
runtime environment available in this image, IcedTea6 1.9.16. For each experiment, the
only option passed to the Java virtual machine was to set the maximum heap size to 16
Gb, -Xmx16G.
The choice of this evaluation environment was motivated by the high memory require-
ment of the exhaustive search algorithm. To ensure fair comparability of the running
times of the proposed tabu search algorithms with those of the exhaustive search, the
same instance type was used, despite the tabu search algorithms having a smaller memory
footprint.
5.3 Evaluation Data Sets
Motivated by the need of Operations Research (OR) researchers to compare algorithms
for identical problems, a number of test data sets was devised for a variety of OR problems
(Beasley, 1990). The OR library7 includes test data sets for Steiner problems, such as the
Steiner tree in graphs and the prize collecting Steiner tree. As the problem addressed in
this thesis is novel one, it was not possible to make use of this library, so a series of test
data sets was generated for the evaluation of the proposed algorithms. The design choices
for the evaluation test data sets are given in the remainder of this section.
The three problem sets, A, B, and C, used in the evaluation are described in tables 5.1,
5.3, and 5.4 respectively. For each problem in the test data set, the problem input with
reference to the problem definition given in problem definition 2 consists of three types of
variable:
• publish/subscribe inputs,
4http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
5http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
6http://icedtea.classpath.org/
7http://people.brunel.ac.uk/ mastjjb/jeb/info.html
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– E (set of events randomly chosen from the event distribution Ev)
– B (overhead budget)
– Ap (publisher’s advertisement)
– S (set of subscribers)
– SFS = {sfs | s ∈ S} (set of subscription functions for each subscriber where
sfs is the subscription function of subscriber s)
– R (set of routers);
• connectivity graph, Gc = (V,Ec);
• the trust graph used as input to the individuals’ trust functions, Gτ = (V,Eτ );
The test data sets are comprised of problem instances with varying |R|, as the primary
objective is to analyse the proposed algorithms with respect to connectivity graphs of
increasing sizes in both V and Ec, the latter achieved by maintaining the graph density
within a test data set to be approximately equal across the problem instances as |R|
increases. By increasing the number of routers in each problem, the test data sets allow
for the evaluation of algorithms with respect to problems of increasing complexity, as both
the number of possible moves at each iteration of the tabu search and the dominant factor
of the PST enumeration algorithm n(t+ t1) increase. For all problems, the cardinality of
the set of subscribers, S, is 5.
For a given test data set, each problem is identified by an identifier in the follow-
ing format, <Problem Data set><Subset Number>-<Problem Number> where <Problem
Data set> is the data set identifier (A, B, or C), <Subset Number> indicates the subset
within the problem data set and is equal to value of |R| for each problem in the subset, and
<Problem Number> is the problem identifier where 1 =⇒ B = 2000, 2 =⇒ B = 3000,
3 =⇒ B = 4000, 4 =⇒ B = 5000 and 5 =⇒ B = 231 − 1 (Java’s largest max-
imum integer). Test data sets are made of subsets of five problems, each problem sharing
identical parameters other than the value of the overhead budget, B. The values chosen
for B exclude 1000 as there is no optimal PST solution with an overhead value that is less
than or equal to 1000 for all problems where the optimal solution is known. No budgets
are considered where 5000 < B < 231−1, as all optimal solutions found where B = 231−1
are identical to those where B = 5000, implying that there is no PST, T , with higher
trust values where 5000 < OT < 2
31 − 1 and OT is the overhead value of T . The choice
of B = 231 − 1 is so that the algorithms can find the most trusted PST with the largest
permitted integer overhead budget.
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Problem set A (table 5.1) consists of problems where 1 ≤ |R| ≤ 9. Set A is the only
problem set where optimal solutions are available for comparison to those found by the
tabu search algorithms, as for larger problems, the running times of the exhaustive search
are excessive. Table 5.2 shows the execution times of the exhaustive search for each subset
of problems in problem set A. The average times given are those of the five algorithm runs
for each subset of problems, except for A9 where this was impractical. Each experiment
run finds the solutions where the overhead budget is 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, and 231 − 1.
For problem subsets A0 to A4, the exhaustive search executes quickly, however, there is
an order of magnitude difference in the execution time with the addition of an additional
router to problems of subsets A5 and A8. The timings exhibit non-linear growth, which
is to be expected, as the problem under consideration is in NP-Complete. Given the
execution time of the exhaustive search for problem A9, attempts to solve larger problems
were not attempted.
The remaining problem sets B (table 5.3) and C (table 5.4), allow for the evaluation
of the algorithms with respect to larger cardinalities of the set R. For problem set B,
problems with between 10 to 19 routers are defined, and for problem set C, from 20 to
100 routers in increments of 10. Problems C100-1, C100-2, C100-3, C100-4 and C100-5
are the largest problems by |V |, |Ec| and |R| that are considered, where the connectivity
graph has 106 vertices and 2782 edges, and the trust graph of the same number of vertices
and 1020 edges.
5.3.1 Publish/Subscribe Properties
To generate the advertisement Ap for the publisher p, the set of events E drawn from
the event distribution Ev and the subscriptions sfs for all s ∈ S, the Numbers Interval
(NI) model is used (Huang and Garcia-Molina, 2003). The model defines a subscription
as an interval on the real line, with events represented as real values. Given a subscrip-
tion of interval [x, y], event i matches the subscription if and only if x ≤ i ≤ y is true,
where x, y, i ∈ R. Huang and Molina define three variants of the NI model to generate
subscriptions: the NI-R (random center) model where a real value is chosen at random
to be the centre of the subscription interval; the NI-X model where the location of the
subscriber (x-coordinate) is used as the centre of the interval; and the NI-Xmod model
where some random offset is added to the x-coordinate of the subscriber to give the centre
of the interval. The NI-X and NI-Xmod models generate localised subscriptions, which
is of interest when evaluating the overhead metric, but is irrelevant with respect to the
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Properties Solution
Pr |Vc| |Ec| |S| |R| B Gc Density |Vtrust| |Etrust| τTbest OTbest
A0-1 6 7 5 0 2000 0.467 6 20 - -
A0-2 6 7 5 0 3000 0.467 6 20 0.0322 2179
A0-3 6 7 5 0 4000 0.467 6 20 0.0322 2179
A0-4 6 7 5 0 5000 0.467 6 20 0.0322 2179
A0-5 6 7 5 0 231 − 1 0.467 6 20 0.0322 2179
A1-1 7 10 5 1 2000 0.476 7 30 - -
A1-2 7 10 5 1 3000 0.476 7 30 0.0181 2398
A1-3 7 10 5 1 4000 0.476 7 30 0.0181 2398
A1-4 7 10 5 1 5000 0.476 7 30 0.0181 2398
A1-5 7 10 5 1 231 − 1 0.476 7 30 0.0181 2398
A2-1 8 14 5 2 2000 0.5 8 40 0.0931 1850
A2-2 8 14 5 2 3000 0.5 8 40 0.0931 1850
A2-3 8 14 5 2 4000 0.5 8 40 0.0931 1850
A2-4 8 14 5 2 5000 0.5 8 40 0.0931 1850
A2-5 8 14 5 2 231 − 1 0.5 8 40 0.0931 1850
A3-1 9 18 5 3 2000 0.5 9 50 - -
A3-2 9 18 5 3 3000 0.5 9 50 0.0224 2917
A3-3 9 18 5 3 4000 0.5 9 50 0.0224 2917
A3-4 9 18 5 3 5000 0.5 9 50 0.0224 2917
A3-5 9 18 5 3 231 − 1 0.5 9 50 0.0224 2917
A4-1 10 22 5 4 2000 0.489 10 60 - -
A4-2 10 22 5 4 3000 0.489 10 60 0.1855 2224
A4-3 10 22 5 4 4000 0.489 10 60 0.1855 2224
A4-4 10 22 5 4 5000 0.489 10 60 0.1855 2224
A4-5 10 22 5 4 231 − 1 0.489 10 60 0.1855 2224
A5-1 11 27 5 5 2000 0.491 11 70 - -
A5-2 11 27 5 5 3000 0.491 11 70 0.0542 2262
A5-3 11 27 5 5 4000 0.491 11 70 0.0812 3196
A5-4 11 27 5 5 5000 0.491 11 70 0.0812 3196
A5-5 11 27 5 5 231 − 1 0.491 11 70 0.0812 3196
A6-1 12 33 5 6 2000 0.5 12 80 - -
A6-2 12 33 5 6 3000 0.5 12 80 - -
A6-3 12 33 5 6 4000 0.5 12 80 0.0360 3846
A6-4 12 33 5 6 5000 0.5 12 80 0.0360 4414
A6-5 12 33 5 6 231 − 1 0.5 12 80 0.0360 4414
A7-1 13 39 5 7 2000 0.5 13 90 - -
A7-2 13 39 5 7 3000 0.5 13 90 - -
A7-3 13 39 5 7 4000 0.5 13 90 0.0692 3570
A7-4 13 39 5 7 5000 0.5 13 90 0.0692 3570
A7-5 13 39 5 7 231 − 1 0.5 13 90 0.0692 3570
A8-1 14 45 5 8 2000 0.495 14 100 - -
A8-2 14 45 5 8 3000 0.495 14 100 - -
A8-3 14 45 5 8 4000 0.495 14 100 0.0031 3657
A8-4 14 45 5 8 5000 0.495 14 100 0.0031 4031
A8-5 14 45 5 8 231 − 1 0.495 14 100 0.0031 4031
A9-1 15 52 5 9 2000 0.495 15 110 0.2184 1885
A9-2 15 52 5 9 3000 0.495 15 110 0.2184 1885
A9-3 15 52 5 9 4000 0.495 15 110 0.2184 1885
A9-4 15 52 5 9 5000 0.495 15 110 0.2184 1885
A9-5 15 52 5 9 231 − 1 0.495 15 110 0.2184 1885
Table 5.1: Problem Set A
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Pr. Min. (s) Max. (s) Avg. (s)
A0 0.0153 0.0871 0.0339
A1 0.0239 0.1522 0.058
A2 0.1238 0.3774 0.1852
A3 0.8051 1.2791 0.9304
A4 1.7682 2.4166 1.9041
A5 19.5833 20.212 19.7224
A6 285.8669 287.4492 286.3381
A7 945.8277 949.9657 947.4963
A8 6149.868 6164.197 6158.712
A9 97672.93 97672.93 -
Table 5.2: Execution Times of Exhaustive Search Results for Problem Set A
evaluation objectives described above. In addition, as the generated connectivity graphs
do not encapsulate any location information, the NI-R model is used.
Advertisements are not specified in the NI-R model, so it is extended such that Ap
is defined as an interval [a, b] on the real line. For each e ∈ E, a ≤ e ≤ b and is
chosen at random from the event distribution Ev, a normal distribution N (µ, σ2) where
µ = (b− a)/2 (mean) and σ = (µ− a)/3 (standard deviation). Where e > b ∧ e < a, the
value is discarded. The set of events is identical for all problems within a problem set and
consists of one thousand events. For each subscriber s ∈ S, the subscription sfs = [x, y]
such that a ≤ x ≤ b ∧ a ≤ y ≤ b ∧ x ≤ y. The values x and y are drawn from the same
normal distribution as the events. In all experiments, the chosen values for a and b are
0.333 and 0.666 respectively.
5.3.2 Connectivity Graph
Many networks topologies exhibit the power-law property in the number of adjacent edges
at vertices such that a small set of vertices have a much higher degree than others (i.e.
there exists a small set of hub vertices). These topologies are referred to as scale-free
networks, examples of which include the World Wide Web (Baraba´si et al., 2000) and
social networks, such as the e-mail network where e-mail addresses are vertices and e-
mails are edges (Ebel et al., 2002). For each problem instance, the connectivity graph
Gc = (V,Ec) was generated using the EppsteinPowerLawGenerator class from the JUNG
library that generates a graph with power law properties (Eppstein and Wang, 2002).
The algorithm begins by generating a random graph with m-edges and then running for
a number of iterations, during which an edge is removed from the graph and a new edge
added that connects two nodes where one is chosen with probability that is proportional
to its degree, subject to the edge not being a member of the edge set and not being a
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Pr |Vc| |Ec| |S| |R| B (Budget) Gc Density |Vtrust| |Etrust|
B10-1 16 60 5 10 2000 0.5 16 120
B10-2 16 60 5 10 3000 0.5 16 120
B10-3 16 60 5 10 4000 0.5 16 120
B10-4 16 60 5 10 5000 0.5 16 120
B10-5 16 60 5 10 231 − 1 0.5 16 120
B11-1 17 68 5 11 2000 0.5 17 130
B11-2 17 68 5 11 3000 0.5 17 130
B11-3 17 68 5 11 4000 0.5 17 130
B11-4 17 68 5 11 5000 0.5 17 130
B11-5 17 68 5 11 231 − 1 0.5 17 130
B12-1 18 76 5 12 2000 0.496 18 140
B12-2 18 76 5 12 3000 0.496 18 140
B12-3 18 76 5 12 4000 0.496 18 140
B12-4 18 76 5 12 5000 0.496 18 140
B12-5 18 76 5 12 231 − 1 0.496 18 140
B13-1 19 85 5 13 2000 0.497 19 150
B13-2 19 85 5 13 3000 0.497 19 150
B13-3 19 85 5 13 4000 0.497 19 150
B13-4 19 85 5 13 5000 0.497 19 150
B13-5 19 85 5 13 231 − 1 0.497 19 150
B14-1 20 95 5 14 2000 0.5 20 160
B14-2 20 95 5 14 3000 0.5 20 160
B14-3 20 95 5 14 4000 0.5 20 160
B14-4 20 95 5 14 5000 0.5 20 160
B14-5 20 95 5 14 231 − 1 0.5 20 160
B15-1 21 105 5 15 2000 0.5 21 170
B15-2 21 105 5 15 3000 0.5 21 170
B15-3 21 105 5 15 4000 0.5 21 170
B15-4 21 105 5 15 5000 0.5 21 170
B15-5 21 105 5 15 231 − 1 0.5 21 170
B16-1 22 115 5 16 2000 0.498 22 180
B16-2 22 115 5 16 3000 0.498 22 180
B16-3 22 115 5 16 4000 0.498 22 180
B16-4 22 115 5 16 5000 0.498 22 180
B16-5 22 115 5 16 231 − 1 0.498 22 180
B17-1 23 126 5 17 2000 0.498 23 190
B17-2 23 126 5 17 3000 0.498 23 190
B17-3 23 126 5 17 4000 0.498 23 190
B17-4 23 126 5 17 5000 0.498 23 190
B17-5 23 126 5 17 231 − 1 0.498 23 190
B18-1 24 138 5 18 2000 0.5 24 200
B18-2 24 138 5 18 3000 0.5 24 200
B18-3 24 138 5 18 4000 0.5 24 200
B18-4 24 138 5 18 5000 0.5 24 200
B18-5 24 138 5 18 231 − 1 0.5 24 200
B19-1 25 150 5 19 2000 0.5 25 210
B19-2 25 150 5 19 3000 0.5 25 210
B19-3 25 150 5 19 4000 0.5 25 210
B19-4 25 150 5 19 5000 0.5 25 210
B19-5 25 150 5 19 231 − 1 0.5 25 210
Table 5.3: Problem Set B
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Pr |Vc| |Ec| |S| |R| B (Budget) Gc Density |Vtrust| |Etrust|
C20-1 26 162 5 20 2000 0.498 26 220
C20-2 26 162 5 20 3000 0.498 26 220
C20-3 26 162 5 20 4000 0.498 26 220
C20-4 26 162 5 20 5000 0.498 26 220
C20-5 26 162 5 20 231 − 1 0.498 26 220
C30-1 36 315 5 30 2000 0.5 36 320
C30-2 36 315 5 30 3000 0.5 36 320
C30-3 36 315 5 30 4000 0.5 36 320
C30-4 36 315 5 30 5000 0.5 36 320
C30-5 36 315 5 30 231 − 1 0.5 36 320
C40-1 46 517 5 40 2000 0.4995169 46 420
C40-2 46 517 5 40 3000 0.4995169 46 420
C40-3 46 517 5 40 4000 0.4995169 46 420
C40-4 46 517 5 40 5000 0.4995169 46 420
C40-5 46 517 5 40 231 − 1 0.4995169 46 420
C50-1 56 770 5 50 2000 0.5 56 520
C50-2 56 770 5 50 3000 0.5 56 520
C50-3 56 770 5 50 4000 0.5 56 520
C50-4 56 770 5 50 5000 0.5 56 520
C50-5 56 770 5 50 231 − 1 0.5 56 520
C60-1 66 1072 5 60 2000 0.4997669 66 620
C60-2 66 1072 5 60 3000 0.4997669 66 620
C60-3 66 1072 5 60 4000 0.4997669 66 620
C60-4 66 1072 5 60 5000 0.4997669 66 620
C60-5 66 1072 5 60 231 − 1 0.4997669 66 620
C70-1 76 1425 5 70 2000 0.5 76 720
C70-2 76 1425 5 70 3000 0.5 76 720
C70-3 76 1425 5 70 4000 0.5 76 720
C70-4 76 1425 5 70 5000 0.5 76 720
C70-5 76 1425 5 70 231 − 1 0.5 76 720
C80-1 86 1827 5 80 2000 0.4998632 86 820
C80-2 86 1827 5 80 3000 0.4998632 86 820
C80-3 86 1827 5 80 4000 0.4998632 86 820
C80-4 86 1827 5 80 5000 0.4998632 86 820
C80-5 86 1827 5 80 231 − 1 0.4998632 86 820
C90-1 96 2280 5 90 2000 0.5 96 920
C90-2 96 2280 5 90 3000 0.5 96 920
C90-3 96 2280 5 90 4000 0.5 96 920
C90-4 96 2280 5 90 5000 0.5 96 920
C90-5 96 2280 5 90 231 − 1 0.5 96 920
C100-1 106 2782 5 100 2000 0.49991015 106 1020
C100-2 106 2782 5 100 3000 0.49991015 106 1020
C100-3 106 2782 5 100 4000 0.49991015 106 1020
C100-4 106 2782 5 100 5000 0.49991015 106 1020
C100-5 106 2782 5 100 231 − 1 0.49991015 106 1020
Table 5.4: Problem Set C
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Figure 5.1: Average Execution Times of Exhaustive Search Results for Problem Set A
self-loop. The algorithm ran for one thousand iterations and the number of required edges
was set such that the generated graphs had graph density approximately equal to 0.5. The
connectivity graphs are simple graphs where no router vertex has only one adjacent edge.
This ensures that all routers in R can be considered as a candidate router of the solution
PST, as any router with only one adjacent edge can only be a leaf of a PST, which is
contradictory to the definition of a PST.
5.3.3 Trust Graph and Trust Functions
Analysis of social networks shows that they have both scale-free and small-word properties
(Guha et al., 2004), however, there is some initial research to suggest that the Pareto-
lognormal distribution may provide a better fit, as the power-law model over estimates
the number of nodes with high degree (Sala et al., 2010). Experiments conducted on the
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Advogato trust data set8 support the theory of an over-estimation of high degree nodes by
the power-law distribution. Figure 5.2 shows the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) of the out-degree of vertices in the Advogato trust graph. As the graph
is a log-log plot, the CCDF would fit a Pareto distribution only if it were a straight line,
however this is not the case. The Pareto distribution where α = 1.621746 is shown on the
figure and is the best-fit for the empirical data as given by the R library, igraph9. Further
research on the suitability of the Pareto-lognormal distribution is required, so in this work
it is assumed that the trust graph has a high clustering property (small-world) and fits
the power-law model.
Outdegree (log10)
P
(X
≥
x)
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
100 100.5 101 101.5 102 102.5
Empirical Pareto Fit (alpha = 1.621746)
Figure 5.2: Power-law fit to Empirical CCDF of Advogato Out-degree
To generate trust graphs with both power-law and high clustering properties, the
model described by Klemm and Egu´ıluz is used (Klemm and Eguiluz, 2002). It requires
8http://www.trustlet.org/datasets/advogato/
9http://igraph.sourceforge.net/
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two parameters, µ and m, where µ ∈ [0, 1] is a tunable parameter such that µ = 0 gives a
high clustering model and µ = 1 is the Barabasi-Albert model (scale-free) (Baraba´si et al.,
2000), and m is the number of active nodes at any given iteration. The initial graph has
m vertices and is complete with each node in an active state. At any given iteration only
m vertices can be active, and it is to these vertices that a new vertex, n, is connected
to at each iteration. The algorithm continues by determining with random probability,
proportional to the vertex degree (i.e. preferential attachment), if each newly added edge
(n, y), where y is an active vertex, is replaced by an edge (n, x) where x is a randomly
chosen vertex that is a member of the graph’s vertex set and maybe in either the active
or inactivate state. An iteration of the algorithm ends with r being set to the active state
and one of the existing active vertices being deactivated with probability that is inversely
proportional to the ratio of a given active vertex’s degree to the sum of the degrees at all
active vertices.
To generate the trust graph for a given problem instance, µ = 0.1 and m = 5 were
selected. µ = 0.1 is chosen for two reasons: the experimental results by Klemm and
Egu´ıluz show that µ = 0.1 gives short average path lengths, which is a property of scale-
free networks, and that they grow logarithmically with the graph size, a property of
small-world networks; the clustering coefficient is shown to be near to constant where
0 < µ  1. Each edge represents a trust relationship, but given two adjacent vertices, a
and b, the trust value of their relationship may not be identical, that is τ(a, b) 6= τ(b, a),
so the undirected edge is replaced by two directed and weighted edges. Due to the absence
of analytical research on directed trust graphs with real-valued edge weights representing
trust, the trust values of the relationships encapsulated by the trust graph were chosen at
random from a normal distribution with mean µ = 0.5 and variance σ2 = (0.5/3)2 where
any random values greater than 1 and less than 0 were discarded. Note that trust values
must be between 0 and 1 inclusive, as this is a requirement inherited from the analytical
leximin function. The user-set parameter of this function is ∆ = 0.001.
5.4 Evaluation of Tabu Search Algorithms
5.4.1 Problem Set A
This test data set comprises of problems where 1 ≤ |R| ≤ 9 and |S| = 5. For all solutions
found by the tabu search algorithms, the relative errors to the optimal solutions found by
the exhaustive search algorithm (table 5.1) are given. The following subsections provide
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an analysis of the results for the tabu search algorithm with respect to each combination
of penalty function, PST selection policy, and diversification technique. The section ends
with a summary of the conclusions drawn from the results tables and the averages for the
properties under evaluation (table 5.9).
5.4.1.1 Static Penalty Function and Best PST Selection
The results for the tabu search algorithm with static penalty function and best PST
selection policy are given in table 5.5 with problems where no optimal solution exists
omitted. They show that the optimal solution is found for all problems in problem subsets
A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, and A9, regardless of the diversification strategy used. In addition,
optimal solutions are found for subset A8 when the SPT diversification policy is used. Of
the 35 problems in the test data set, 30 optimal solutions are found by the algorithm when
SPT diversification is used and 28 are found with Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification.
The problem subsets A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, and A9, each contain problems whose
optimal solutions have identical trust and overhead values, however, this is not the case
for A5, A6, and A8, where the algorithm finds non-optimal solutions. The algorithm,
using either diversification strategy, finds the optimal solution for A5-2, A6-3, and A8-3,
the problems with the strictest budget in their subsets where an optimal solution exists.
For A5-3, A5-4, and A5-5, the diversification policies yield the same solutions with no
relative error in the trust values and 0.1202 relative error in the overhead values. For A6-
4 and A6-5, the solutions are identical for both diversification strategies with a relative
error of 5×10−7 in the trust value and 0.1287 in the overhead values. Problems A8-4
and A8-5 are the only ones where there is a difference in the solutions between the two
diversification strategies. The use of SPT diversification leads to the algorithm finding
the optimal solutions for A8-3, A8-4 and A8-5, but the Takahashi-Diversification does
not, although there is only a small relative error of 1×10−6 in the trust value and 0.00928
in the overhead value. With reference to table 5.22, the initial solutions found by the
Takahashi-Matsuyama and SPT heuristics are different for the problems A8-4 and A8-5,
where the SPT solution is the less favourable. In practise, the solutions found for A8-4
and A8-5 with Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification could be considered preferable, as the
relative trust error is negligible and the solutions are of a lower overhead value, however
given the problem definition, they are not optimal. No solution found by the algorithm is
over the given budget, B, for all problems.
There is little difference in the running times between the diversification policies until
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problem A8-4. The differences in the average running times for A8-4 and A8-5 are 10.74
and 10.82 seconds slower with SPT diversification respectively. For problems in A9, the
difference increases to approximately 21 seconds. For the problem subsets A1 to A4, the
running times of the exhaustive search outperforms those of this tabu search algorithm
regardless of the diversification strategy used. The exhaustive search running time for
problem subset A1 is approximately 205 times faster, but this declines to 4.5 times faster
for problem subset A4.
Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
A1-2 0.0181 2398 - - 2.90 0.0181 2398 - - 2.92
A1-3 0.0181 2398 - - 2.90 0.0181 2398 - - 2.92
A1-4 0.0181 2398 - - 2.89 0.0181 2398 - - 2.92
A1-5 0.0181 2398 - - 2.89 0.0181 2398 - - 2.90
A2-1 0.0931 1850 - - 11.77 0.0931 1850 - - 11.93
A2-2 0.0931 1850 - - 11.78 0.0931 1850 - - 11.93
A2-3 0.0931 1850 - - 11.77 0.0931 1850 - - 11.94
A2-4 0.0931 1850 - - 11.75 0.0931 1850 - - 11.93
A2-5 0.0931 1850 - - 11.79 0.0931 1850 - - 11.90
A3-2 0.0224 2917 - - 9.39 0.0224 2917 - - 9.35
A3-3 0.0224 2917 - - 9.40 0.0224 2917 - - 9.34
A3-4 0.0224 2917 - - 9.42 0.0224 2917 - - 9.36
A3-5 0.0224 2917 - - 9.39 0.0224 2917 - - 9.33
A4-2 0.1855 2224 - - 9.06 0.1855 2224 - - 9.03
A4-3 0.1855 2224 - - 9.06 0.1855 2224 - - 9.05
A4-4 0.1855 2224 - - 9.04 0.1855 2224 - - 9.02
A4-5 0.1855 2224 - - 9.01 0.1855 2224 - - 8.99
A5-2 0.0542 2262 - - 9.13 0.0542 2262 - - 9.09
A5-3 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.84 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.81
A5-4 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.82 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.80
A5-5 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.80 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.79
A6-3 0.0360 3846 - - 39.50 0.0360 3846 - - 39.54
A6-4 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 41.45 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 41.41
A6-5 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 42.91 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 42.86
A7-3 0.0692 3570 - - 88.41 0.0692 3570 - - 88.17
A7-4 0.0692 3570 - - 88.74 0.0692 3570 - - 88.61
A7-5 0.0692 3570 - - 88.77 0.0692 3570 - - 88.52
A8-3 0.0031 3657 - - 20.66 0.0031 3657 - - 24.12
A8-4 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 20.71 0.0031 4031 - - 31.45
A8-5 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 20.70 0.0031 4031 - - 31.52
A9-1 0.2184 1885 - - 48.98 0.2184 1885 - - 70.19
A9-2 0.2184 1885 - - 48.95 0.2184 1885 - - 70.05
A9-3 0.2184 1885 - - 48.94 0.2184 1885 - - 70.23
A9-4 0.2184 1885 - - 48.90 0.2184 1885 - - 70.33
A9-5 0.2184 1885 - - 48.92 0.2184 1885 - - 70.33
Table 5.5: Solutions for Problem Set A using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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5.4.1.2 Static Penalty Function and Adaptive PST Selection
The results for problem set A (table 5.6) are identical to those of the tabu search with
static penalty and best PST selection, for both diversification strategies. It is likely that
the absence of any improvement is due to: the initial solution being optimal for some
problem subsets (see table 5.22); and the small problem sizes with respect to |R| and
consequently the size of the connectivity graph and the number of PSTs (i.e. elements of
the search space).
The running times for problem subsets A1 to A4 are similar to those of the tabu search
with static penalty and best PST selection policy for both diversification strategies and
they are similarly inferior to those of the exhaustive search. For problem subset A6, the
use of the adaptive PST selection policy results in slower running times (a little over four
times slower), but for problem subsets A7, A8, and A9, the opposite is true.
5.4.1.3 NFT Penalty Function and Best PST Selection
The static penalty function penalises PSTs found by the tabu search that are over budget
by decreasing their objective value to 50% of the solution’s trust value. Such an approach
may prove to be disadvantageous, as a move to a worse current solution may eventually
lead to finding a better overall solution, but the static penalty discourages this by fa-
vouring PSTs that are within budget. The NFT penalty function attempts to encourage
exploration of the search space in a manner that is dependent upon the previously found
solutions. It penalises solutions that are over budget to a lesser extent (i.e. within some
feasible threshold) if the solutions in the algorithm’s memory structures have been under
budget, and more so if the opposite is true. According to its authors, such a technique
should be expected to yield improvements to the results in comparison to a static pen-
alty function (Kulturel-Konak et al., 2004), but the results for this particular problem
set (table 5.7) show otherwise. The algorithm with Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification
finds 27 optimal solutions and with SPT diversification, 29 optimal solutions are found,
one less in each case than the algorithm using the static penalty function with identical
diversification strategy.
Unlike the tabu search utilising the static penalty function, the tabu search with NFT
penalty function, best PST selection and Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification finds a
non-optimal solution for problem A5-2, which has high relative errors, 0.4976 in the trust
value and 0.4129 in the overhead value, and is also over-budget. These are the highest
errors of any non-optimal solution found for data set A, but this solution is the optimal
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Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
A1-2 0.0181 2398 - - 3.01 0.0181 2398 - - 2.89
A1-3 0.0181 2398 - - 3.02 0.0181 2398 - - 2.88
A1-4 0.0181 2398 - - 3.01 0.0181 2398 - - 2.89
A1-5 0.0181 2398 - - 3.00 0.0181 2398 - - 2.87
A2-1 0.0931 1850 - - 8.44 0.0931 1850 - - 8.42
A2-2 0.0931 1850 - - 8.49 0.0931 1850 - - 8.41
A2-3 0.0931 1850 - - 8.40 0.0931 1850 - - 8.40
A2-4 0.0931 1850 - - 8.37 0.0931 1850 - - 8.35
A2-5 0.0931 1850 - - 8.36 0.0931 1850 - - 8.36
A3-2 0.0224 2917 - - 11.12 0.0224 2917 - - 8.91
A3-3 0.0224 2917 - - 11.12 0.0224 2917 - - 8.93
A3-4 0.0224 2917 - - 11.03 0.0224 2917 - - 8.88
A3-5 0.0224 2917 - - 11.06 0.0224 2917 - - 8.89
A4-2 0.1855 2224 - - 7.28 0.1855 2224 - - 7.08
A4-3 0.1855 2224 - - 7.21 0.1855 2224 - - 7.01
A4-4 0.1855 2224 - - 7.20 0.1855 2224 - - 7.02
A4-5 0.1855 2224 - - 7.21 0.1855 2224 - - 7.02
A5-2 0.0542 2262 - - 13.63 0.0542 2262 - - 13.67
A5-3 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.26 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.26
A5-4 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.24 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.24
A5-5 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.22 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.25
A6-3 0.0360 3846 - - 139.19 0.0360 3846 - - 139.87
A6-4 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 138.96 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 139.87
A6-5 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 127.22 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 127.98
A7-2 0.0692 3570 - - 70.95 0.0692 3570 - - 71.02
A7-3 0.0692 3570 - - 72.92 0.0692 3570 - - 72.75
A7-4 0.0692 3570 - - 78.38 0.0692 3570 - - 78.33
A8-3 0.0031 3657 - - 9.77 0.0031 3657 - - 9.30
A8-4 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 9.77 0.0031 4031 - - 12.11
A8-5 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 9.82 0.0031 4031 - - 12.13
A9-1 0.2184 1885 - - 20.39 0.2184 1885 - - 36.06
A9-2 0.2184 1885 - - 14.69 0.2184 1885 - - 29.70
A9-3 0.2184 1885 - - 20.55 0.2184 1885 - - 37.15
A9-4 0.2184 1885 - - 20.49 0.2184 1885 - - 37.19
A9-5 0.2184 1885 - - 20.51 0.2184 1885 - - 37.21
Table 5.6: Solutions for Problem Set A using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and Ad-
aptive PST Selection
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one for A5-3, A5-4 and A5-5, and peculiarly it is not found for these problems. All other
optimal and non-optimal solutions are identical to those found by the static penalty tabu
search algorithms. In comparison to the tabu search algorithm using the static penalty
function, the best PST selection policy and the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification, the
running times are similar except for the problems in A8 which are on average 2.55, 2.56,
and 2.55 times faster for problems A8-3, A8-4, and A8-5 respectively. As is the case for the
tabu search with static penalty algorithms, the exhaustive search runs faster for problem
subsets A1-A4.
With the SPT diversification strategy, better performance is observed than with the
Takahashi-Matsuyama, as more optimal solutions are found and for the problem A5-2, the
relative trust error is eliminated, the relative overhead error is reduced to 0.1698, and the
solution found is not over budget. In problem subsets A6 and A8, the algorithm finds the
optimal solutions where the budget B is 5000 and 231 − 1, but not for B = 4000. This is
the opposite behaviour to that of the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification strategy, where
the solution is found for the strictest budget problems, but is not found for problems with
a larger budget. Two solutions found by the algorithm are over budget, problem A6-3
(14% error) and A8-3 (10% error). Compared to the tabu search with static penalty
function, there is an improvement in problem subset A6 (two optimal solutions found
rather one) and a deterioration in problem subset A8 (two optimal solution rather than
all three). The running times, for the most part, are comparable to those of the tabu
search algorithm with static penalty, best PST selection and SPT diversification, however
there is an improvement when using the NFT penalty function for the problems in the
subset A8 and the problem A5-2, and a deterioration for those in the subset A9. For
A5-2, A8-3, A8-4, and A8-5 the running times are 3, 1.96, 2.56 and 2.54 times faster
respectively. For A6-3, A6-4 and A6-5, the running times are 1.58, 2.13, and 2.05 times
slower respectively. In comparison to the exhaustive search running times, the use of SPT
diversification results in slower running times for problem subsets A1-A4 and problem
A5-2. The latter is not true of with the use of the Takahashi-Matsuyama strategy.
5.4.1.4 NFT Penalty Function and Adaptive PST Selection
The tabu search with NFT penalty and adaptive PST selection policy finds identical
solutions to those found by the tabu search with NFT penalty and best PST selection
policy where both use the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification strategy. Although the
solutions found are identical, there are notable differences in the running times for the
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Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
A1-2 0.0181 2398 - - 3.21 0.0181 2398 - - 3.63
A1-3 0.0181 2398 - - 3.05 0.0181 2398 - - 3.62
A1-4 0.0181 2398 - - 3.01 0.0181 2398 - - 3.63
A1-5 0.0181 2398 - - 3.03 0.0181 2398 - - 3.61
A2-1 0.0931 1850 - - 11.74 0.0931 1850 - - 12.76
A2-2 0.0931 1850 - - 11.84 0.0931 1850 - - 12.79
A2-3 0.0931 1850 - - 11.93 0.0931 1850 - - 12.73
A2-4 0.0931 1850 - - 11.87 0.0931 1850 - - 12.66
A2-5 0.0931 1850 - - 11.97 0.0931 1850 - - 12.68
A3-2 0.0224 2917 - - 7.76 0.0224 2917 - - 9.65
A3-3 0.0224 2917 - - 7.76 0.0224 2917 - - 9.62
A3-4 0.0224 2917 - - 7.73 0.0224 2917 - - 9.66
A3-5 0.0224 2917 - - 7.73 0.0224 2917 - - 9.68
A4-2 0.1855 2224 - - 8.90 0.1855 2224 - - 11.64
A4-3 0.1855 2224 - - 8.84 0.1855 2224 - - 11.76
A4-4 0.1855 2224 - - 8.84 0.1855 2224 - - 11.80
A4-5 0.1855 2224 - - 8.84 0.1855 2224 - - 11.80
A5-2 0.0812 3196 0.4976 0.4129 9.87 0.0542 2646 - 0.1698 27.27
A5-3 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.84 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 6.11
A5-4 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.81 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 6.09
A5-5 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 5.85 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 6.07
A6-3 0.0360 3846 - - 39.46 0.0360 4414 5×10−7 0.1477 62.62
A6-4 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 41.22 0.0360 4414 - - 88.34
A6-5 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 42.56 0.0360 4414 - - 87.68
A7-3 0.0692 3570 - - 87.22 0.0692 3570 - - 94.41
A7-4 0.0692 3570 - - 86.90 0.0692 3570 - - 94.62
A7-5 0.0692 3570 - - 87.48 0.0692 3570 - - 94.77
A8-3 0.0031 3657 - - 8.09 0.0031 4031 1×10−6 0.1023 12.30
A8-4 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 8.08 0.0031 4031 - - 12.30
A8-5 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 8.09 0.0031 4031 - - 12.40
A9-1 0.2184 1885 - - 50.32 0.2184 1885 - - 69.85
A9-2 0.2184 1885 - - 50.36 0.2184 1885 - - 69.54
A9-3 0.2184 1885 - - 50.69 0.2184 1885 - - 69.95
A9-4 0.2184 1885 - - 50.60 0.2184 1885 - - 69.64
A9-5 0.2184 1885 - - 50.26 0.2184 1885 - - 69.62
Table 5.7: Solutions for Problem Set A using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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problem subsets A6 and A9. For problem subset A6, there is a deterioration in the running
times with the adaptive policy resulting in problems A6-3, A6-4 and A6-5, running on
average 3.54, 3.39 and 3.00 times slower. The opposite effect is observed for A9, with the
adaptive policy resulting in faster running times for the problems in this subset by at best,
30% (A9-2).
The tabu search with NFT penalty function, best PST selection policy, and SPT
diversification found six non-optimal solutions, but when the adaptive PST selection is
used, five non-optimal solutions are found, the improvement being in the solution to
problem A6-3. The number of over budget solutions remains the same. Comparing the best
and adaptive PST policies for the tabu search algorithm utilising the NFT penalty function
and the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification strategy, the adaptive PST selection policy
gives three less non-optimal solutions, but the running times for all problems are slower.
The adaptive policy has an adverse effect on the solution found for problem A5-3, where
the relative error in the overhead value increases to 0.4129 and the relative error in the
trust value is 0.4976. The running times for A6 and A9 differ significantly when compared
to those of the tabu search with NFT penalty, best PST selection and SPT diversification.
For problems A6-3, A6-4, and A6-5, the running times are 2.84, 2.34, and 2.60 times slower
on average. For all problems in the subset A9, there is an improvement in the running
times.
5.4.1.5 Summary
Table 5.9 shows that the static penalty function outperforms the NFT penalty function
with respect to the number of non-optimal and over-budget solutions found, the average
trust error of the non-optimal solutions, and the average overhead error of the non-optimal
solutions. For each algorithm, the static penalty function variant finds more optimal
solutions than those that use the NFT penalty function, except when the adaptive PST
selection policy and SPT diversification are used, where they find the same number. All
algorithms using the static penalty function find no over-budget solutions, but for the NFT
penalty function this is not the case, as in conjunction with the Takahashi-Matsuyama
diversification strategy, one over budget solution is found, and with SPT diversification,
two over budget solutions are found. The average trust error is less for all static penalty
tabu search algorithms when compared to the algorithm with identical properties other
than the penalty function. The algorithms using the NFT penalty function, other than
the variant with best PST selection policy and SPT diversification, have average trust
94
Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
A1-2 0.0181 2398 - - 2.90 0.0181 2398 - - 3.06
A1-3 0.0181 2398 - - 2.88 0.0181 2398 - - 3.06
A1-4 0.0181 2398 - - 2.88 0.0181 2398 - - 3.04
A1-5 0.0181 2398 - - 2.90 0.0181 2398 - - 3.03
A2-1 0.0931 1850 - - 8.43 0.0931 1850 - - 8.74
A2-2 0.0931 1850 - - 8.41 0.0931 1850 - - 8.81
A2-3 0.0931 1850 - - 8.37 0.0931 1850 - - 8.77
A2-4 0.0931 1850 - - 8.36 0.0931 1850 - - 8.75
A2-5 0.0931 1850 - - 8.36 0.0931 1850 - - 8.73
A3-2 0.0224 2917 - - 9.02 0.0224 2917 - - 11.32
A3-3 0.0224 2917 - - 9.04 0.0224 2917 - - 11.28
A3-4 0.0224 2917 - - 9.06 0.0224 2917 - - 11.33
A3-5 0.0224 2917 - - 9.11 0.0224 2917 - - 11.19
A4-2 0.1855 2224 - - 7.47 0.1855 2224 - - 9.47
A4-3 0.1855 2224 - - 7.35 0.1855 2224 - - 9.40
A4-4 0.1855 2224 - - 7.30 0.1855 2224 - - 9.32
A4-5 0.1855 2224 - - 7.30 0.1855 2224 - - 9.36
A5-2 0.0812 3196 0.4976 0.4129 13.64 0.0812 3196 0.4976 0.4129 14.75
A5-3 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.30 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.35
A5-4 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.23 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.33
A5-5 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.25 0.0812 3580 - 0.1202 8.28
A6-3 0.0360 3846 - - 139.74 0.0360 3846 - - 178.15
A6-4 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 139.72 0.0360 4414 - - 206.86
A6-5 0.0360 3846 5×10−7 0.1287 127.82 0.0360 4414 - - 228.70
A7-3 0.0692 3570 - - 70.76 0.0692 3570 - - 78.84
A7-4 0.0692 3570 - - 72.65 0.0692 3570 - - 78.54
A7-5 0.0692 3570 - - 77.97 0.0692 3570 - - 86.64
A8-3 0.0031 3657 - - 8.09 0.0031 4031 1×10−6 0.1023 12.30
A8-4 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 8.08 0.0031 4031 - - 12.30
A8-5 0.0031 3657 1×10−6 0.0928 8.09 0.0031 4031 - - 12.40
A9-1 0.2184 1885 - - 21.14 0.2184 1885 - - 36.14
A9-2 0.2184 1885 - - 15.22 0.2184 1885 - - 29.87
A9-3 0.2184 1885 - - 21.08 0.2184 1885 - - 37.14
A9-4 0.2184 1885 - - 21.07 0.2184 1885 - - 36.99
A9-5 0.2184 1885 - - 21.07 0.2184 1885 - - 36.95
Table 5.8: Solutions for Problem Set A using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Adaptive
PST Selection
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values that are five orders of magnitude greater than those of the tabu search algorithms
using the static penalty function. Given these observations, the NFT penalty function
gives no benefits. This may be because the technique is less beneficial when there are few
constraints (Kulturel-Konak et al., 2004), or due to the choice of value for the amplification
exponent, k, of the NFT penalty function. Increasing k would penalise the non-optimal
PSTs that are beyond the NFT to a greater degree, but reduce the penalty applied to
those solutions within the NFT.
Comparing the static penalty tabu search algorithms, it is evident that of the two
diversification strategies, SPT outperforms Takahashi-Matsuyama (this is also true of the
tabu search algorithms using the NFT penalty function, with respect to the number of non-
optimal solutions, but not the number of over budget solutions). Both pairs of algorithms
using the same diversification policies have the same results, so it can be concluded that
the initial and diversified SPTs result in more optimal solutions being found, despite the
fact that in some cases the initial SPT solution can be a worse PST than that given by
the Takahashi-Matsuyama heuristic.
For the average running time, the use of the Takahashi-Matsuyama policy results
in faster running times. Static penalty algorithms outperform the exhaustive search for
problem subsets A5 and above. This is also true of the NFT tabu search algorithms except
where the best PST selection and SPT diversification are used, where A5-2 is slower than
the exhaustive search.
Algorithm Non-optimal Over-budget Avg ητ Avg ηO Avg Time
Static, Best, Takahashi 7 0 9×10−7 0.1148 24.78
Static, Best, SPT 5 0 5×10−7 0.1236 28.53
Static, Adaptive, Takahashi 7 0 9×10−7 0.1148 26.27
Static, Adaptive, SPT 5 0 5×10−7 0.1236 28.47
NFT, Best, Takahashi 8 1 0.0995 0.1521 25.06
NFT, Best, SPT 6 2 9×10−7 0.1301 33.57
NFT, Adaptive, Takahashi 8 1 0.0995 0.1521 26.00
NFT, Adaptive, SPT 5 2 0.2487 0.1752 35.72
Table 5.9: Average Results Overview for Problem Set A
5.4.2 Problem Set B
This test data set has the same number of subscribers, |S| = 5, as problem set A, but the
cardinality of R is greater, 10 ≤ |R| ≤ 19. All other parameters used in the generation of
this problem set are identical to those used to generate problem set A. No relative errors
are given as it was impractical to run the exhaustive search algorithm on this problem set.
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The last column in each table of results for problem set B contains SPT where the SPT
solution is better than the Takahashi-Matsuyama one, Tak where the opposite is true,
N/A where the solutions found using both diversification policies are over-budget, or ’-’
where the solutions found are identical and neither are over budget.
5.4.2.1 Static Penalty Function and Best PST Selection
The results of the application of this algorithm to the problem set B are given in table 5.10.
Although in every problem instance, SPT diversification results in a slower running time
(for some problems by an order of magnitude difference) than the Takahashi-Matsuyama
diversification. The use of the former gives better solutions for eleven problem instances.
This follows from the tabu search results for problem set A where the use of SPT diversi-
fication gives more optimal solutions. The number of problems where no solution is within
budget is 12.
The longest average running time (748.67s) is that of problem A16-5 where the SPT
diversification strategy is used. This is longer than any of the average running times for
problem set A, but it is less than that of the exhaustive search for problem subset A7.
5.4.2.2 Static Penalty Function and Adaptive PST Selection
The use of the adaptive policy gives rise to a reduction in the number of problem instances
where the SPT diversification gives a better solution than the Takahashi-Matsuyama di-
versification. Two problems, B16-4 and B16-5, have a better solution when SPT di-
versification is used and one problem, B14-2, when Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification
is used. This change is due to the adaptive policy resulting in an improvement in the
solutions found with the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification, and not a deterioration in
those found with SPT diversification. For Takahashi-Matsuyama, improvements are seen
in B10-2, B12-3, B12-4, B12-5, B14-3, B16-4, B16-5, B17-2, B17-3, B17-5 when adaptive
PST selection rather than the best PST selection policy. The number of problems where
no solution within budget is found is 12, all of which are for the same problems as the
over budget PSTs found by the tabu search with static penalty function and best PST
selection.
As with the best PST selection policy, the use of the adaptive PST selection shows
that running times are slower when SPT diversification is used. The extent of the dif-
ference is dependent on the problem subset. For problems in B9, SPT diversification is
approximately seven times slower than that of Takahashi-Matsuyama, but the difference
97
Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
B10-1 0.1095 3592 30.88 0.1095 3592 102.42 N/A
B10-2 0.0850 2912 31.06 0.1095 2912 65.36 SPT
B10-3 0.1095 3592 45.59 0.1095 3592 127.72 -
B10-4 0.1095 3592 40.37 0.1095 3592 146.14 -
B10-5 0.1095 3592 40.41 0.1095 3592 145.93 -
B11-1 0.0722 3495 30.49 0.0722 3495 592.05 N/A
B11-2 0.0722 3495 30.63 0.0722 3495 592.70 N/A
B11-3 0.0722 3495 74.09 0.0722 3495 379.10 -
B11-4 0.0722 3495 69.61 0.0722 3495 144.23 -
B11-5 0.0722 3495 69.60 0.0722 3495 144.17 -
B12-1 0.0394 3002 35.71 0.0395 3682 89.38 N/A
B12-2 0.0394 2944 12.93 0.0394 2944 30.34 -
B12-3 0.0394 3753 44.90 0.0395 3812 74.98 SPT
B12-4 0.0394 3002 13.44 0.0395 3812 33.08 SPT
B12-5 0.0394 3002 13.45 0.0395 3812 34.24 SPT
B13-1 0.0770 1479 10.43 0.0770 1479 11.29 -
B13-2 0.0770 1479 10.43 0.0770 1479 11.27 -
B13-3 0.0770 1479 10.45 0.0770 1479 11.27 -
B13-4 0.0770 1479 10.46 0.0770 1479 11.25 -
B13-5 0.0770 1479 10.44 0.0770 1479 11.28 -
B14-1 0.0705 3359 15.13 0.0705 3743 311.10 N/A
B14-2 0.0628 2791 15.52 0.0705 3743 311.15 Tak.
B14-3 0.0705 3390 18.09 0.0705 3587 142.02 SPT
B14-4 0.0705 3774 30.75 0.0705 3587 145.03 -
B14-5 0.0705 3774 30.83 0.0705 3587 85.70 -
B15-1 0.1368 3977 9.96 0.0719 4493 28.51 N/A
B15-2 0.1368 3977 9.97 0.0719 4493 28.43 N/A
B15-3 0.1368 3813 12.92 0.1368 3603 31.38 -
B15-4 0.1368 3813 12.48 0.1368 3603 45.72 -
B15-5 0.1368 3813 12.47 0.1368 3603 44.92 -
B16-1 0.0177 4414 85.29 0.0178 5236 201.69 N/A
B16-2 0.0177 4414 85.36 0.0178 5236 201.92 N/A
B16-3 0.0177 4414 85.51 0.0178 5236 201.92 N/A
B16-4 0.0177 4930 88.11 0.0178 4852 200.25 SPT
B16-5 0.0177 5418 46.12 0.0178 5752 748.67 SPT
B17-1 0.1124 2079 29.12 0.1124 2970 117.99 N/A
B17-2 0.1124 2079 29.09 0.1124 2970 45.49 SPT
B17-3 0.1124 2079 29.05 0.1124 3912 49.69 SPT
B17-4 0.1124 2079 29.08 0.1124 3912 58.93 SPT
B17-5 0.1124 2079 29.05 0.1124 3912 66.49 SPT
B18-1 0.2218 1829 20.60 0.2218 1829 30.11 -
B18-2 0.2218 1829 20.64 0.2218 1829 30.09 -
B18-3 0.2218 1829 20.62 0.2218 1829 30.10 -
B18-4 0.2218 1829 20.69 0.2218 1829 30.13 -
B18-5 0.2218 1829 20.62 0.2218 1829 30.16 -
B19-1 0.1457 1720 1.75 0.1457 1720 14.14 -
B19-2 0.1457 1720 1.73 0.1457 1720 14.11 -
B19-3 0.1457 1720 1.72 0.1457 1720 14.62 -
B19-4 0.1457 1720 1.72 0.1457 1720 14.61 -
B19-5 0.1457 1720 1.72 0.1457 1720 14.62 -
Table 5.10: Solutions for Problem Set B using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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for problems in B13 is less than a second. The times for the problems in B16 are con-
siderably higher than all others for both diversification strategies, where there is an order
of magnitude difference between the running times of the problem in B16 and the non-
B16 problem with the longest running time. However, the longest running times, B16-5
at 1683.23s and 3562.55s, for the Takahashi-Matsuyama and SPT diversifications respect-
ively are a significant improvement over what would be expected from an exhaustive search
for these problems, as both are faster than the exhaustive search time for problem subset
A9. Although the use of the adaptive PST selection policy leads to longer running times
for problem subset B16, there is an improvement in the quality of the solutions. Despite
this, the solutions found with Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification still remain inferior to
those found when SPT diversification is used.
5.4.2.3 NFT Penalty Function and Best PST Selection
The results for the tabu search algorithm using the NFT penalty function and best PST
selection policy are given in table 5.12. When implemented with SPT diversification, it
finds identical solutions (excluding those where the solution found is over-budget) to those
found where the static penalty function and the same PST selection and diversification
policies are used. For Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification, there are differences in the
solutions found for the problems B10-2, B12-2 and B14-2 between NFT and static penalty
function variants using the best PST selection and either diversification policies. Each PST
found for these problems has a higher trust value, but the overheads are all over-budget.
The number of solutions where the SPT diversification finds a better solution than
Takahashi diversification is 12, one more than the tabu search with static penalty, best
PST selection and SPT diversification (B12-2 degrades for Takahashi-Matsuyama). As
with problem set A, there is an increase in the number of over-budget solutions found when
compared to the algorithms using the static penalty function. The number of problems
where both SPT and Takahashi solutions are over-budget is 13, one more than the tabu
search with static penalty, best PST selection and SPT diversification (B14-2 degrades for
Takahashi-Matsuyama).
There is little difference between the running times when the algorithm is compared
to that with the static penalty and best PST selection for both diversification strategies, a
similar finding to that of problem set A results. The running times for the tabu search with
NFT penalty function and best PST selection policy are slower for all problems where the
SPT diversification strategy is used instead of Takahashi-Matsuyama, a recurring theme.
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
B10-1 0.1095 3592 29.05 0.1095 3592 76.74 N/A
B10-2 0.1095 2912 32.62 0.1095 2912 78.90 -
B10-3 0.1095 3592 41.03 0.1095 3592 96.70 -
B10-4 0.1095 3592 56.93 0.1095 3592 123.66 -
B10-5 0.1095 3592 56.92 0.1095 3592 123.72 -
B11-1 0.0722 3495 13.22 0.0722 3495 374.69 N/A
B11-2 0.0722 3495 13.25 0.0722 3495 374.81 N/A
B11-3 0.0722 3495 26.98 0.0722 3495 143.87 -
B11-4 0.0722 3495 23.48 0.0722 3495 64.20 -
B11-5 0.0722 3495 23.51 0.0722 3495 64.57 -
B12-1 0.0395 3682 27.34 0.0395 3682 50.13 N/A
B12-2 0.0394 2944 27.17 0.0394 2944 49.74 -
B12-3 0.0395 3812 43.79 0.0395 3812 74.08 -
B12-4 0.0395 3812 35.60 0.0395 3812 61.27 -
B12-5 0.0395 3812 35.59 0.0395 3812 61.39 -
B13-1 0.0770 1479 11.83 0.0770 1479 12.32 -
B13-2 0.0770 1479 11.81 0.0770 1479 12.34 -
B13-3 0.0770 1479 11.80 0.0770 1479 12.39 -
B13-4 0.0770 1479 11.83 0.0770 1479 12.34 -
B13-5 0.0770 1479 11.81 0.0770 1479 12.36 -
B14-1 0.0705 3359 24.24 0.0705 3498 133.28 N/A
B14-2 0.0628 2791 25.42 0.0705 3498 133.28 Tak.
B14-3 0.0705 3774 41.15 0.0705 3774 116.23 -
B14-4 0.0705 3774 64.50 0.0705 3587 142.68 -
B14-5 0.0705 3774 68.37 0.0705 3587 117.68 -
B15-1 0.1368 3977 6.40 0.0867 3637 17.27 N/A
B15-2 0.1368 3977 6.39 0.0867 3637 17.29 N/A
B15-3 0.1368 3977 9.94 0.1368 3603 26.55 -
B15-4 0.1368 4493 11.56 0.1368 3603 46.34 -
B15-5 0.1368 4493 11.73 0.1368 3603 45.73 -
B16-1 0.0178 5236 1,154.96 0.0178 5236 1,825.15 N/A
B16-2 0.0178 5236 1,155.46 0.0178 5236 1,829.69 N/A
B16-3 0.0178 5236 1,155.62 0.0178 5236 1,830.59 N/A
B16-4 0.0178 4852 1,403.36 0.0178 4852 1,435.04 SPT
B16-5 0.0178 5120 1,683.23 0.0178 5120 3,562.55 SPT
B17-1 0.1124 3426 24.31 0.1124 2970 111.84 N/A
B17-2 0.1124 2970 23.24 0.1124 2970 39.37 -
B17-3 0.1124 3426 24.78 0.1124 3912 44.66 -
B17-4 0.1124 3912 28.84 0.1124 3912 57.80 -
B17-5 0.1124 3912 28.83 0.1124 3912 65.30 -
B18-1 0.2218 1829 13.53 0.2218 1829 21.30 -
B18-2 0.2218 1829 13.57 0.2218 1829 21.28 -
B18-3 0.2218 1829 14.84 0.2218 1829 22.21 -
B18-4 0.2218 1829 14.79 0.2218 1829 22.21 -
B18-5 0.2218 1829 14.82 0.2218 1829 22.22 -
B19-1 0.1457 1720 1.93 0.1457 1720 14.30 -
B19-2 0.1457 1720 2.20 0.1457 1720 14.57 -
B19-3 0.1457 1720 2.14 0.1457 1720 15.25 -
B19-4 0.1457 1720 2.16 0.1457 1720 15.00 -
B19-5 0.1457 1720 2.14 0.1457 1720 14.97 -
Table 5.11: Solutions for Problem Set B using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and
Adaptive PST Selection
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The average times for Problem B16-5 is where the greatest difference is found with SPT
diversification being close to 17 times slower.
5.4.2.4 NFT Penalty Function and Adaptive PST Selection
As with the static penalty tabu search algorithms, the use of an adaptive PST policy sees
an improvement in quality of the solutions when the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification
policy is used. There are only two problems, B16-4 and B16-5, where the SPT diversific-
ation solution is better, compared to 12 where the best PST selection policy is used. No
solution found with the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification is better than that found
by SPT diversification, as is also the case when the NFT penalty function and best PST
selection is used.
The running times are similar to those of the algorithm with the static penalty function
with adaptive PST selection irrespective of the diversification policy used. For all prob-
lems, the SPT diversification has longer running times than the Takahashi-Matsuyama
strategy. Problem subset B16 has the longest running time with problem B16-5 being
the longest (1700.79s —Takahashi-Matsuyama, 3578.68s —SPT), an order of magnitude
greater than the next longest running non-B16 problem running time.
5.4.2.5 Summary
Table 5.14 shows the number of best solutions found, the number of over-budget solutions
found and the average running time for each algorithm. Similar observations made for
problem set A can also be made for this problem set with respect to the quality of the
solutions found and the running time.
For each algorithm, the static penalty variant finds more best solutions and less over-
budget ones than the NFT variant, except for where the best selection policy and SPT
diversification are used, where they are both equal. Of the static algorithms, the tabu
search with static penalty, adaptive PST selection, and SPT diversification finds the most
number of best solutions, 38, but given the 12 over budget solutions, and the excessive
running times of problems in B16, the tabu search with static penalty, best PST selection,
and SPT diversification offers a better compromise between solution quality and running
time. However, even for this algorithm the B16-5 problem has a running time of 12 minutes
28 seconds. The running times do not significantly differ between static and NFT penalty
functions, but do so considerably between the best PST selection and adaptive selection
policies, primarily due to the increased running times of problems in B16. The adaptive
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
B10-1 0.0255 2564 17.82 0.1095 2912 65.99 N/A
B10-2 0.1095 3602 30.44 0.1095 2912 66.11 SPT
B10-3 0.1095 3592 44.63 0.1095 3592 129.26 -
B10-4 0.1095 3592 39.39 0.1095 3592 147.96 -
B10-5 0.1095 3592 39.37 0.1095 3592 148.06 -
B11-1 0.0722 3495 31.16 0.0501 3682 557.31 N/A
B11-2 0.0722 3495 30.95 0.0722 3260 557.48 N/A
B11-3 0.0722 3495 74.81 0.0722 3495 385.37 -
B11-4 0.0722 3495 71.17 0.0722 3495 146.39 -
B11-5 0.0722 3495 70.49 0.0722 3495 146.68 -
B12-1 0.0394 3002 36.13 0.0394 3002 58.19 N/A
B12-2 0.0394 3002 13.56 0.0394 2944 30.83 SPT
B12-3 0.0394 3753 45.25 0.0395 3812 76.59 SPT
B12-4 0.0394 3002 13.61 0.0395 3812 33.67 SPT
B12-5 0.0394 3002 13.71 0.0395 3812 34.64 SPT
B13-1 0.0770 1479 10.52 0.0770 1479 11.59 -
B13-2 0.0770 1479 10.56 0.0770 1479 11.58 -
B13-3 0.0770 1479 10.56 0.0770 1479 11.58 -
B13-4 0.0770 1479 10.55 0.0770 1479 11.59 -
B13-5 0.0770 1479 10.57 0.0770 1479 11.41 -
B14-1 0.0198 3222 14.84 0.0175 3390 238.91 N/A
B14-2 0.0705 3359 14.75 0.0285 3570 238.76 N/A
B14-3 0.0705 3390 17.55 0.0705 3587 141.91 SPT
B14-4 0.0705 3774 29.84 0.0705 3587 145.05 -
B14-5 0.0705 3774 29.92 0.0705 3587 85.44 -
B15-1 0.0438 3035 8.66 0.0167 3813 18.62 N/A
B15-2 0.0438 3035 8.71 0.0438 3035 18.65 N/A
B15-3 0.1368 3813 12.94 0.1368 3603 32.63 -
B15-4 0.1368 3813 12.48 0.1368 3603 47.26 -
B15-5 0.1368 3813 12.52 0.1368 3603 46.53 -
B16-1 0.0157 5340 85.48 0.0034 5916 201.60 N/A
B16-2 0.0157 5340 85.36 0.0034 5916 201.96 N/A
B16-3 0.0177 5478 85.47 0.0157 5778 202.22 N/A
B16-4 0.0177 4930 88.06 0.0178 4852 200.24 SPT
B16-5 0.0177 5418 45.97 0.0178 5752 747.87 SPT
B17-1 0.1124 2079 29.05 0.1124 2079 117.70 N/A
B17-2 0.1124 2079 29.14 0.1124 2970 45.88 SPT
B17-3 0.1124 2079 29.32 0.1124 3912 50.37 SPT
B17-4 0.1124 2079 29.32 0.1124 3912 59.04 SPT
B17-5 0.1124 2079 29.13 0.1124 3912 66.79 SPT
B18-1 0.2218 1829 20.90 0.2218 1829 30.12 -
B18-2 0.2218 1829 20.88 0.2218 1829 29.83 -
B18-3 0.2218 1829 20.93 0.2218 1829 29.87 -
B18-4 0.2218 1829 20.88 0.2218 1829 29.84 -
B18-5 0.2218 1829 21.07 0.2218 1829 29.93 -
B19-1 0.1457 1720 1.77 0.1457 1720 14.25 -
B19-2 0.1457 1720 1.75 0.1457 1720 14.25 -
B19-3 0.1457 1720 1.76 0.1457 1720 14.75 -
B19-4 0.1457 1720 1.74 0.1457 1720 14.76 -
B19-5 0.1457 1720 1.74 0.1457 1720 14.74 -
Table 5.12: Solutions for Problem Set B using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
B10-1 0.0255 2564 30.09 0.1095 2912 75.92 N/A
B10-2 0.1095 2912 32.54 0.1095 2912 79.37 -
B10-3 0.1095 3592 41.27 0.1095 3592 97.70 -
B10-4 0.1095 3592 57.30 0.1095 3592 124.23 -
B10-5 0.1095 3592 56.93 0.1095 3592 123.71 -
B11-1 0.0722 3495 13.40 0.0501 3682 372.94 N/A
B11-2 0.0722 3495 13.47 0.0722 3260 372.85 N/A
B11-3 0.0722 3495 27.55 0.0722 3495 142.94 -
B11-4 0.0722 3495 23.98 0.0722 3495 63.78 -
B11-5 0.0722 3495 23.77 0.0722 3495 64.21 -
B12-1 0.0394 3002 27.14 0.0394 3002 48.01 N/A
B12-2 0.0394 3002 27.39 0.0394 3002 47.92 N/A
B12-3 0.0395 3812 44.10 0.0395 3812 71.17 -
B12-4 0.0395 3812 35.50 0.0395 3812 59.23 -
B12-5 0.0395 3812 35.46 0.0395 3812 58.84 -
B13-1 0.0770 1479 11.54 0.0770 1479 12.32 -
B13-2 0.0770 1479 11.52 0.0770 1479 12.33 -
B13-3 0.0770 1479 11.54 0.0770 1479 12.43 -
B13-4 0.0770 1479 11.51 0.0770 1479 12.52 -
B13-5 0.0770 1479 11.52 0.0770 1479 12.55 -
B14-1 0.0198 3222 24.90 0.0175 3390 132.68 N/A
B14-2 0.0705 3359 25.28 0.0285 3570 132.87 N/A
B14-3 0.0705 3774 42.50 0.0705 3774 116.23 -
B14-4 0.0705 3774 66.66 0.0705 3587 142.62 -
B14-5 0.0705 3774 71.11 0.0705 3587 118.02 -
B15-1 0.0438 3035 5.52 0.0167 3813 15.64 N/A
B15-2 0.0438 3035 5.58 0.0438 3035 15.63 N/A
B15-3 0.1368 3977 9.99 0.1368 3603 27.30 -
B15-4 0.1368 4493 11.62 0.1368 3603 47.43 -
B15-5 0.1368 4493 11.76 0.1368 3603 47.32 -
B16-1 0.0157 5340 1,037.95 0.0034 5916 1,436.47 N/A
B16-2 0.0157 5340 1,039.50 0.0034 5916 1,434.91 N/A
B16-3 0.0177 5478 1,040.55 0.0157 5778 1,429.08 N/A
B16-4 0.0178 4852 1,418.33 0.0178 4852 1,439.70 SPT
B16-5 0.0178 5120 1,700.79 0.0178 5120 3,578.68 SPT
B17-1 0.1124 2079 22.58 0.1124 2079 112.19 N/A
B17-2 0.1124 2970 23.16 0.1124 2970 40.03 -
B17-3 0.1124 3426 24.69 0.1124 3912 45.15 -
B17-4 0.1124 3912 28.69 0.1124 3912 58.16 -
B17-5 0.1124 3912 28.66 0.1124 3912 66.39 -
B18-1 0.2218 1829 13.66 0.2218 1829 21.50 -
B18-2 0.2218 1829 13.76 0.2218 1829 21.55 -
B18-3 0.2218 1829 15.03 0.2218 1829 22.59 -
B18-4 0.2218 1829 14.99 0.2218 1829 22.78 -
B18-5 0.2218 1829 14.85 0.2218 1829 22.80 -
B19-1 0.1457 1720 1.95 0.1457 1720 14.73 -
B19-2 0.1457 1720 2.23 0.1457 1720 14.82 -
B19-3 0.1457 1720 2.24 0.1457 1720 15.42 -
B19-4 0.1457 1720 2.20 0.1457 1720 15.55 -
B19-5 0.1457 1720 2.19 0.1457 1720 15.41 -
Table 5.13: Solutions for Problem Set B using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Ad-
aptive PST Selection
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PST policy leads to a significant increase in the number of best solutions found for the
Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification regardless of the other properties of the tabu search.
A direct comparison between the running times of the tabu search and exhaustive
search algorithms can not be made for this problem set, as the running times for the
exhaustive search would be excessive, thus rendering the experiments impractical. The
average running time shown in table 5.14 are favourable when compared to the running
times given for the exhaustive search in table 5.2, the longest average running time of
273.24s is approximately equal to that of the exhaustive search average running time of
A6. In the worst case, the longest running times are those of B16-5 when the tabu search
utilises that of the adaptive SPT policy, but is still faster than the exhaustive search for
|R| = 7. Despite this, the running times for B16 for both PST selection policies are
impractical for real-world problems.
In table 5.15, the algorithms that find the best solution (it is not possible to de-
termine if these are also optimal due to running time of the exhaustive search) for each
problem are given. Algorithm (1) is the static/best/takahashi tabu search, (2) is the
static/best/spt, (3) is the static/adaptive/takahashi, (4) is the static/adaptive/spt, (5) is
the nft/best/takahashi, (6) is the nft/best/spt, (7) is the nft/adaptive/takahashi, and (8)
is the nft/adaptive/spt.
Algorithm Best Over-budget Avg Time
Static, Best, Takahashi 28 11 29.02
Static, Best, SPT 37 12 120.96
Static, Adaptive, Takahashi 37 11 151.60
Static, Adaptive, SPT 38 12 273.24
NFT, Best, Takahashi 26 14 28.74
NFT, Best, SPT 37 12 115.44
NFT, Adaptive, Takahashi 35 13 145.41
NFT, Adaptive, SPT 37 13 249.47
Table 5.14: Average Results Overview for Problem Set B
5.4.3 Problem Set C
The results for problem set C show the least deviation in results. Of the static penalty
tabu search algorithms, three find identical results: best PST selection and Takahashi
diversification (table 5.16); best PST selection and SPT diversification (table 5.16); and
Adaptive PST selection and Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification (table 5.17). The same
is also true when then the tabu search algorithm utilises the NFT penalty function, the
results for these algorithms can be found in tables 5.18 and 5.19. The tabu search al-
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Pr Algorithms
B10-1
B10-2 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B10-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B10-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B10-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B11-1
B11-2
B11-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B11-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B11-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B12-1
B12-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
B12-3 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B12-4 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B12-5 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B13-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B13-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B13-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B13-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B13-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B14-1
B14-2 (1) (3)
B14-3 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B14-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B14-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B15-1
B15-2
B15-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B15-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B15-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B16-1
B16-2
B16-3
B16-4 (2) (4) (6) (8)
B16-5 (4) (8)
B17-1
B17-2 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B17-3 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B17-4 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B17-5 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8)
B18-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B18-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B18-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B18-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B18-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B19-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B19-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B19-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B19-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B19-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Table 5.15: Algorithm Finding Best Solutions for Problem Set B
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gorithm with adaptive PST selection and SPT diversification, utilising either the static
(table 5.17) or NFT penalty function (table 5.18), outperformes the other techniques by
finding better solutions for problems D100-4 and D100-5, as show in table 5.21, where al-
gorithm (1) is the static/best/takahashi tabu search, (2) is the static/best/spt, (3) is the
static/adaptive/takahashi, (4) is the static/adaptive/spt, (5) is the nft/best/takahashi,
(6) is the nft/best/spt, (7) is the nft/adaptive/takahashi, and (8) is the nft/adaptive/spt.
While the combination of adaptive PST selection and SPT diversification yields more
better solutions, its average running time is only third fastest for both static and NFT
penalty functions. Unlike previous problem sets, the NFT penalty tabu search algorithms
do not find more over budget solutions than the static ones, as all algorithms find six over
budget PSTs for the same problems.
The running times are dependent on the PST selection policy and diversification
strategies. For problem sets A and B, the use of the adaptive PST selection policy resulted
in an increase in the running time for each tabu search algorithm where all other proper-
ties remain identical. For problem set C, the opposite behaviour is observed, as changing
the PST selection policy from best to adaptive gives faster running times, a little over
three seconds improvement when the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification is used and
1.90 times faster when the diversification strategy is SPT on average. Although the PST
selection policy has an impact on running times, the diversification strategy contributes to
it to a much greater extent. The tabu search with static penalty and best PST selection
is on average 9.8 times faster when the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification is used, and
for the tabu search with NFT penalty function and the same PST selection policy, use
of the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification gives a running time that is 9.3 times faster.
For the tabu search with static penalty and adaptive PST policy, and for the tabu search
with NFT penalty and adaptive PST policy, the running times when used in conjunction
with the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification strategy are 5.47 and 5.38 times faster re-
spectively. The average running times of the tabu search with SPT diversification are
elevated as a result of the increased running times for problem subsets C20, C40, C80
and C90, which are an order of magnitude slower than those of the Takahashi-Matsuyama
diversification.
With respect to the number of best solution found, the static and NFT penalty tabu
search algorithms with adaptive PST selection and SPT diversification, find the most best
solutions for the problem set, but some of the running times are impractical for real-
world use. For the static variant, the running times of problem subsets C20 and C40
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are in the order of hundreds of seconds, with the longest running time being 643.89s for
problem C20-4. For the NFT variant, the running times for C20 and C40 are similar
with the longest running time being 626.41s for problem C20-4. These running times are
impractical in real-world applications where the connectivity graph is subject to change
due to churn or mobility, and likely to change within these lengths of time, so for practical
applications and given the results for this problem set, that tabu search algorithms using
Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification are preferable.
5.5 Takahashi-Matsuyama and SPT Heuristics
The Steiner tree rooted at the publisher p, spanning the set of subscribers S, and the
shortest path tree rooted at p, where each s ∈ S is a terminal node, are in the set of all
possible PSTs of an MTPSTO problem. These trees are the initial solutions to the tabu
search algorithms. In tables 5.22, 5.23, and 5.24, the trust and overhead values of the
initial PSTs using these methods are given for the three problem sets. In addition, for
problem set A, their relative error with respect to the trust and overhead values, but as
this information is not available for problem sets B and C, the relative errors to the best
solution found by the tabu search algorithms is given for each problem.
Both heuristics are naive, in the sense that neither uses the trust information nor the
subscriptions of the subscribers to estimate or to seek to reduce overheads, perhaps by
maximising subscription covering. Despite this, for problem subset C, solutions are found
to C60 and C90 using the Takahashi-Matsuyama heuristic, and for C80 and C90 by the
SPT heuristic. The connectivity graph for problem subset C90, has the publisher directly
connected to all the subscribers, so both the heuristics find the most trusted tree, however
for almost all problems in problem sets B and C, the relative errors are high. Problem
subset C30 is of particular interest as the solution for C30-1 is not selected by any tabu
search algorithm as the best solution, instead they find an over budget solution and despite
the solution being the initial solution of the search. This is due to the penalty functions
penalising the initial solution such that inferior ones are preferred. For small connectivity
graph size, where the publisher is located nearer to the publishers, the use of either of
these heuristics may be preferable to the tabu search and the exhaustive search given the
solutions found and the running times for the smaller problems of problem set A, however
this may not always be the case, as is shown by the relative error for the problem subset
A1 when the Takahashi-Matsuyama heuristic is used.
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
C20-1 0.1210 2948 71.76 0.1210 2948 493.05 N/A
C20-2 0.1210 2948 71.57 0.1210 2948 493.83 -
C20-3 0.1210 3254 70.10 0.1210 3934 498.79 -
C20-4 0.1210 3254 70.15 0.1210 3934 631.74 -
C20-5 0.1210 3254 70.08 0.1210 3934 489.76 -
C30-1 0.1329 2234 59.38 0.1329 2234 98.42 N/A
C30-2 0.1329 2234 95.97 0.1329 2234 237.14 -
C30-3 0.1329 2234 95.65 0.1329 2234 237.92 -
C30-4 0.1329 2234 95.77 0.1329 2234 237.95 -
C30-5 0.1329 2234 95.94 0.1329 2234 238.15 -
C40-1 0.0245 2564 58.11 0.0245 3132 518.75 N/A
C40-2 0.0245 2564 57.97 0.0245 2564 520.06 -
C40-3 0.0245 2564 57.90 0.0245 3132 519.93 -
C40-4 0.0245 2564 57.80 0.0245 3132 530.84 -
C40-5 0.0245 2564 57.84 0.0245 3132 530.01 -
C50-1 0.0124 2224 15.05 0.0124 2224 26.08 N/A
C50-2 0.0124 2224 15.03 0.0124 2224 26.11 -
C50-3 0.0124 2224 15.03 0.0124 2224 26.09 -
C50-4 0.0124 2224 15.03 0.0124 2224 26.06 -
C50-5 0.0124 2224 15.06 0.0124 2224 26.00 -
C60-1 0.0661 1630 9.26 0.0661 1630 40.16 -
C60-2 0.0661 1630 9.25 0.0661 1630 40.05 -
C60-3 0.0661 1630 9.22 0.0661 1630 39.88 -
C60-4 0.0661 1630 9.24 0.0661 1630 40.12 -
C60-5 0.0661 1630 9.24 0.0661 1630 40.08 -
C70-1 0.0381 2838 14.39 0.0381 2838 41.97 N/A
C70-2 0.0381 2838 14.39 0.0381 2838 41.98 -
C70-3 0.0381 2838 14.79 0.0381 2838 40.38 -
C70-4 0.0381 2838 14.80 0.0381 2838 40.46 -
C70-5 0.0381 2838 14.82 0.0381 2838 40.40 -
C80-1 0.1320 1962 9.89 0.1320 1962 103.20 -
C80-2 0.1320 1962 9.89 0.1320 1962 103.40 -
C80-3 0.1320 1962 9.88 0.1320 1962 103.48 -
C80-4 0.1320 1962 9.88 0.1320 1962 103.54 -
C80-5 0.1320 1962 9.86 0.1320 1962 103.64 -
C90-1 0.0354 1282 27.12 0.0354 1282 1,412.56 -
C90-2 0.0354 1282 27.09 0.0354 1282 1,412.63 -
C90-3 0.0354 1282 27.03 0.0354 1282 1,412.73 -
C90-4 0.0354 1282 27.10 0.0354 1282 1,414.15 -
C90-5 0.0354 1282 27.06 0.0354 1282 1,413.67 -
C100-1 0.0112 2968 22.91 0.0128 2788 47.25 N/A
C100-2 0.0128 2798 18.91 0.0128 2798 38.46 -
C100-3 0.0128 2798 19.24 0.0128 2798 37.31 -
C100-4 0.0128 2798 19.26 0.0128 2798 36.00 -
C100-5 0.0128 2798 20.39 0.0128 2798 35.87 -
Table 5.16: Solutions for Problem Set C using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
C20-1 0.1210 2948 42.00 0.1210 2948 463.82 N/A
C20-2 0.1210 2948 41.97 0.1210 2948 456.55 -
C20-3 0.1210 3254 36.33 0.1210 3934 458.79 -
C20-4 0.1210 3254 33.76 0.1210 3934 643.89 -
C20-5 0.1210 3254 33.73 0.1210 3934 445.46 -
C30-1 0.1329 2234 57.19 0.1329 2234 91.39 N/A
C30-2 0.1329 2234 61.82 0.1329 2234 105.19 -
C30-3 0.1329 2234 72.58 0.1329 2234 101.00 -
C30-4 0.1329 2234 88.44 0.1329 2234 113.33 -
C30-5 0.1329 2234 84.46 0.1329 2234 120.65 -
C40-1 0.0245 2564 56.52 0.0245 3132 505.12 N/A
C40-2 0.0245 2564 60.04 0.0245 2564 512.88 -
C40-3 0.0245 2564 50.73 0.0245 3132 499.93 -
C40-4 0.0245 2564 50.77 0.0245 3132 505.03 -
C40-5 0.0245 2564 50.81 0.0245 3132 508.89 -
C50-1 0.0124 2224 18.96 0.0124 2224 32.27 N/A
C50-2 0.0124 2224 18.87 0.0124 2224 32.12 -
C50-3 0.0124 2224 18.70 0.0124 2224 31.83 -
C50-4 0.0124 2224 19.70 0.0124 2224 33.61 -
C50-5 0.0124 2224 19.96 0.0124 2224 33.95 -
C60-1 0.0661 1630 9.86 0.0661 1630 41.32 -
C60-2 0.0661 1630 9.98 0.0661 1630 41.03 -
C60-3 0.0661 1630 9.82 0.0661 1630 41.26 -
C60-4 0.0661 1630 9.89 0.0661 1630 41.32 -
C60-5 0.0661 1630 9.91 0.0661 1630 41.39 -
C70-1 0.0381 2838 30.00 0.0381 2838 61.08 N/A
C70-2 0.0381 2838 29.99 0.0381 2838 61.28 -
C70-3 0.0381 2838 46.44 0.0381 2838 81.15 -
C70-4 0.0381 2838 46.77 0.0381 2838 82.05 -
C70-5 0.0381 2838 45.85 0.0381 2838 80.47 -
C80-1 0.1320 1962 17.84 0.1320 1962 114.96 -
C80-2 0.1320 1962 13.54 0.1320 1962 109.63 -
C80-3 0.1320 1962 13.56 0.1320 1962 109.79 -
C80-4 0.1320 1962 13.55 0.1320 1962 109.82 -
C80-5 0.1320 1962 13.57 0.1320 1962 109.80 -
C90-1 0.0354 1282 11.56 0.0354 1282 131.76 -
C90-2 0.0354 1282 11.59 0.0354 1282 131.87 -
C90-3 0.0354 1282 11.59 0.0354 1282 132.09 -
C90-4 0.0354 1282 11.57 0.0354 1282 131.87 -
C90-5 0.0354 1282 11.57 0.0354 1282 131.71 -
C100-1 0.0112 2968 28.40 0.0128 2788 66.01 N/A
C100-2 0.0128 2798 23.02 0.0128 2798 51.20 -
C100-3 0.0128 2798 18.89 0.0128 2798 49.50 -
C100-4 0.0128 2798 19.64 0.0128 2978 53.15 SPT
C100-5 0.0128 2798 19.52 0.0128 2978 53.08 SPT
Table 5.17: Solutions for Problem Set C using Tabu Search with Static Penalty and
Adaptive PST Selection
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
C20-1 0.1210 2948 72.17 0.0198 2564 477.44 N/A
C20-2 0.1210 2948 71.80 0.1210 2948 477.92 -
C20-3 0.1210 3254 70.83 0.1210 3934 482.08 -
C20-4 0.1210 3254 70.29 0.1210 3934 611.87 -
C20-5 0.1210 3254 70.70 0.1210 3934 474.06 -
C30-1 0.1329 2234 57.40 0.1329 2234 97.70 N/A
C30-2 0.1329 2234 92.82 0.1329 2234 234.46 -
C30-3 0.1329 2234 92.88 0.1329 2234 235.38 -
C30-4 0.1329 2234 92.87 0.1329 2234 235.41 -
C30-5 0.1329 2234 92.85 0.1329 2234 235.40 -
C40-1 0.0245 2564 58.55 0.0045 2564 517.87 N/A
C40-2 0.0245 2564 58.58 0.0245 2564 518.35 -
C40-3 0.0245 2564 58.51 0.0245 3132 519.12 -
C40-4 0.0245 2564 58.32 0.0245 3132 529.66 -
C40-5 0.0245 2564 58.39 0.0245 3132 530.63 -
C50-1 0.0124 2224 16.09 0.0124 2224 26.90 N/A
C50-2 0.0124 2224 16.08 0.0124 2224 26.95 -
C50-3 0.0124 2224 16.09 0.0124 2224 26.92 -
C50-4 0.0124 2224 16.07 0.0124 2224 26.87 -
C50-5 0.0124 2224 16.08 0.0124 2224 26.88 -
C60-1 0.0661 1630 9.62 0.0661 1630 40.00 -
C60-2 0.0661 1630 9.59 0.0661 1630 40.05 -
C60-3 0.0661 1630 9.57 0.0661 1630 40.06 -
C60-4 0.0661 1630 9.58 0.0661 1630 40.03 -
C60-5 0.0661 1630 9.58 0.0661 1630 40.13 -
C70-1 0.0381 2838 14.19 0.0381 2838 41.83 N/A
C70-2 0.0381 2838 14.20 0.0381 2838 41.77 -
C70-3 0.0381 2838 14.61 0.0381 2838 40.21 -
C70-4 0.0381 2838 14.58 0.0381 2838 40.39 -
C70-5 0.0381 2838 14.59 0.0381 2838 40.22 -
C80-1 0.1320 1962 9.71 0.1320 1962 104.78 -
C80-2 0.1320 1962 9.66 0.1320 1962 105.21 -
C80-3 0.1320 1962 9.65 0.1320 1962 104.97 -
C80-4 0.1320 1962 9.65 0.1320 1962 105.23 -
C80-5 0.1320 1962 9.68 0.1320 1962 105.18 -
C90-1 0.0354 1282 27.45 0.0354 1282 1,418.56 -
C90-2 0.0354 1282 27.43 0.0354 1282 1,420.29 -
C90-3 0.0354 1282 27.47 0.0354 1282 1,418.59 -
C90-4 0.0354 1282 27.43 0.0354 1282 1,418.93 -
C90-5 0.0354 1282 27.52 0.0354 1282 1,421.42 -
C100-1 0.0038 2448 20.42 0.0031 2628 38.92 N/A
C100-2 0.0128 2798 19.21 0.0128 2798 37.90 -
C100-3 0.0128 2798 19.12 0.0128 2798 37.56 -
C100-4 0.0128 2798 19.21 0.0128 2798 36.22 -
C100-5 0.0128 2798 19.71 0.0128 2798 36.04 -
Table 5.18: Solutions for Problem Set C using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Best
PST Selection
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Takahashi SPT
PST PST
Pr τT OT Sec τT OT Sec Best
C20-1 0.1210 2948 42.49 0.0198 2564 451.71 N/A
C20-2 0.1210 2948 42.31 0.1210 2948 444.22 -
C20-3 0.1210 3254 36.61 0.1210 3934 445.57 -
C20-4 0.1210 3254 34.08 0.1210 3934 626.41 -
C20-5 0.1210 3254 34.05 0.1210 3934 433.22 -
C30-1 0.1329 2234 57.16 0.1329 2234 93.44 N/A
C30-2 0.1329 2234 61.67 0.1329 2234 107.19 -
C30-3 0.1329 2234 72.13 0.1329 2234 103.09 -
C30-4 0.1329 2234 87.94 0.1329 2234 115.90 -
C30-5 0.1329 2234 84.20 0.1329 2234 122.99 -
C40-1 0.0245 2564 56.92 0.0045 2564 523.61 N/A
C40-2 0.0245 2564 60.52 0.0245 2564 529.70 -
C40-3 0.0245 2564 51.25 0.0245 3132 517.41 -
C40-4 0.0245 2564 51.34 0.0245 3132 522.35 -
C40-5 0.0245 2564 51.25 0.0245 3132 526.18 -
C50-1 0.0124 2224 20.13 0.0124 2224 32.22 N/A
C50-2 0.0124 2224 20.16 0.0124 2224 32.10 -
C50-3 0.0124 2224 19.95 0.0124 2224 31.86 -
C50-4 0.0124 2224 20.98 0.0124 2224 33.57 -
C50-5 0.0124 2224 21.20 0.0124 2224 33.98 -
C60-1 0.0661 1630 10.21 0.0661 1630 41.28 -
C60-2 0.0661 1630 10.38 0.0661 1630 41.06 -
C60-3 0.0661 1630 10.21 0.0661 1630 41.26 -
C60-4 0.0661 1630 10.25 0.0661 1630 41.34 -
C60-5 0.0661 1630 10.25 0.0661 1630 41.33 -
C70-1 0.0327 2838 30.40 0.0327 2838 63.12 N/A
C70-2 0.0381 2838 30.47 0.0381 2838 62.59 -
C70-3 0.0381 2838 47.12 0.0381 2838 83.22 -
C70-4 0.0381 2838 47.50 0.0381 2838 84.08 -
C70-5 0.0381 2838 46.52 0.0381 2838 82.36 -
C80-1 0.1320 1962 18.13 0.1320 1962 116.49 -
C80-2 0.1320 1962 13.77 0.1320 1962 111.15 -
C80-3 0.1320 1962 13.77 0.1320 1962 111.02 -
C80-4 0.1320 1962 13.77 0.1320 1962 111.29 -
C80-5 0.1320 1962 13.80 0.1320 1962 111.39 -
C90-1 0.0354 1282 11.48 0.0354 1282 128.57 -
C90-2 0.0354 1282 11.53 0.0354 1282 129.00 -
C90-3 0.0354 1282 11.51 0.0354 1282 129.17 -
C90-4 0.0354 1282 11.57 0.0354 1282 129.25 -
C90-5 0.0354 1282 11.66 0.0354 1282 129.35 -
C100-1 0.0038 2448 28.06 0.0031 2628 46.02 N/A
C100-2 0.0128 2798 22.92 0.0128 2798 40.36 -
C100-3 0.0128 2798 18.84 0.0128 2798 39.03 -
C100-4 0.0128 2798 19.57 0.0128 2978 41.90 SPT
C100-5 0.0128 2798 19.44 0.0128 2978 41.92 SPT
Table 5.19: Solutions for Problem Set C using Tabu Search with NFT Penalty and Ad-
aptive PST Selection
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Algorithm Best Over-budget Avg Time
Static, Best, Takahashi 37 6 34.80
Static, Best, SPT 37 6 324.22
Static, Adaptive, Takahashi 37 6 31.21
Static, Adaptive, SPT 39 6 170.93
NFT, Best, Takahashi 37 6 34.68
NFT, Best, SPT 37 6 322.80
NFT, Adaptive, Takahashi 37 6 31.50
NFT, Adaptive, SPT 39 6 169.61
Table 5.20: Average Results Overview for Problem Set C
5.6 Summary
Given the results and their analysis in this chapter, it is possible to draw a number of
conclusions with respect to the evaluation objectives given at the beginning of this chapter.
The principle conclusion is that the tabu search algorithms are well suited to the MTPSTO
problem, outperforming the exhaustive search and naive heuristics for all but problems of
small graph sizes. The tabu search is able to find solutions to problems with much larger
connectivity graphs than the exhaustive search within a reasonable time, with optimal
solutions being found for problems where they are known. Compared to the Takahashi-
Matsuyama and SPT heuristics, the relative error of the solutions found by the naive
heuristics are, for the most part, very high.
The properties of the tabu search, the penalty function, the PST selection policy, and
the diversification strategy were also considered. The use of the NFT penalty function was
expected to give improved results when compared to the static penalty function, however
this proved not to be the case, with the NFT penalty function finding some over-budget
solutions for problem set A and B, while none were found when the static penalty was used.
For problem set C, there was no difference between the two. The poor performance of the
NFT method may be due to the user-set parameter of the NFT penalty function not being
ideal, or it may be due to the method being less effective where there are few constraints,
as highlighted by its authors. The static penalty function is by no means perfect, with
one particularly interesting case where the initial solution is a better solution than that
eventually found by the tabu search using this penalty method.
For the PST selection policy, conflicting conclusions can be drawn. For problem set
B, the running times increase with the use of the adaptive policy, but for problem set C,
they decrease. The impact on the results can be seen when it is used with the Takahashi-
Matsuyama diversification for problem set B and the SPT diversification for problem
set C. Clearly, further research is needed on the PST selection policy. For many of the
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Pr Algorithms
C20-1
C20-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C20-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C20-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C20-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C30-1
C30-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C30-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C30-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C30-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C40-1
C40-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C40-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C40-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C40-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C50-1
C50-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C50-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C50-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C50-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C60-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C60-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C60-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C60-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C60-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C70-1
C70-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C70-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C70-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C70-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C80-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C80-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C80-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C80-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C80-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C90-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C90-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C90-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C90-4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C90-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C100-1
C100-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C100-3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C100-4 (4) (8)
C100-5 (4) (8)
Table 5.21: Algorithm Finding Best Solutions for Problem Set C
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Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
A0-2 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0071 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0087
A0-3 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0071 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0087
A0-4 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0071 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0087
A0-5 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0071 0.0322 2179 - - 0.0087
A1-2 0.0023 2884 0.873 0.2027 0.0064 0.0181 2398 - - 0.006
A1-3 0.0023 2884 0.873 0.2027 0.0064 0.0181 2398 - - 0.006
A1-4 0.0023 2884 0.873 0.2027 0.0064 0.0181 2398 - - 0.006
A1-5 0.0023 2884 0.873 0.2027 0.0064 0.0181 2398 - - 0.006
A2-1 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0076 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0059
A2-2 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0076 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0059
A2-3 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0076 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0059
A2-4 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0076 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0059
A2-5 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0076 0.0931 1850 - - 0.0059
A3-2 0.0223 3297 0.00128 0.1303 0.0086 0.0223 3436 - - 0.0059
A3-3 0.0223 3297 0.00128 0.1303 0.0086 0.0223 3436 - - 0.0059
A3-4 0.0223 3297 0.00128 0.1303 0.0086 0.0223 3436 - - 0.0059
A3-5 0.0223 3297 0.00128 0.1303 0.0086 0.0223 3436 - - 0.0059
A4-2 0.1855 2224 - - 0.0083 0.0933 2564 0.4968 0.1529 0.0052
A4-3 0.1855 2224 - - 0.0083 0.0933 2564 0.4968 0.1529 0.0052
A4-4 0.1855 2224 - - 0.0083 0.0933 2564 0.4968 0.1529 0.0052
A4-5 0.1855 2224 - - 0.0083 0.0933 2564 0.4968 0.1529 0.0052
A5-2 0.0542 2262 - - 0.0078 0.0369 2968 0.3192 0.3121 0.0079
A5-3 0.0542 2262 0.3323 0.2922 0.0078 0.0369 2968 0.5454 0.0713 0.0079
A5-4 0.0542 2262 0.3323 0.2922 0.0078 0.0369 2968 0.5454 0.0713 0.0079
A5-5 0.0542 2262 0.3323 0.2922 0.0078 0.0369 2968 0.5454 0.0713 0.0079
A6-3 0.0241 3911 0.3318 0.0169 0.0185 0.0253 3828 0.2966 0.0047 0.0081
A6-4 0.0241 3911 0.3318 0.114 0.0185 0.0253 3828 0.2966 0.1328 0.0081
A6-5 0.0241 3911 0.3318 0.114 0.0185 0.0253 3828 0.2966 0.1328 0.0081
A7-3 0.0644 3512 0.0685 0.0162 0.0091 0.0057 3132 0.9458 0.1124 0.0053
A7-4 0.0644 3512 0.0685 0.0162 0.0091 0.0057 3132 0.9458 0.1124 0.0053
A7-5 0.0644 3512 0.0685 0.0162 0.0091 0.0057 3132 0.9458 0.1124 0.0053
A8-3 0.00031 4293 0.9011 0.1739 0.0106 0.00017 4484 0.9458 0.2261 0.0053
A8-4 0.00031 4293 0.9011 0.065 0.0106 0.00017 4484 0.9458 0.1124 0.0053
A8-5 0.00031 4293 0.9011 0.065 0.0106 0.00017 4484 0.9458 0.1124 0.0053
A9-1 0.0193 2278 0.9114 0.2085 0.0093 0.0359 2104 0.8358 0.1162 0.0058
A9-2 0.0193 2278 0.9114 0.2085 0.0093 0.0359 2104 0.8358 0.1162 0.0058
A9-3 0.0193 2278 0.9114 0.2085 0.0093 0.0359 2104 0.8358 0.1162 0.0058
A9-4 0.0193 2278 0.9114 0.2085 0.0093 0.0359 2104 0.8358 0.1162 0.0058
A9-5 0.0193 2278 0.9114 0.2085 0.0093 0.0359 2104 0.8358 0.1162 0.0058
Table 5.22: Solutions for Problem Set A using the Takahashi-Matsuyama Steiner Tree
Heuristic & the Shortest Path Tree Heuristic
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Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
B10-1 0.00147 3871 N/A N/A 0.0294 0.0254 4916 N/A N/A 0.0181
B10-2 0.00147 3871 0.9865 0.3293 0.0294 0.0254 4916 0.768 0.6882 0.0181
B10-3 0.00147 3871 0.9865 0.0777 0.0294 0.0254 4916 0.768 0.3686 0.0181
B10-4 0.00147 3871 0.9865 0.0777 0.0294 0.0254 4916 0.768 0.3686 0.0181
B10-5 0.00147 3871 0.9865 0.0777 0.0294 0.0254 4916 0.768 0.3686 0.0181
B11-1 0.0134 4820 N/A N/A 0.0268 0.05 5354 N/A N/A 0.0185
B11-2 0.0134 4820 N/A N/A 0.0268 0.05 5354 N/A N/A 0.0185
B11-3 0.0134 4820 0.8149 0.3791 0.0268 0.05 5354 0.307 0.5319 0.0185
B11-4 0.0134 4820 0.8149 0.3791 0.0268 0.05 5354 0.307 0.5319 0.0185
B11-5 0.0134 4820 0.8149 0.3791 0.0268 0.05 5354 0.307 0.5319 0.0185
B12-1 8×10−4 4699 N/A N/A 0.0473 0.0394 4674 N/A N/A 0.0211
B12-2 8×10−4 4699 0.9787 0.5961 0.0473 0.0394 4674 - 0.5876 0.0211
B12-3 8×10−4 4699 0.9787 0.2327 0.0473 0.0394 4674 0.001 0.2261 0.0211
B12-4 8×10−4 4699 0.9787 0.2327 0.0473 0.0394 4674 0.001 0.2261 0.0211
B12-5 8×10−4 4699 0.9787 0.2327 0.0473 0.0394 4674 0.001 0.2261 0.0211
B13-1 0.00244 3224 0.9683 1.1799 0.023 0.0207 3223 0.7317 1.1792 0.0192
B13-2 0.00244 3224 0.9683 1.1799 0.023 0.0207 3223 0.7317 1.1792 0.0192
B13-3 0.00244 3224 0.9683 1.1799 0.023 0.0207 3223 0.7317 1.1792 0.0192
B13-4 0.00244 3224 0.9683 1.1799 0.023 0.0207 3223 0.7317 1.1792 0.0192
B13-5 0.00244 3224 0.9683 1.1799 0.023 0.0207 3223 0.7317 1.1792 0.0192
B14-1 0.0198 4271 N/A N/A 0.0263 0.0175 5062 N/A N/A 0.0234
B14-2 0.0198 4271 0.6849 0.5303 0.0263 0.0175 5062 0.7205 0.8137 0.0234
B14-3 0.0198 4271 0.7196 0.1317 0.0263 0.0175 5062 0.7513 0.3413 0.0234
B14-4 0.0198 4271 0.7196 0.1317 0.0263 0.0175 5062 0.7513 0.3413 0.0234
B14-5 0.0198 4271 0.7196 0.1317 0.0263 0.0175 5062 0.7513 0.3413 0.0234
B15-1 3×10−4 3811 N/A N/A 0.0282 0.0167 5267 N/A N/A 0.0209
B15-2 3×10−4 3811 N/A N/A 0.0282 0.0167 5267 N/A N/A 0.0209
B15-3 3×10−4 3811 0.9976 0.0417 0.0282 0.0167 5267 0.8778 0.3244 0.0209
B15-4 3×10−4 3811 0.9976 0.1518 0.0282 0.0167 5267 0.8778 0.1723 0.0209
B15-5 3×10−4 3811 0.9976 0.1518 0.0282 0.0167 5267 0.8778 0.1723 0.0209
B16-1 7×10−4 5738 N/A N/A 0.0291 0.00343 7588 N/A N/A 0.0284
B16-2 7×10−4 5738 N/A N/A 0.0291 0.00343 7588 N/A N/A 0.0284
B16-3 7×10−4 5738 N/A N/A 0.0291 0.00343 7588 N/A N/A 0.0284
B16-4 7×10−4 5738 0.9963 0.1826 0.0291 0.00343 7588 0.8069 0.5639 0.0284
B16-5 7×10−4 5738 0.9963 0.1207 0.0291 0.00343 7588 0.8069 0.482 0.0284
B17-1 0.0539 4001 N/A N/A 0.0301 0.0540 3743 N/A N/A 0.0252
B17-2 0.0539 4001 0.5207 0.3471 0.0301 0.0540 3743 0.5197 0.2603 0.0252
B17-3 0.0539 4001 0.5207 0.0228 0.0301 0.0540 3743 0.5197 0.0432 0.0252
B17-4 0.0539 4001 0.5207 0.0228 0.0301 0.0540 3743 0.5197 0.0432 0.0252
B17-5 0.0539 4001 0.5207 0.0228 0.0301 0.0540 3743 0.5197 0.0432 0.0252
B18-1 0.0935 3491 0.5785 0.9087 0.033 0.0360 3635 0.8378 0.9874 0.0192
B18-2 0.0935 3491 0.5785 0.9087 0.033 0.0360 3635 0.8378 0.9874 0.0192
B18-3 0.0935 3491 0.5785 0.9087 0.033 0.0360 3635 0.8378 0.9874 0.0192
B18-4 0.0935 3491 0.5785 0.9087 0.033 0.0360 3635 0.8378 0.9874 0.0192
B18-5 0.0935 3491 0.5785 0.9087 0.033 0.0360 3635 0.8378 0.9874 0.0192
B19-1 0.1117 2971 - - 0.0224 0.1457 3392 - - 0.0216
B19-2 0.1117 2971 - - 0.0224 0.1457 3392 - - 0.0216
B19-3 0.1117 2971 - - 0.0224 0.1457 3392 - - 0.0216
B19-4 0.1117 2971 - - 0.0224 0.1457 3392 - - 0.0216
B19-5 0.1117 2971 - - 0.0224 0.1457 3392 - - 0.0216
Table 5.23: Solutions for Problem Set B using the Takahashi-Matsuyama Steiner Tree
Heuristic & the Shortest Path Tree Heuristic
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Takahashi SPT
PST Rel. Error PST Rel. Error
Pr τT OT ητ ηO Sec τT OT ητ ηO Sec
C20-1 0.0213 4456 N/A N/A 0.0212 0.0198 4620 N/A N/A 0.0192
C20-2 0.0213 4456 0.8241 0.5115 0.0212 0.0198 4620 0.8366 0.5672 0.0192
C20-3 0.0213 4456 0.8241 0.1327 0.0212 0.0198 4620 0.8366 0.1744 0.0192
C20-4 0.0213 4456 0.8241 0.1327 0.0212 0.0198 4620 0.8366 0.1744 0.0192
C20-5 0.0213 4456 0.8241 0.1327 0.0212 0.0198 4620 0.8366 0.1744 0.0192
C30-1 0.0170 1758 N/A N/A 0.0164 0.0170 1758 N/A N/A 0.0116
C30-2 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0164 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0116
C30-3 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0164 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0116
C30-4 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0164 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0116
C30-5 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0164 0.0170 1758 0.8723 0.2131 0.0116
C40-1 0.00322 2280 N/A N/A 0.0178 0.00445 3002 N/A N/A 0.00978
C40-2 0.00322 2280 0.8686 0.1108 0.0178 0.00445 3002 0.8179 0.1708 0.00978
C40-3 0.00322 2280 0.8686 0.272 0.0178 0.00445 3002 0.8179 0.0415 0.00978
C40-4 0.00322 2280 0.8686 0.272 0.0178 0.00445 3002 0.8179 0.0415 0.00978
C40-5 0.00322 2280 0.8686 0.272 0.0178 0.00445 3002 0.8179 0.0415 0.00978
C50-1 0.00267 2224 N/A N/A 0.0171 0.00937 2564 N/A N/A 0.013
C50-2 0.00267 2224 0.7852 - 0.0171 0.00937 2564 0.2454 0.1529 0.013
C50-3 0.00267 2224 0.7852 - 0.0171 0.00937 2564 0.2454 0.1529 0.013
C50-4 0.00267 2224 0.7852 - 0.0171 0.00937 2564 0.2454 0.1529 0.013
C50-5 0.00267 2224 0.7852 - 0.0171 0.00937 2564 0.2454 0.1529 0.013
C60-1 0.0661 1630 - - 0.021 0.0661 1720 2×10−4 0.0552 0.0126
C60-2 0.0661 1630 - - 0.021 0.0661 1720 2×10−4 0.0552 0.0126
C60-3 0.0661 1630 - - 0.021 0.0661 1720 2×10−4 0.0552 0.0126
C60-4 0.0661 1630 - - 0.021 0.0661 1720 2×10−4 0.0552 0.0126
C60-5 0.0661 1630 - - 0.021 0.0661 1720 2×10−4 0.0552 0.0126
C70-1 0.00424 3222 N/A N/A 0.024 0.0131 2564 N/A N/A 0.0101
C70-2 0.00424 3222 0.8886 0.1353 0.024 0.0131 2564 0.6564 0.0965 0.0101
C70-3 0.00424 3222 0.8886 0.1353 0.024 0.0131 2564 0.6564 0.0965 0.0101
C70-4 0.00424 3222 0.8886 0.1353 0.024 0.0131 2564 0.6564 0.0965 0.0101
C70-5 0.00424 3222 0.8886 0.1353 0.024 0.0131 2564 0.6564 0.0965 0.0101
C80-1 0.0316 2253 0.7607 0.1483 0.0314 0.1319 1962 - - 0.0148
C80-2 0.0316 2253 0.7607 0.1483 0.0314 0.1319 1962 - - 0.0148
C80-3 0.0316 2253 0.7607 0.1483 0.0314 0.1319 1962 - - 0.0148
C80-4 0.0316 2253 0.7607 0.1483 0.0314 0.1319 1962 - - 0.0148
C80-5 0.0316 2253 0.7607 0.1483 0.0314 0.1319 1962 - - 0.0148
C90-1 0.0354 1282 - - 0.0291 0.0354 1282 - - 0.012
C90-2 0.0354 1282 - - 0.0291 0.0354 1282 - - 0.012
C90-3 0.0354 1282 - - 0.0291 0.0354 1282 - - 0.012
C90-4 0.0354 1282 - - 0.0291 0.0354 1282 - - 0.012
C90-5 0.0354 1282 - - 0.0291 0.0354 1282 - - 0.012
C100-1 3×10−4 2738 N/A N/A 0.0262 8×10−4 2968 N/A N/A 0.0137
C100-2 3×10−4 2738 0.9792 0.0214 0.0262 8×10−4 2968 0.9382 0.0608 0.0137
C100-3 3×10−4 2738 0.9792 0.0214 0.0262 8×10−4 2968 0.9382 0.0608 0.0137
C100-4 3×10−4 2738 0.9792 0.0806 0.0262 8×10−4 2968 0.9382 0.0034 0.0137
C100-5 3×10−4 2738 0.9792 0.0806 0.0262 8×10−4 2968 0.9382 0.0034 0.0137
Table 5.24: Solutions for Problem Set C using the Takahashi-Matsuyama Steiner Tree
Heuristic & the Shortest Path Tree Heuristic
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problems, the tabu search algorithms using the Takahashi-Matsuyama diversification finds
less optimal solutions or better solutions than the SPT diversification, but the latter results
in longer running times.
Although the tabu search algorithm is largely successful in finding optimal solutions
and has a significantly lower growth rate in the running time, there are some problems
in the experimentation that led to excessive running time. While these still outperform
what one would expect of the exhaustive search, these rare cases give impractical times
for real-world application. For these problems, and perhaps others too, there would be an
improvement in the running times if the PST enumeration could be eliminated from the
algorithm and replaced by a tabu search move selection heuristic that not only considers
the impact of the trust by applying the move to a PST, but also the change in overhead
value. This would result in the application of a move to a PST giving a new PST and
not a subgraph, upon which PSTs must be enumerated. While this and the penalty
functions require further investigation, it is clear that the tabu search methods proposed
provide good approximations where the optimal solutions are not found, and outperform
the running times of the exhaustive search.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Research Contributions
6.1.1 Trust Metric for PSTs
The application of trust in P2P networks has been proposed as a means to prevent selfish
and malicious behaviour by peers. Inspired by this work and the security issues that
aﬄict publish/subscribe systems, the primary research objective of this thesis was to
investigate the construction of PSTs with respect to the trust preferences of publishers
and subscribers, and the communication overhead costs. The premise for this is that a
PST constructed with respect to these properties will reduce the likelihood of attacks
against its participants, whilst ensuring that communication remains efficient.
Trust metrics in P2P networks define either local or global trust values of peers that
can be used to determine if an entity is sufficiently trustworthy for an interaction with
it to take place. This differs greatly to the trust metric required in this thesis, where it
defines the trustworthiness of a network structure. Defining the trustworthiness of a PST,
as a function of the trust held by the PST’s publisher and subscribers in each other, was
achieved by using social choice and welfare theory. After identifying the relationships in
the PST between publishers, internal subscribers and leaf subscribers, a trust metric was
defined that is based upon Rawls’ principles of justice through the use of the Leximin
social welfare functional. The trustworthiness of a PST is dominated by that of vertex
with the least trust in the PST and the trust held in a PST by a vertex is given by the
trustworthiness of the end-to-end communication paths between it and the other clients.
Given the proposed mechanism to determine the trustworthiness of a PST, a set of feasible
PSTs can be socially ordered with respect to the individuals’ trust functions.
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6.1.2 Inter-personal Incomparability of Trust
An important observation was made regarding the interpersonal incomparability of trust.
In the existing literature, trust is assumed to be interpersonal comparable, however, we
are argue that this is not the case. Regardless of the trust metric, ordinal or cardinal, two
individuals may differ in how they value the trustworthiness of some entity even if the trust
sources are identical, that is their trust functions used to evaluate the trustworthiness of
an entity may not be the same. This has important ramifications to much of the existing
work on computational trust, where it is assumed that individuals’ trust functions and
local trust values are comparable. As the proposed approach to devise the trustworthiness
of PSTs utilises the analytical leximin aggregation function, cardinal full comparability
of the individuals’ trust functions must hold true, however arguments against this are
presented. The strict assumptions made in this thesis in order to address this issue are
to assume that evaluation of the trust sources and the individuals’ trust functions are
identical. Although it is unrealistic to assume such homogeneity of publishers, routers,
and subscribers, it is no worse than not addressing the issue at all. Additionally, we
postulate that the individual trust evaluation functions may evolve to a state where they
are inter-personally comparable. If we assume the mechanism, that is the socially trusted
PST social welfare function (definition 41), described in this thesis to determine the most
trusted PST to be incentive-compatible, then the individuals’ trust functions (that is their
notions of trust) will evolve some common understanding, a Nash equilibrium.
6.1.3 The Maximum Trusted PST with Overhead Budget Problem
Having defined a trust metric for PSTs, the problem of finding the most trusted PST
within some overhead budget was shown to be NP-Complete. As expected, the exhaustive
search algorithm for this problem was shown to be unable to scale beyond small problem
sizes. Algorithms using the tabu search metaheuristic were devised and shown to scale
to problem sizes where |R| = 100 with good approximation solutions found and running
times that are comparable to the exhaustive search for much smaller problems.
In a real-world deployment, the proposed tabu search algorithms would be executed
at the publisher vertex. Algorithm execution could then take place in rounds, at regular
intervals or when change in the state of any of the inputs warrants the reconfiguration
of the PST. Subscribers would provide the required inputs such as trust information and
subscriptions to the algorithm publisher prior to a round, while the connectivity graph
could be maintained by the use of a gossip protocol.
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6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Monitoring
There are three components to P2P reputation management systems (Marti and Garcia-
Molina, 2006): information gathering; scoring and ranking; response. If the past behaviour
of nodes is to used as an input to individuals’ trust functions, and consequently the social
trust ordering of PSTs, then an information gathering stage is required. For P2P systems,
this is typically feedback pertaining to transactions between peers, however this alone is
not adequate for PSTs.
Consider a path in a PST, from a publisher to a terminal subscriber of length greater
than two. The terminal subscriber does not receive a notification from the publisher, and
as a consequence it may wish to reduce its trust of its parent node and the publisher’s child
node. This would be unfair on one of these nodes, as only one of them can be the culprit
responsible for dropping notification (if we exclude communication error as a cause). This
example assumes that terminal subscriber has a means to determine that it has missed
a notification, which given the nature of publish/subscribe, can not be the case unless it
verifies this to be true with the publisher or some other trusted subscriber. The space, time
and synchronisation decoupling that give rise to scalability of publish/subscribe systems
(Eugster et al., 2003) are attributes that inhibit determining the source of selfish and
malicious behaviour.
Clearly the monitoring of PSTs presents unique challenges, however for PSTs in mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs), existing work on the use of reputation in MANET routing
may prove to be a starting point for further research. CONFIDANT (Buchegger and Le
Boudec, 2004) is a reputation management system for mobile ad hoc network routing that
allows the routing protocol to determine trustworthy paths and reject route requests from
untrustworthy nodes. Monitoring is conducted by nodes in promiscuous mode, observing
the routing behaviour of others.
6.2.2 Improvements to the Tabu Search Algorithms
Although the tabu search algorithms provide good approximations of the optimal solutions
and have a faster running time than the exhaustive search algorithm, there are a number of
possible improvements that could be made. Spanning tree enumeration is used to find the
set of PSTs in the subgraph formed by applying a tabu move (the addition or removal of a
router) to the current PST solution. Char’s spanning tree enumeration algorithm (Char,
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1968) is used for this and has a running time of O(m + n + n(t + t0)), however Knuth
(Knuth, 2011) documents an algorithm by Malcolm Smith (Smith, 1997) that generates
spanning trees in gray code order (Gray, 1953) that has a running time of O(m+ n+ t).
Smith’s algorithm could provide a faster means to finding PSTs.
6.2.3 Self-organising Trusted PST Algorithm
Algorithms have been proposed for self-organising broker networks with respect to com-
munication cost (Jaeger et al., 2007) (Baldoni et al., 2007) (Migliavacca and Cugola,
2007), and for the PST structure considered in this work, the SHOPPARENT (Huang
and Garcia-Molina, 2003) and DSAPST (Cao and Shen, 2009) algorithms self-organise
the PST with respect to the overhead costs as given in equations 2.3 and 2.4.
When executed at the publisher, the tabu search algorithms require knowledge of the
connectivity graph, these subscriptions of the subscribers, the individual trust functions
of the subscribers and the inputs to these functions. As the number of subscribers and the
graph size increases, maintaining global state at the publisher increases in message and
state complexity at this node. The development of a distributed heuristic may present a
solution to this issue, however it is not clear how privacy of individuals’ trust relationships
could be preserved by the technique. A logical assumption of the distributed heuristic
would be that it must not leak trust information to other routers and subscribers, even if
they are trusted, as the information may reveal a loss in trust in them.
6.3 Closing Remarks
Publish/Subscribe has evolved a great deal from its precursor of group communication
systems, the latter originally introduced in the System V kernel for interprocess commu-
nication (Cheriton and Zwaenepoel, 1985). Subsequent research had led to developments
such as topic-based and content-based models, the use of decentralised event notification
services, and routing and matchmaking algorithm optimisations. In comparison, there is
significantly less research on security, which is at least in part due to the decoupled prop-
erties of publish/subscribe that are contradictory to the coupling that is required of most
security techniques. The proposed approaches described in chapter 2 are either purely
cryptographic-based or a form of role-based access-control, and while they address the
issues of trust and confidentiality to varying degrees, the approach presented in this work
has a number of advantages over them.
The trusted PST approach provides a greater degree of adaptability to the changing
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behaviour in the publish/subscribe system, and it is suitable for ad hoc publish/subscribe
applications, as the identities of entities need not be associated with roles and there is
no requirement for administrative entities to define access-control policies. Although the
monitoring system is beyond the scope of this work, its presence allows for PSTs to adapt
to changes in the behaviour of entities. As trust evaluations change with interactions
and over time, the PSTs can be reconstructed to eliminate selfish or malicious nodes.
The network structure evolves in response to the behaviour of its participants, something
that is not possible in the approaches evaluated in chapter 2. For example, in RBAC
systems, the reconfiguration of policies, and the revoking and reissuing of keys is required
to replicate this behaviour. No previously proposed approach allows for the clients of
a publish/subscribe system to be considered either trustworthy or untrustworthy given
their past behaviour and for their removal from the communication infrastructure given
this information.
In this work, a trust evaluation function based on social choice and welfare theory
has been proposed to define the trustworthiness of a PST, the problem to find the most
trustworthy PST within some overhead budget has been shown to be NP-complete, and
the tabu search metaheuristic has been shown to be effective at solving this problem. It
has been shown that individual trust can be used to construct network structures that are
socially trusted by its users, however consideration must be given to the inter-personal
comparability of the individuals’ trust functions.
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